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ABSTRACT
The Second World War had radically changed the focus of the BBC's overseas
operation from providing an imperial service in English only, to that of a global
broadcaster speaking to the world in over forty different languages. The end of that
conflict saw the BBC's External Services, as they became known, re-engineered for a
world at peace, but it was not long before splits in the international community caused
the postwar geopolitical landscape to shift, plunging the world into a cold war. At the
British government's insistence a re-calibration of the External Services' broadcasting
remit was undertaken, particularly in its broadcasts to Central and Eastern Europe, to
adapt its output to this new and emerging world order.
Broadcasting was seen at the time as an essential adjunct to Britain's non-shooting war
with the Soviet Union and a primary means of engaging with attitudes and opinion
behind the Iron Curtain. Funded by government Grant-in-Aid, but with its editorial
independence enshrined in the BBC's Charter, Licence and Agreement, this thesis
examines, in the context of the cold war, where the balance of power lay in relations
between Whitehall and the External Services. In doing so, it traces the evolution of
overseas broadcasting from Britain, alongside the political, diplomatic and fiscal
challenges facing it, up to the 1956 Hungarian uprising and Suez crisis. These were
defining experiences for the United Kingdom's international broadcaster that, as a
consequence, helped shape the future the External Services for the rest of the cold
war.
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INTRODUCTION
'The Overseas Services of the BBC provide one of the most effective instruments for use by this
country in maintaining the stability of the free world in the present struggle with Russian
Communism. This struggle, often called the "Cold War", seems likely to be long. It cannot be
won quickly, though it might quickly be lost.'
SSC Memorandum for the Committee on Colonial Information Policy, June 19501
On 1 January 1947 the third successive Charter of the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) came into effect. It was intended, by both the Corporation and the government
that its passing should mark not only the continuation of the BBC as the monopoly
broadcaster in the United Kingdom, but also denote the transition from the wartime
activities of its overseas services to the broadcasting requirements of peace." It was
with a sense of emerging out of the darkness of the previous 'six long, weary and
perilous years', as the BBC's Director-General William Haley put it in his VE Day
message to staff, that broadcasting was considered as having a continuing and vital
function to perform as 'the newest of the great instruments of peace'.'
Broadcasting overseas by the BBC had begun on 19 December 1932 with
transmissions in English to the Empire on shortwave, but it was not until January 1938
that broadcasting in foreign languages began with an Arabic Service which was soon
followed by Spanish and Portuguese programmes for Latin America. Transmissions to
Europe began later that year with German, Italian and French translations of Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain's speech on 27 September 1938 during the Munich crisis
1 The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London. CAB134/102, Committee on Colonial Information
Policy, CI(50)21, 'The Overseas Services of the BBC', Memorandum by the BBC, 19 June
1950.
2 William Haley, 'The Next Five Years in Broadcasting', BBC Yearbook 1948 (London: BBC,
1948), p.?
3 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III: The War of Words,
1939-1945 (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p.642.
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in a deliberate attempt to counter the reporting of international developments
emanating from Italian and German foreign-language radio stations. It was this
competitive impulse to ensure that those in other countries should be made aware of
the British interpretation of events that became a founding principle of vernacular
broadcasting and lay at the heart of the subsequent massive expansion of what would
become known as the BBC External Services, not just in Europe, but to all continents
during the Second World War. In this way, Britain's governing geopolitical concerns
and the intricacies of international diplomacy were dynamically and irrevocably knitted
with the existing purpose of the BBC's Empire Service which had been to transmit the
core values of the British way of life to the imperial outreaches and create a tangible
(as well as metaphorical) border-defying community of interests that was held together
by an imperceptible network of wavelengths with London at its heart."
By the end of 1943 the BBC was making programmes in 45 languages (not including
English) and at the end of the war broadcasts to Europe had already passed 50
transmission hours a day with the total hours broadcast by the External Services
outstripping that of domestic broadcasting." This explosion in the overseas activities of
the BBC during the war - the scope of its transmissions and the scale and multinational
character of its workforce - altered the broadcasting remit of the BBG to a point where
Haley was able to assert that in the ten years since the BBG started its previous
Charter in January 1937, 'the horizons of broadcasting [have] immeasurably widened.
The BBG's field is now the world'." This was indeed the case in 1947 by which time the
competitive dynamic that had originally spurred-on the development of the foreign-
language services in 1938/9 was echoed in the uncertain postwar international
4 For the prewar development of foreign language services see, Asa Briggs, The History of
Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume II: The Golden Age of Wireless, 1927-1939,
~Oxford: OUP, 1995), pp.342, 368-80.
Briggs, War of Words, p.18; 'Broadcasts to Europe', BBC Yearbook 1945, (London: BBe,
1945), p.109.
6 Haley, 'The Next Five Years' p.11.
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environment where the threat of a cold war was being defined not just in the minds of
policy makers and military planners but also in terms of a wider public perception. The
1946 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy argued that 'other Powers intend to continue
to use the broadcasting medium to put their point of view...and we cannot afford to let
the British viewpoint go by default'.' To this end the BBC was charged with the task of
ensuring that the voice of Britain remained a force overseas at a time of intense fiscal
uncertainty at home and high anxiety abroad, as postwar reconstruction gave way to a
recrudescence of deep geopolitical schisms that posed an ominous threat to the
recently achieved peace.
Nevertheless, despite the high profile postwar role assigned to what is now known as
the BBC World Service and public familiarity with it as an institution, the history of
overseas broadcasting by the Corporation is little known and perhaps even less
understood." Its services have yet to receive the kind of critical and detailed
examination that their role in the political, diplomatic and cultural lives of the United
Kingdom and those countries to which they broadcast would suggest they deserve. As
such, the home of overseas broadcasting from Britain, Bush House, remains a
relatively unexplained icon."
As Philip Taylor has argued, the academic community has generally failed to integrate
the media and other forms of cultural exchange into mainstream political and
administrative histories. He notes that 'The Cold War ... looks very different when
viewed through the films emanating from Hollywood and Peking or the broadcasts of
Radio Moscow and the Voice of America than it does from the diplomatic papers of the
7 Broadcasting Policy, Gmd.6852 (London: HMSO, July 1946), para.58.
a The SSG External Services were renamed SSG World Service in 1988.
9 Sush House was first occupied by the SSG European Services in January 1941. It was
another 16 years before the whole of the External Services' operation was located at Sush
House when the English language General Overseas Services moved there from 200 Oxford
Street in 1957.
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State Department and the Kremlin' .10 Similarly, Nicholas Cull has pointed out that
'Historians have been slow to pay serious attention to the details of the cultural
components of the Cold War,.11 Traditional conceptual as well as methodological
approaches have marginalised the study of international broadcasting to those
instances where it has a remarkable or notorious part to play in otherwise "legitimate"
historical narratives - for example, its use in support of resistance movements in
occupied territories in World War Two or in Britain's disastrous psychological warfare
campaign during the Suez crisis of 1956. More recently, however, as the cultural
dimension of international relations has become an increasingly popular focus of
scholarship, the beginnings of a synthesis are emerging that more clearly locates
broadcasting within a wider historical continuum that properly evinces the intimate
relationship between the traditional levers of diplomatic power and the more subtle, but
no less important, arts of what has been described by Joseph Nye as "soft" power."
Very little sense can be made of the wider significance of broadcasting overseas by the
BBC, however, without access to the necessary primary sources and it is here that
important developments in the last decade or so are starting to make their impact. First,
there is the BBC's own Written Archive Centre at Caversham in Berkshire, on the site
that houses the BBC Monitoring Service. Woefully underused in the past by outside
researchers it contains, in its policy and programme files, unique slices of twentieth
century life from Britain and around the world and is slowly gaining the reputation it
deserves as a place of serious academic research. More dramatic, though, has been
the trickle of releases concerning the government's information services and both overt
10 Philip Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945
~London: Routledge, 1997), p.4.
1 Nicholas Cull, 'Book Review of War of the Black Heavens: the battles of Western
broadcasting in the Cold War by Michael Nelson', Historical Journal of Film Radio and
Television, 20(1), 2000, pp.136.
12 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs,
2004). See also, Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international
relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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and covert publicity campaigns that has turned into a steady stream at The National
Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) since the 'Waldegrave Initiative", codified
in the Open Government White Paper of 1993 and then the 1994 Code of Practice on
Access to Government Information, gave an unprecedented degree of public access to
previously restricted classes of files."
More recently, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 has precipitated a further
loosening of governing attitudes in the practice of archival husbandry out of which there
is now a rich and as yet, relatively undigested, seam of source material on these
subjects. The cumulative effect has been to reveal the previously hidden depths of
possible research - the submerged topography of historical icebergs - and to
illuminate whole new structures now open to study. Above all, a far more nuanced
portrait of the public service ecology has emerged within which Bush House 'co-habits',
as Anthony Adamthwaite put it, with its paymasters in Whitehall and makes
accommodation with their strategic interests." These archival developments have
been reflected in recent scholarship and the knowledge gap concerning the BBC's
overseas operation is beginning to be closed, though only beginning to be.
The narrative template laid down by the BBC's first official historian, Asa Briggs - an
episodic institutional history of Bush House interspersed amongst several thousand
pages in his five volumes of The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom - has
become indicative of subsequent treatments of a subject that has taken second place
to the story of domestic broadcasting. His examination of overseas broadcasting only
becomes genuinely multi-dimensional in relation to the Second World War when the
BBC itself was engaged in a radio war, on many fronts, against Germany and the Axis
13 Open Government, Cm.2290 (London: HMSO, July 1993); Code of Practice on Access to
Government Information, (Cabinet Office, OPSS, April 1994).
14 Anthony Adamthwaite, 'Nation Shall Speak Peace Unto Nation: The BBC's response to
peace and defence issues, 1945-58', Contemporary Record, 7(3), 1993, p.557.
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powers and was, self-evidently, an integral and important part of the larger national war
effort. Nevertheless, Briggs' history is an invaluable resource and the first port of call
for anyone wishing to understand broadcasting abroad by the BBC and remains the
most complete continuous history of the External Services, albeit up to the mid-1970s.
That Briggs' general history of the BBC still stands out as the most authoritative text on
the subject of overseas broadcasting is symptomatic of both its genuine importance as
the first official draft of its history and the relative paucity of subsequent studies that
have attempted to engage in a debate about overseas broadcasting from Britain. More
often than not it has been practitioner-based exposition and memoir that has lifted the
curtain on the practices and principles of broadcasting to foreign countries. From
Tangye Lean's 1943 Voices in the Darkness to John Tusa's 1992 A World in Your Ear,
broadcasters have been alive to the opportunity provided by this kind of corporate self-
reflection to explain the development, purpose and techniques of international
broadcasting in their own terms." Likewise, those involved in managing overseas
communication strategy in Whitehall have helped flesh-out what is an otherwise
relatively unheralded element of government endeavour from policy-making, as in the
case of Charles Hill's Both Sides of the Hill, to practice, as laid out in Robert Marett's
Through the Back Door," In addition, and perhaps to be expected of an organisation
15 Edward Tangye Lean, Voices in the Darkness: The story of the European radio war (London:
Seeker & Warburg, 1943); John Tusa, A World in Your Ear: reflections on changes (London:
Broadside, 1992). See also, for example, George Urban, The Nineteen Days: a broadcaster's
account of the Hungarian Revolution (London: Heinemann, 1957); Harman Grisewood, One
Thing at a Time: an autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1968); Thomas Barman, Diplomatic
Correspondent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968); Hugh Carleton Greene, The Third Floor
Front: a view of broadcasting in the sixties (London: Bodley Head, 1969); Peter Johnson,
'Working as the BBC's German Service representative and news correspondent in West Berlin,
1965-1970', in Charmain Brinson & Richard Dove (eds.), "Stimme der Wahrheit": German-
language broadcasting by the BBC, Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian
Exile Studies, 5 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), pp.207-19.
16 Charles Hill, Both Sides ofthe Hill (London: Heinemann, 1964). Hill, later Baron Hill of Luton,
broadcast on the SBC during the Second World War as the 'Radio Doctor' and later served as
Postmaster-General and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with responsibility for information
services. He was subsequently Chairman of both the Independent Television Authority and the
SBC. Robert Marett, Through the Back Door: an inside view of Britain's Overseas Information
9
dedicated to the explanatory proposition, the BBG itself has provided regular, if rather
self-promotional, accounts of the means and impact of overseas broadcasting in its
various publications, broadcasts and lectures."
However, despite this running commentary, both as continuous assessment and
retrospective insight, there have, until recently, been relatively few attempts to shed a
genuinely historical light on the subject of Bush House. The clearest exception to this is
the book by a former Managing Director of External Broadcasting, Gerard Mansell's Let
Truth Be Told which, despite the obvious sympathies indicated in the title, successfully
combines the sensitivities and intuition of the insider with evidence-based research and
contains possibly the best evocation of broadcasting to Europe by the BBG during the
Second World War in a single volume." Similarly, the journalist Peter Partner, a
frequent contributor in the past to the External Services, has written a concise and well
researched chronological history of the BBG's Arabic Service from its origins in the
prewar scramble for influence in North Africa to the end of the 1980s.19 It is interesting
to note that there has been an equivalent tendency in the United States for histories of
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to be authored from the inside,
although the discreet bias evident in British renditions stands in contrast to often
uncritical and at times triumphalist US practitioner histories."
Services (London: Pergamon, 1968). See also, Christopher Mayhew, A War of Words: a Cold
War witness (London: IS Taurus, 1998).
17 See, for example, Martin Esslin, 'The Listener in Occupied Europe and Sehind the Iron
Curtain', London Calling, 10 December 1953; Ian Jacob, 'The SSC as a national and
international force', address to the 8th Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Relations, 18
May 1957; J.S. Clark, 'The SSC's External Services', International Affairs, 35(2), 1959, pp.170-
180; Maurice Latey, 'Sroadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe', BBC Lunchtime Lectures
:fd Series (London: SSC, 1964); SSC External Services Publicity Unit, Voice for the World: 50
years of broadcasting to the world, 1932-1982 (London: SSC, 1982).
18 Gerard Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 years of BBC external broadcasting (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982).
19 Peter Partner, Arab Voices: The BBC Arabic Service, 1938-1988, (London: SSC, 1988).
20 See, for example, Arch PUddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000); Sig Mickelson,
America's other voice: the story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger,
1983); Robert Pirsein, The Voice of America: an history of the international broadcasting
activities ofthe United States government, 1940-1962 (New York: Arno Press, 1979). The best
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These first and second generation histories have, more recently, been overtaken by a
revitalised appetite for researching the BBC World Service that is directly linked to the
increasing quantity and quality of primary source material available. Not only does this
growing resource assist in looking behind and beyond earlier analyses, but perhaps
most significantly, it makes it increasingly possible to weave together a number of
research areas that were previously dislocated from each other, into a coherent,
though far from complete, narrative tapestry. This can perhaps most clearly be seen in
the study of the government's overseas information services. It is now possible to
examine in some considerable detail what John Black described as Britain's
'propaganda instrument', the Whitehall machinery supporting it, and the place it
occupied in wider government policy." A prime example of this is the declassification
from 1995 of files relating to the Foreign Office's infamous covert propaganda unit, the
Information Research Department (IRD). Created in 1948 it was tasked with producing
anti-communist information for onward dissemination by British missions abroad and
other channels communication, both formal and informal, including the BBC External
Services. Since its closure in 1977 by the then Foreign Secretary, David Owen, its
activities have been the source of intense speculation.
Early accounts of its work were severely hampered by the lack of access to the official
record, relying instead on piecing together the memories of former insiders and the
fragmentary evidence found in other classes of files.22 However, the release of IRD's
exception to this rule is Alan Heil, Voice of America: a history (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2003).
21 John Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument: the British experience (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).
22 See, for example, Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research
Department, 1947-77', Millenium, 9(1), 1980, pp.67-83; Richard Fletcher, 'British Propaganda
since World War Two - A Case Study', Media, Culture and Society, 4(2), 1982, pp.97-109;
Scott Lucas and C.J. Morris, 'A very British crusade: the Information Research Department and
the beginning of the Cold War', in Richard Aldrich (ed.) British Intelligence, Strategy and the
Cold War, 1945-51 (London: Routledge. 1992). pp.85-110.
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files,23 in chronological tranches, since 1995 has generated a second round of analysis
as demonstrated in Hugh Wilford's 1998 article which sought to reveal 'Britain's secret
Cold War weapon' .24 These files, in combination with those of the Foreign Office's less
notorious, but just as illuminating, Information Policy Department (IPD), have provided
an archival spinal column that has precipitated the unearthing of the wider Whitehall
architecture of anti-communist and propaganda activities from Cabinet Committee to
covert operations." This has been reflected in a growing, though still limited, literature
on the early history of Britain's machinery of persuasion, propaganda and political
warfare after the Second World War as these new sources are digested and processed
into scholarly output. Most recently this has resulted in Andrew Defty's detailed and
earnest examination of IRD's early years in the context of Anglo-American cold war
strategy, James Vaughan's excellent analysis of the failure of UK and US postwar
propaganda in the Middle East, and John Jenks' instructive though limited take on
British propaganda in the cold war."
23 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, IRD: origins and establishment of the
Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946-48, Library and Records Department
~London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1995).
4 Hugh Wilford, 'The Information Research Department: Britain's secret Cold War weapon
revealed', Review of International Studies, 24(3), 1998, pp.353-369. In contrast to this well
documented article, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver's book, Britain's Secret Propaganda War,
also published in 1998, fails to take advantage of the archival releases and raises as many
questions as it sought to answer in this rather sensationalist treatment of IRD. Paul Lashmar
and James Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War, 1948-1977 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing,
1998).
25 Files relating to the postwar activities of the Intelligence Agencies remain closed, however.
26 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The Information
Research Department (London: Routledge, 2004); James Vaughan, The Failure of American
and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); John Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in
the Cold War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). See also, Gary Rawnsley (ed.),
Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Tony Shaw, 'The
Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950-
1953', Journal of Contemporary History, 34(2), 1999, pp.263-281; James Vaughan,
'Propaganda by Proxy? Britain, America and Arab radio broadcasting, 1953-1957', Historical
Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 22(2), 2002, pp.157-172; Andrew Detty, "Close and
Continuous Liaison': British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United
States, 1950-51', Intelligence and National Security, 17(4), 2002, pp.100-130; Richard Aldrich,
'Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert
Information Warfare', Intelligence and National Security, 18(2), 2003, pp.109-133; James
Vaughan, "Cloak Without Dagger': How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's
Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-1956', Cold War History, 4(3), 2004, pp.56-84; James
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What these works clearly demonstrate is the importance of the BBC's External
Services (as part of the government's overseas information services, funded by the
Foreign Office) in terms of what would now be described as Britain's public diplomacy
ettort." With the machinery of government as their primary focus, however, they fail to
illuminate in any sustained way the internal workings of Bush House. There are,
however, a few studies that have attempted to synthesise analyses of overseas
broadcasting with government policy. Unfortunately, the most recent and successful of
these are now over a decade old, thereby missing most of this recent evidence.
Nevertheless, as with Tony Shaw's revisionist history of broadcasting during the Suez
crisis (ostensibly in relation to domestic coverage), they are required reading for
anyone attempting to understand the intricacies of the relationship between the
government and the BBC: in Shaw's case, the power of government to unduly
influence the output of the BBC in its favour." Likewise, Gary Rawnsley's comparative
case studies of overseas broadcasting by the BBC and Voice of America (VOA) in
relation to the Hungarian uprising, the Suez crisis and the Cuban missile crisis are
detailed and, on the evidence then available, well-judged assessments of the realities
of cold war broadcasting in these contexts."
Vaughan, "A Certain Idea of Britain': British Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1945-57',
Contemporary British History, 19(2), 2005, pp.151-168.
27 The BBC World Service is currently part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 'Public
Diplomacy' funded programme and the Director of the BBC World Service sits (as an observer)
on the department's Public Diplomacy Board which aims to 'inform and engage individuals and
organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United
Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals'. Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, 'Public Diplomacy Board: Terms of Reference', Public Diplomacy Group,
April 2006.
28 Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez and the mass media: propaganda and persuasion during the Suez
crisis (London: IB Taurus, 1996). See also, Tony Shaw, 'Government manipulation of the press
during the 1956 Suez crisis', Contemporary Record, 8, 1994, pp.274-288; Tony Shaw, 'Eden
and the BBC during the Suez crisis: A myth re-examined', Twentieth Century British History,
6(3), 1995, pp.320-343; Tony Shaw, 'Cadogan's last fling: Sir Alexander Cadogan, Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the BBC', Contemporary British History, 13(2), 1999, pp.126-145.
29 Gary Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: the BBC and VOA in international
politics, 1956-64 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). See also, Gary Rawnsley, 'Cold War Radio in
Crisis: The BBC Overseas Services, the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Uprising', Historical
Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 16(2), 1996, pp.197-219; Gary Rawnsley, 'Overt and
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What both these otherwise excellent books lack, however, is a sense of the wider
context of Bush House's editorial and institutional response to the cold war, its
translation into practice and the concurrent development of postwar relations with the
government in general and the Foreign Office in particular. In this regard, Michael
Nelson's comparative history of the Western broadcasters (in particular, BBC, Voice of
America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty) in War of the Black Heavens is the
only recent attempt to narrate this larger picture of cold war broadcastinq." However,
despite the importance of the genuine insights it provides on the basis of broad
research, it is limited by the very scale of the task at hand and, consequently, is better
at highlighting the signifying moments and trends in the cold war history of the BBC
than providing a detailed examination of how they were negotiated. The story of how
the BBC's External Services came to terms with the cold war and the tone, over time,
of its fundamental relationship with Whitehall and the government is one that has, so
far, only been partially told.
Covering the first decade in which the BBC re-took editorial control of all its overseas
services, in English and foreign languages, it will be argued that only an appreciation of
the development of this central governing relationship can provide a properly nuanced
understanding of the wider context of the External Services' history. Accordingly, this
thesis aims to illuminate the domestic life of international broadcasting from Britain as a
means of examining the unique overseas activities of the BBC. In doing so, this study
will seek to inform and update previous research while also mapping out new analyses
of the Corporation's engagement with the cold war. This has been made possible not
just by the greater public access to the official record and the consequent knock on
Covert: the Voice of Britain and black radio broadcasting in the Suez crisis, 1956', Intelligence
and National Security, 11, 1996, pp.497-522.
30 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: the battles of Western broadcasting in the Cold
War (London: Brassey's, 1997).
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effect at other public and private archives, but also as a result of the unrestricted
access given by the BBC to the author, during the course of research for this thesis, to
its own files at Caversham.
The reconstruction of overseas broadcasting after the Second World War and the way
in which the BBC subsequently set about translating the cold war experience for
audiences abroad, at the behest of Whitehall, provides the central focus of this thesis.
By the end of the 1940s the External Services were once again engaged in a daily
sound war, this time with the Soviet bloc, and Bush House found itself on the frontline
of a new geopolitical battle that saw overseas broadcasting as a primary means of
communication with strategically important communities around the world, particularly
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. As such, the BBC's role in the
early cold war and the tone of its broadcasts across the Iron Curtain was the outcome
of continuous, complex and often difficult negotiations with the British government set
against the broadcast experience and in-house editorial assessments of the
Corporation, all played out in a highly charged and volatile international environment.
This thesis will investigate the dynamics of this interface and map the course of
governmenUCorporation relations as a way of exploring the establishment of
broadcasting principles that defined the cold war task of the BBC's External Services.
The foreign language services of the BBC had been born into a world on the brink of
war. As a consequence, their astonishing growth and development in the proceeding
years was made subject - at the acquiescence of the Corporation - to the
requirements of total war as directed by central government. By 1945, the scope,
nature and purpose of the vast range of overseas services provided by the BBC was
determined by wartime needs and regulated by wartime concerns. Peace, however,
brought with it new considerations. Taking this moment of transition as its starting
point, the thesis will investigate the re-imagining of the BBC's External Services - as
15
they became known in 1949 following the amalgamation into one unified structure of
European and Overseas Divisions in 1947 - as both the government and the BBC
began to consider the shape of broadcasting after the war.
This need to rethink the purpose of overseas broadcasting forms the focus of the first
part of the thesis. The Second World War had demonstrated the influence and
importance of broadcasting abroad, both in its own right and as an adjunct to wider
government strategies. It had also shown, in contrast with the German propaganda
instrument, the value of building credibility with audiences through, as far as
circumstances allowed, objective and truthful reporting. It had, however, become a very
large and expensive operation which posed tricky questions about its ongoing financial
and editorial management. Indeed, such was its perceived importance to Britain's
postwar diplomatic effort that there were serious questions over whether an
independently-minded BBC was the right home for these services.
These considerations, which are examined in Chapter One, found expression in the
process of planning that started in 1944 with the establishment of a War Cabinet
Broadcasting Committee which led, three years later, to a new Charter for the BBC
incorporating all its overseas activities. This settlement was intended to mark out a new
era in broadcasting for the SSC: a return to normality for the domestic services and the
institution of a permanent peacetime arrangement for overseas broadcasting. Chapter
Two subsequently looks at the practical context in which relations between Bush
House and Whitehall were conducted in pursuit of a negotiated interpretation of their
respective responsibilities under the Charter. However, little time would be found for
equilibrium and Chapter Three explores the preparations set in train as a new threat
emerged on the international horizon and the world steered away from the devastation
of hot war into the icy, and no less dangerous, waters of the cold war.
16
The second part of the thesis will examine the institutional and editorial responses, at
the BBC and within government, to these new strategic conditions. Of course, the cold
war was not the only issue that concerned the External Services as they broadcast
across the globe, but it did provide a uniquely common theme against which they would
have to define themselves - the negative setting from which the positive projection of
British values would be broadcast. And as it became clear to all but the most optimistic
that the cold war would be a protracted battle, the institutional gearing of sensibilities as
well as of practice towards it that took place within the External Services from the
beginning of 1948 were to have an enduring effect on their output until the collapse of
communism in Europe 40 years later.
As the then Director of External Broadcasting, Sir Ian Jacob, had been quick to
perceive, broadcasting was a 'long-term weapon' ideally matched for such an arms-
length conflict. But defining the voice of Britain and establishing its multi-faceted tone
for the politically as well as culturally varied ears of the BBC's many audiences around
the world made for, as will be seen, a very considerable challenge. This was
particularly so in the case of Europe, the first front-line of the cold war, which the BBC
considered 'as the most important target' and to whom nearly half its foreign language
services were beamed." The decision of the British Cabinet in January 1948 to embark
on an anti-communist publicity policy consequently put the year-old Charter settlement
(editorial independence for overseas broadcasting, financed by the Foreign Office
through Grant-in-Aid) to its first great test." Accordingly, Chapters Four and Five detail
the External Services' response to the multiple editorial and technical challenges of
broadcasting through the Iron Curtain to Central and Eastern Europe and Soviet
attempts to neutralise these efforts. As a part of the government's Information Services,
would the BBC be required to fall-in with the wider communications strategy of an all-
31 TNA, CAB134/1 02, CI(50)26, Working Party for the Colonial Information Policy Committee, 11
July 1950.
32 TNA, CAB128/12, CM(48)2(5), 'Foreign Policy In Europe', 8 January 1948.
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out attack on Russia and the Soviet system? And if so, how would the External
Services set about finding a voice to match this new reality?
What ensued was an acute phase of re-engineering of External Services output in
response to prevailing geopolitical conditions which brought into sharp focus the
essential principles of cold war broadcasting. It also marked out those areas of conflict
and disagreement that would underscore future relations between Bush House and the
government and which were to become such an important part of the creative tension
between them. Central amongst these were arguments linking governance and
strategic orientation with finance that have continually looped through the history of the
BBC's overseas services. In the decade or so after the Second World War they
indelibly left their mark not just on the state of relations between the two, but directly on
output in terms of the range of services provided and the ability of the External
Services to function as a independent and global broadcaster. This dimension of
international broadcasting from Britain is explored in the course of Chapters Six and
Seven in the third part of this thesis which links these debates to the collective picture
of cold war broadcasting. In that period of postwar austerity, it is hard to comprehend
the challenges facing the External Services without understanding the budgetary
pressures on them and the political imperatives attending them.
These unresolved and fractious economic arguments which ran through the 1950s
were subsequently to play their part in what would become a period of intense activity
for the External Services as they came to terms not only with major international
developments, but conflict on the home front with the British government. Events in
Central and Eastern Europe in the middle of that decade raised concerns about the
efficacy of international broadcasting and the lengths to which outside broadcasters
should and could interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. As will be seen in
Chapter Eight, the protracted jostling for position and political infighting within the
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Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin in 1953 prompted a re-evaluation of
broadcasts to Russia and the future of the BBC's relations with audiences and the
Soviet authorities. The convulsions within the Soviet system accompanying the rise of
Khrushchev, reaching their peak in 1956, will then be examined in Chapter Nine as
international broadcasting took on the mantle of diplomatic interlocutor and active
participant in the Hungarian revolution. Meanwhile, as Chapter Ten explores, in the
Middle East in 1956 the Suez crisis stretched the BBC's credibility with audiences to
near breaking point as it sought to reconcile political and public division and dissent at
home with the projection of Britain abroad. As such, the fourth part of this thesis will
attempt to place these events in the context of the simultaneous disintegration of
relations between the External Services and Whitehall as the government's attitude
towards overseas broadcasting rapidly transformed from one of general dissatisfaction
to outright hostility.
It will be argued that the tone of the relationship between Whitehall and the BBC's
External Services, how they learnt to speak to each other after the Second World War,
was instrumental in defining the task of overseas broadcasting from Britain during the
cold war and in establishing the voices with which the BBC spoke to its many
audiences around the world. As an ongoing conversation, its tone was continually
modulated to reflect the political, cultural, economic and practical dynamics bearing
down on it. By examining the ecology of this central relationship, from its postwar
planning stages in 1944-45 to its nadir during the Suez crisis, it is intended to provide
an assessment of the BBC External Services through a cycle of experience that
defined principles and practice of overseas broadcasting which have subsequently
become a part of the operating DNA of the BBC.
19
I. RETHINKING BROADCASTING
'Broadcasting is the newest of the greatest instruments of peace which can also be used
to wage war; and at home, overseas and in the enemy and enemy-held countries we
have used it as well, as efficiently, and as vigorously as each one of us knew how.
Tomorrow we must turn that same energy to the problems of peace.'
VE Day message from the Director-General of the SSG, William Haley, 8 May 194533
1. CHARTER RENEWAL AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACE
On 12 October 1943, William Haley's predecessor as Director-General, Robert Foot,
informed the Corporation's Governors that he was 'now engaged in clearing my own
mind, with the help of the DDG [Deputy Director-General] and the Controllers, with
regard to the problems which will face us in the future and to their possible solution'."
What he proposed was a comprehensive review of the Corporation, its purpose and the
activities of all its services in the postwar world. At around the same time, ministers had
been asked by the Prime Minister to supply policy recommendations for a postwar
transition period of up to two years. Amongst these, Brendan Bracken, the Minister of
Information, suggested a small committee to advise the government on 'its attitude
towards the future of radio broadcasting in this country', while the Deputy Prime
Minister, Clement Attlee, thought that the BBC needed to be looked at in a wider
context that examined 'international as well as domestic issues'." Consequently, on 27
January 1944, the War Cabinet established a Ministerial Committee chaired by the
newly appointed Minister of Reconstruction, Lord Woolton, to 'enquire into future
33 Asa Briggs, War of Words (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p.642.
34 BBC Written Archive Centre (WAC), Caversham, Berkshire, R1/79/2, G64, Note by Foot, 12
October 1943.
35 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume IV: Sound and Vision
(Oxford: OUP, 1995), pp.30.
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broadcasting policy'." This Committee, therefore, provided the central Whitehall forum
in which the search for the principles with which to govern post-war broadcasting
beqan."
Foot's review, co-written with Haley (previously editor the Manchester Evening News),
who had been appointed to the new post of Editor-in-Chief in August 1943, defined in
broad terms the desired administrative and structural re-organisation of the SSC's
output and envisaged that after the war the SSC would produce 'five programmes,
three in this country... , one European, and one Overseas Group comprising all the rest
of the world excluding Europe' which, crucially, would all be paid for out of an increased
licence fee. Specifically in terms of the External Services the review recommended
'that it will be necessary to maintain these two separate services at any rate until the
time comes when what we know as our European Division becomes an integral part of
the SSC, free from the direct control of the PWE.,,38 The PWE, or Political Warfare
Executive, had come into being in early 1942 as part of the government's
reorganisation of its information machinery and was designed to direct and co-ordinate
propaganda activities during the war." In this context what the review puts into
perspective was the extent to which the European Services of the SSC had, for
operational reasons, come under governmental control during the war. This was true
not just in the shape of PWE which even had offices in Bush House for the purpose of
very close liaison and the issuing of directives, but also in the prior appointment in
February 1941 of the Foreign Office official (and, later, its Permanent Secretary), Ivone
36 TNA, CAB76/16, CP(45)293, 'Broadcasting Policy: Report by the Lord President of the
Council, The Minister of Information, the Postmaster-General and the Minister of State', 20
November 1945.
37 The original members of the committee were: Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction
(Chair); Clement Attlee, Lord President of the Council; Brendan Bracken, Minister if Information;
Harry Crookshank, Postmaster-General; and a representative of the Foreign Office.
38 WAC, R1/80/1, G15, Untitled Report on the Reorganisation of the BBC, Robert Foot and
William Haley, 14 February 1944. PWE's sponsoring Departments were the Foreign Office
~~olicy) and the Ministry of Information (administration).
For the story of the creation and development of PWE see, David Garnett, The Secret History
of PWE: the Political Warfare Executive 1939-1945 (London: St Ermin's Press, 2002).
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Kirkpatrick to the position of Controller of European Services. Foot and Haley's
segregation of the European Division from the rest of the BBC's activities define the
corporate psychology towards this branch of the organisation that, since its foundation
(a definable European Service having emerged only in August 1939) had never been
able to establish itself independent of the wartime context."
The overriding message of the review, however, was that despite the Corporation's
intentions, it would have to wait for the conclusions of the government's Broadcasting
Committee before firm plans could be made. This committee in turn accepted the
continued value of broadcasting across the world in English, as the BBC Yearbook
later put it, 'for all those who think of the United Kingdom as home, wherever they may
be'." On the more complex issue of foreign language broadcasting there was little
dissent amongst Ministers from Bracken's view that the 'broadcast voice of Britain has
become a great influence in Europe,' and that 'the Government will wish to have the
BBC's services to foreign countries continued after the war'." Still, it was taken as
axiomatic that 'the Government would have to exercise a much greater degree of
control over overseas broadcasting than over home broadcasting' ,43
After a meeting with the Broadcasting Committee in October 1944 Haley, who had
succeeded Foot five months earlier, and Sir Allan Powell the Chairman of the Board of
Governors, Sir Allan Powell, were invited to submit a paper on Broadcasting to Europe
_ the key to the wider shape and overall future design of the External Services - which
was itself informed by the government's own timetable for change in the move from war
to peace. The 'first transitional period,' Haley noted, 'will come to an end with final
defeat of Germany'. The second, 'when BBC broadcasting to a Europe nominally at
40 Briggs, The War of Words, p.161.
41 'General Overseas Service', BBC Yearbook 1947, (London: BBC, 1947), p.96.
42 TNA, CAB76/16, B(44)7, 'The Future of Broadcasting', 12 July 1944.
43 Ibid., B(44) 1st Meeting, 15 May 1944.
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peace would serve the ends of SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force] and of the British Government,' would last for one year. After this the third
period would see 'the Government. ..divest themselves of their present control over
[the] European Division and return all responsibility for its activities to the BBC.,44
In thinking his paper through, Haley, with the assistance of 'a small divisional
committee' that included the new head of the European Services, Harman Grisewood,
tried to imagine what the postwar requirements of a liberated Europe would be. He
concluded that in peacetime the nature of the audience would radically change: 'Once
the dark silence of Hitler's five year blackout of news has been lifted there will not be
the same overwhelming need for the clerk and the peasant in Europe to listen to the
BBC.'45 This expectation was counter to the BBC's wartime experience of broadcasting
for mass consumption, but Haley believed that with the inevitable development of
indigenous broadcasters on the continent the Corporation could not expect to maintain
its audience. Therefore, BBC broadcasts should be aimed at 'a much more restricted
circle; newspapers, publicists, [and] men...who take an interest in international politics':
in effect, the decision-makers, opinion-formers and educated classes in liberated
Europe." In pursuit of this Haley proposed that the number of services should be
reduced to the 'great European languages' of French, German, Spanish, or Swedish, at
least one of which this elite target audience could be expected to speak." There
remained, though, the question of content. Here the consensus on the Broadcasting
Committee was aligned to the broad principle voiced by Haley that 'The most we
should seek to do is to make available British news, British culture, and a projection of
life to those who wish to make acquaintance with thern.:"
44 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 'Broadcasting to Europe', 12 October 1944
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. This was later amended to just English, French and German.
48 Ibid. For comparison see, TNA, CAB76/16, B(44)7, 'The Future of Broadcasting', 12 July
1944.
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As a consequence, and with little conception of the challenges to come, when the
ministerial committee met to discuss 'broadcasting to foreign countries' on 24 April
1945 it was generally agreed that this should be reduced to a 'comparatively small
scale' .49 However, the dissolution of the Coalition Government following the end of the
war in Europe meant the Committee was unable to complete its deliberations and
produce a final report. It was left to the new Labour Government and the Lord
President of the Council, Herbert Morrison, to finish the job. This he did under the
auspices of a new ad hoc Cabinet Committee known as GEN 81, consisting of himself,
the Minister of Information, E. J. Williams, the Postmaster-General, the Earl of ListoweI
and, Philip Noel-Baker, a Minister of State at the Foreign Office. It met three times and
it considered the previous administration's draft report and associated unresolved
issues, before delivering to the Cabinet a final Report on Broadcasting Policy. But
before getting to this, it is worth noting a significant change in the perception of what
the future scope of the overseas services would be after the transitional phases.
Haley's paper of October 1944 had placed the European Service, which he planned to
reduce from a wartime peak of 50 broadcasting hours a day (across all services) to a
peacetime level of nine hours, within an overseas framework that also encompassed
broadcasting in English overseas, a Latin-American Service and an Arabic Service."
However, there was a noticeable change in Haley's rhetoric, particularly after a meeting
with the Lord President at the beginning of October 1945, which accorded with the
slightly different vision expounded in the Report on Broadcasting Policy. In November,
and by this time aware of the content of the report, Haley told the annual General
Liaison Meeting of the BBC, off the record, that,
49 TNA, CAB76/16, B(45)3rd Meeting, Broadcasting Committee, 24 April 1944.
50 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 12 October 1944.
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'he had come to the conclusion, and the Government had agreed with him, that
it would be far more sensible to build the Overseas Division service by service,
from the bottom up; instead of making a global picture first and fitting in the
services, as a result of which the Division would probably be either over-sized
or inadequate.:"
This was an inversion of his earlier argument which had essentially advocated
imposing a new structure on, in particular, the European Services. Now, it would
appear, he was supporting a more pragmatic and piecemeal approach to the eventual
shape of overseas broadcasting that would start with what already existed and rest on
a much more flexible set of requirements that would reflect the contemporary status of
broadcasting policy and audience needs. This, of course, was much more in keeping
with the postwar reality of broadcasting that found, most especially in Europe, 'strong
evidence that the European Service retains a surprisingly large audience and that our
friends on the Continent are most anxious that it should continue.' Therefore, while
there was an overall reduction in output after the war, the change was to be found in
the volume of transmissions and not in the number of services, with editorial policy
transformed to one representing British views and character with the 'reputation for
telling the truth even when it hurts' through its news reporting which formed 'the kernel
of all broadcasting for overseas reception'."
GEN 81's Report was discussed and approved by the Cabinet on 17 and 20 December
1945.53 It was not, though, the final resolution of the review process that had formally
begun nearly two years earlier. There was still the need to embed those points agreed
(and deal with those that had been deferred) in the new Licence and Charter that would
become effective from 1 January 1947. And, whereas there had been comparatively
51 WAC, R34/408/2, Note of General Liaison Meeting held in the Council Chamber,
Broadcasting House, 23rd November, 1945.
52 TNA, CAB76/16, CP(45)293, 20 November 1945.
53 TNA, CAB128/2, CM(45)64(1), 'Broadcasting; Future Policy', 20 December 1945.
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little interest at Westminster in the future of broadcasting up to that point, this was
about to change. Subsequent to the announcement of the Prime Minister, Clement
Attlee, in the House of Commons that an independent enquiry into the future of the
SSC would not be taking place, the party political as well as the private and commercial
prewar interests of MP's recrudesced after six years of neglect to enforce a desire for a
belated re-examination of the SSC's broadcasting brief.54
Accordingly, just as the White Paper on Broadcasting Policy was being prepared for
publication, senior Conservative figures convinced Churchill to table a motion in the
Commons, on 20 June 1946, demanding that the issues involved in Charter renewal
should be considered by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses. This was matched
in the House of Lords by a call for an independent enquiry along the lines of the
Ullswater Committee of 1936 by the Conservative peer, Lord Brabazon. Following
intervention by the Postmaster-General, Lord Srabazon removed his motion, but there
was greater difficulty in dealing with Churchill's which had attracted two hundred and
eleven signatures in support." The government was now on the defensive and in the
face of this new pressure, hastily reconsidered the issue on 27 June where it was
thought too late for any enquiry to report before the new Charter would have to be
signed in December. Nevertheless, the scale of the opposition did engender a
willingness for compromise and accordingly, the Cabinet subsequently 'Agreed that the
BSC Charter should be renewed for a period of five years from the 1st January, 1947,'
instead of ten, and that 'the Government would consider the possibility of instituting
such an enquiry before the end of that period of five years'. 56
Despite this late concession, the White Paper represented the constitutional settlement
with regard to broadcasting that would be enacted in the new Charter, Licence and
54 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vo1.419, co1.953, 19 February 1946.
55 Ibid., vo1.425, col.1 063, 16 July 1946.
56 TNA, CAB128/5, CM(46)62(5), 'Broadcasting', 27 June 1946.
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Agreement. However, what was particularly interesting about the White Paper as a
whole was that it defined the broadcasting activities of the BBC and the principles
gUiding them in such broad of terms. Its function and the subsequent function of the
Charter was clearly not to determine detail but to provide parameters within which an
understanding of the purpose of broadcasting and the requirements made of it could be
found between agreed positions.
In order to make sense of this arrangement, Haley, at the end of October 1946, wrote a
paper for the Governors entitled 'The Principles and Purpose of the BBC's External
Services' which represents a key moment, as the BBC looked over the precipice of
Charter renewal and imagined its role abroad in the future. At the heart of its activities
was news and here the White Paper had laid down that the 'treatment of an item in an
Overseas news bulletin must not differ in any material respect from its treatment in a
current news bulletin for domestic listeners'." Beyond this core function, Haley's paper
gave voice to a central article of faith for the Corporation that had been learnt through
the tough experience of the war years: 'it is not a function of the BBC's external
services to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other nation. The services do not
exist to throw out Governments or to change regimes.' To this he added a note of
caution for both the BBC and Whitehall: 'This may seem a platitude but the position has
been challenged from time to tirne.?"
Beyond these basic principles of broadcasting for peace, another major area that
needed negotiating was the nature of the formal institutional relationship between the
government and the BBC. During the war this had been the business of the
Postmaster-General, the Minister of Information and PWE covering technical, broad
policy and operationally sensitive issues. In August 1944 the War Cabinet's Machinery
57 Broadcasting Policy, Cmd.6852, HMSO, July 1946, para.59.
58 WAC, R1/82/3, G68, 'The Principles and Purpose of the SSC's External Services', 30 October
1946.
27
of Government Committee recommended that at the end of the war with Japan the
Ministry of Information should be dismantled which was confirmed by the Labour
Cabinet in December 1945 after consideration in the GEN 85 Committee. However, it
was thought 'essential to retain some effective central organisation to handle
Government publicity' which resulted in the establishment of a new organisational
entity, the Government Information Services (GIS) that would co-ordinate the activities
of the newly minted Central Office of Information, the British Council, the Information
Departments of concerned ministries, such as the Foreign and Colonial Offices,
Information Officers at overseas Embassies, other official and non-official bodies, and
the BBC.59 This would then define the 'broad outlines to be followed by official publicity
[that] will in future be agreed inter-departmentally through the Ministerial and Official
Committees. ,60
Ministerial responsibility for the Corporation, therefore, had to assimilate the changed
strategic environment, the massive growth in overseas broadcasting during the war
and a new organisation for the Government's Information Services. On technical issues
there was agreement that responsibility should remain with the Postmaster-General,
but on questions of wider policy there was, on the one hand, a hesitation to associate
explicit responsibility for the Corporation with anyone minister, and on the other, a
dilemma over which office it should be assigned to. The initial solution was to adapt the
prewar model by preserving 'the formal position that Questions on matters of high
policy affecting the BBC should be addressed to the Prime Minister' while the Lord
President of the Council, who was responsible for the Central Office of Information and
oversaw the GIS, 'could then assist in debates about the BBC,.61 This arrangement did
not survive scrutiny and by the time of its publication, paragraph 19 of the White Paper
on Broadcasting Policy clarified the Lord President's position as 'the Minister who will
59 TNA, CAB128/2, CM(45)60(6), 'Government Publicity Services', 6 December 1945.
60 TNA, CAB129/7, CP(46)54, 'Government Information Services', 12 February 1946.
61 TNA, CAB128/5, CM(46)17(4), 'Government Publicity Service', 21 February 1946.
28
answer Questions on major broadcasting policy save where they fall clearly within the
province of one of his colleagues'."
It is this last half sentence that signifies where practical responsibility lay when it came
to the External Services. In September 1945 the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, had
asked his Cabinet colleagues for a 'decision in principle that foreign publicity is an
instrument for foreign policy, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must be
responsible for it.'63 This was supported three months later by the Official Committee
on Government Information Services and subsequently by the Cabinet where 'in so far
as the Government may accept responsibility for the policy behind overseas
broadcasting services, the responsibility should lie with the overseas Ministers, each in
his own sphere'." Therefore, within this new information services superstructure the
Foreign Office and its Information Officers would, in effect, take the lead on a day-to-
day basis in negotiating the relationship between the government and the External
Services of the BBC - except where other overseas departments' interests were
primarily concerned.
It is important, however, to remember that apart from the English-language services
(which had effectively been excluded from these arrangements on oversight) overseas
broadcasting to foreign audiences had nearly always come under strict government
control and that plans made for the post-war period should not be seen as a ratcheting-
up of control, but rather, as a reduction to what was considered in Whitehall as a
necessary minimum for its purposes. Consequently, there was an inherent and
inevitable dilemma to be found in the balance between control and independence in a
process in which the government prescribed the future terms under which the SBC
62 TNA CAB129/10, CP(46)241, 'Broadcasting Policy', 21 June 1946.
63 TNA: CAB129/2, CP(45)168, 'The Future of British Publicity to Foreign Countries', 13
September 1945.
64 TNA, CAB134/306, GIS(46)8, 'Ministerial Responsibility for the BBC', 8 February 1946.
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would continue to function. Sir Allan Powell had been keenly aware of this delicate
balance when he noted, at the end of 1943, that the 'silken cords' that linked the
Corporation with the government could sometimes become 'chains of iron' when the
controlling impulse was flexed." The renewal of the Charter, though, was meant to
update the principles upon which a working understanding of the concepts of control
and independence, in a time of peace, would be built, but in doing so also highlighted
key areas through which the independence of the Corporation was vulnerable. In broad
terms, these pressure points related to the political and financial controls that might
affect the editorial independence of the BBC.
The government had always emphasised the editorial independence of the BBC and
programming content was publicly upheld, along with technical know-how, as within the
Corporation's sphere of influence. However, although it never explicitly claimed to
control the detailed output of the BBC and specifically the External Services, Lord
Briggs is very persuasive when he wrote that the government 'could always influence
what might be called "the temperature'" of the BBC's broadcasts." One way was
through ministerial and political pressure. Successive BBC Licences had incorporated
paragraphs on two particular powers that related to the transmission of programmes
and the 1947 Licence was no different. The first power, under paragraph 4(3) stated
that the 'Corporation shall whenever so requested by any Department of His Majesty's
Government. ..send ... any announcement or other matter which such Department may
require to be broadcast' while paragraph 4(4) gave the Postmaster-General the ability
to 'require the Corporation to refrain from sending any broadcast matter (either
particular or general).'67 In effect, this meant the government had the right to either
force the BBC to broadcast certain material or prevent the transmission of any
programmes. However, it was the influence derived from these powers, rather than
65 Briggs Sound and Vision, p.27.
66 Ibid., p.465.
67 Broadcasting: Copy of the Licence and Agreement, Cmd.6975, HMSO, December 1946.
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their actual use, that was important as indicated by the experience of the wartime
Postmaster-General, Harry Crookshank: 'the existence of the right has on occasion
facilitated agreement concerning the withdrawal of items to which serious exception
may be taken without formal exercise of the veto. ,68 Therefore, the latent strength
inherent in clauses 4(3) and (4) gave the government a degree of hidden influence over
programming.
This type of inferred influence related to the whole of the BBC's output. Far more
specific to the External Services, and far more pervasive, was the stipulation in the
White Paper and then the Charter that the BBC would 'remain independent in the
preparation of programmes for overseas audiences, though it should obtain from
Government Departments concerned such information about conditions in these
countries and the policies of His Majesty's Government toward them as will permit it to
plan its programmes in the national lnterest.:" From this it would seem that the
requirement being made of the BBC was one of consultation with, rather than
obedience to, the government's relevant policy objectives. This was true, but it was
also the outcome of the Broadcasting Committee's problem of how to exert a greater
degree of control over overseas broadcasting and as such provided for a wider element
of influence than might at first appear. It was through this guidance mechanism that the
Foreign Office and other departments received their right of access not just to the
management of the External Service, but also directly into the individual language
services. Nevertheless, this process was only acceptable because of the benefits the
BBC believed it was getting by adhering to this consultative relationship. Not the least
of which was the genuine desire, with limited internal resources, to be appraised of
conditions in reception areas and the wish not to misrepresent the "national interest" by
being unaware of British strategic sensitivities.
68 TNA, CAB76/16, B(44)3, 'General Questions Affecting the British Broadcasting Corporation',
5 June 1944.
69 Broadcasting Policy, Cmd.6852, HMSO, July 1946, para.60.
31
This balance was recognised in the first directive issued by Major-General Sir Ian
Jacob when he joined the BBC as the new Controller of European Services in July
1946 after having served as the Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet. When
visiting the Foreign Office, Service Directors should 'seek to learn all they can, they
should listen to the views expressed, but they should not act on guidance received
directly from the Foreign Office departmental officials without testing it by our long-term
standards, referring as may be to me.'70 This was a point clearly understood by Haley
who wrote in October 1946, 'The desire to distort information is, in this country, rarely in
evidence. The desire to suppress information, particularly news whose publication may
be inconvenient from a short-term point of view, is more apparent.' However, it was
'precisely this kind of news to which the overseas listener is inclined to attach
great value, and by which the independence and integrity of the BBC's news
services are judged. This, quite frankly, is not always understood in official
circles but by now the BBC has had long experience in maintaining its point of
view and persuading others of the strength of its case.,71
The above mechanisms were not the only means of asserting influence. There was
another central arrangement at the heart of the relationship between the BBC and the
government that had very important implications for the independence of the External
Services - finance. From the start of the Broadcasting Committee's deliberations, the
Postmaster-General had correctly linked the BBC's disposition towards an increased
licence fee after the war, from which all broadcasting activities could be funded, with
the Corporations attempts at diminishing government control in the future." Until 1
September 1939 all the BBC's activities were funded primarily from the licence fee, but
70 'Statement of Policy for the European Service', 29 July 1946. As quoted in, Briggs, Sound
and Vision, pp.142-3.
71 WAC, R1/82/3, G68, 30 October 1946.
72 TNA, PRO, CAB 76/16, B(44)3, 5 June 1944.
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since then all costs had been covered by a Treasury Grant-in-Aid." When planning the
Corporation's postwar financial arrangements, Haley originally estimated the cost of the
European Services at £500,000 a year with the total per annum cost of overseas
broadcasting loosely estimated at £900,000.74 He calculated that with an increased
licence fee of £1 (up from 10/-) providing around £10 million in revenue it could be
possible for this to cover the entirety of the BBC's output."
Nevertheless, Haley felt that 'the Corporation could not irrevocably launch upon such a
course without some experimental period.' He therefore had to find a balance between
achieving independent funding of the External Services without jeopardising the
Corporation as a whole,
'While stating the complete financing of the BBC's sound broadcasting activities
out of its revenues as a proper objective, therefore, I suggest we would have to
seek some half-way house to begin with so that we could see how we went on.
The presence of a provisional Treasury guarantee in the background need not
deter us from reaching our goal.'76
But as the real cost of maintaining many, if not all of the language services in Europe
(in addition to services to the Middle East, the Far East and South-East Asia, North and
Latin America) became apparent throughout 1945, it was finally agreed by the Cabinet
in December that, in light of a revised estimate for the full range of the External
Services of £3,150,000, 'the cost of overseas broadcasting should be borne by the
Exchequer independently of any licence fee revenue.l" Despite Haley's wish for all
funding to come from the licence fee, the transitional funding solution eventually gave
the government permanent financial control over the External Services.
73 WAC, R1/83/1, G29, 'Proposed Principles to Govern Capital Settlement with the Treasury', 10
April 1947.
74 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 12 October 1944.
75 TNA, PRO, CAB 76/16, CP(45)293, 20 November 1945.
76 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 12 October 1944.
77 TNA, CAB76/16, CP(45)293, 20 November 1945; TNA, CAB128/2, CM(45)64(1), 20
December 1945.
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Haley and the Board of Governors had been aware from an early stage of what the
consequences of such an arrangement might be. It was recognised, for example, that
'Subsidisation inevitably involves some degree of control' .78 This was also understood
by the Official Committee on Government Information Services at the beginning of
1946 where it 'was pointed out that there was a close link between control of
expenditure and control of policy.':" While acknowledging that 'the content of the
[overseas] service should be the responsibility of the BBC' Ivone Kirkpatrick, a member
of the committee who was instrumental in defining the postwar relationship between
the Foreign Office and the Corporation, explained that 'the scope and character of
overseas broadcasting should be ultimately fixed by the Foreign Secretary or other
responsible Minister'. He then went on to layout before the committee his view of the
practical reality of the relationship between the BBC's foreign services and the
government in a clinical analysis,
'This ultimate Government responsibility was inherent in the Government's
control over the grant-in-aid for overseas broadcasting. It was not intended that
the Government should accept any formal responsibility for the conduct of the
overseas services, but finance would be provided on the basis of an approved
programme, and the Government would be fully entitled to bring pressure to
bear on the BBC in order that the service should accord with the aims of
Government policy. The ultimate sanction would be a financial one' .80
Not only was this unnervingly prophetic of the approach he was to take with the BBC
ten years later during the Suez crisis, but it clearly exposed, as the new Charter was
being prepared, the attitude of some in Whitehall towards the kind of leverage the
government might seek for its funding of the External Services.
78 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 12 October 1944.
79 TNA, CAB134/306, GIS(46)4th Meeting, 28 February 1946.
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Another dimension of the funding arrangements was opened up by the June 1946
Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates which concluded
that regardless of Treasury satisfaction of its working relationship with the Corporation
over expenditure, funding by Grant-in-Aid required 'the same close financial scrutiny as
is normally applied to the direct functions of Government' .81 This was despite the fact
that the SSC's External Services were not an explicitly avowed function of government
and that the 1936 Ullswater Committee had concluded that to criticise the SSC's
accounts 'by comparison with the detailed Estimates presented to Parliament for
Government services would be to overlook the constitutional difference between the
two cases' (although there were no SSC foreign-language services when the Report
was written)." The Select Committee's proposal of an official audit, which had been
rejected for similar reasons by the Official Committee on GIS four months earlier, was
for the Comptroller and Auditor General to be given a scrutinising function over the
SSC's accounts." For Haley, who had given ground on the principle of funding for
overseas broadcasting and who perceived the Select Committee's recommendations
as the thin edge of the wedge leading to the future scrutiny of all the SSC's accounts,
this raised 'the one main issue - that of the SSC's inoependence.:" Sy October 1946
and after meetings with the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Post Office, the
Treasury suggested a compromise whereby rather than examining the SSC Grant-in-
Aid accounts in detail, the Comptroller and Auditor General should only be allowed to
inspect a total figure. This meant that he would only be required to 'inspect and vouch'
for this figure rather than examine a detailed estimate. However, it was also the
Treasury's view that in the face of the Select Committee's criticisms it was 'essential
81 House of Commons Paper 158, First Report from the Select Committee on Estimates,
Session 1945-6, 'The British Broadcasting Corporation', 26 June 1946, p.vii.
82 WAC, R1/82/2, G52, 'The Select Committee on Estimates' Report', 10 July 1946.
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the SSC should concede this degree of control over Grant-in-Aid in order to avoid
control over its whole exoenditure.:"
It might be considered that these financial arrangements for peacetime broadcasting
represent a failure for the SSC, but a closer look would reveal that despite the very
limited power the Corporation could wield in these negotiations, it was at least able to
engineer some of the outcome. For example, when the Board of Governors
congratulated Haley in October 1946 'on the amount of independence he had managed
to secure for the Corporation' under Grant-in-Aid it becomes clear that the Board had
been preparing itself for a significantly greater degree of control being imposed." And
just two weeks later, Haley informed his colleagues that he had a,
'written assurance from the Treasury that they would resist any encroachment
on the BBC's independence in respect of its Home services as a result of the
agreement to afford the Comptroller and Auditor-General access to the
accounts of the Grant in Aid Services ... [which] ... could be produced in the future
for the Treasury or Cabinet, but was not for publication in Parliament or
elsewhere. ,87
In effect, Haley had extracted from the Treasury a secret agreement that went beyond
the terms of the financial settlement in the Charter in ring-fencing the financial
independence of the Home Services while limiting the degree to which the External
Services budget would be subject to oversiqht." Therefore, despite the increased level
of fiscal control that the imposition of the Grant-in-Aid brought with it, a new accounting
system and the establishment of a layer of parliamentary scrutiny, there is a sense in
which the SBC was able to manage a process that was beyond its control to ultimately
85 WAC, R1/82/3, G67, 'Financial Control under the New Charter', 24 October 1946.
86 WAC, R1/14, Board of Governors meeting, 'Financial Control Under New Charter', 31
October 1946.
87 Ibid. 'Director-General's Report', 14 November 1946.
88 Thisarranqernent was added to at the end of the decade by the principle that scrutiny of the
BBC accounts would be limited to capital expenditure and would not include the day-to-day
revenue expenditure of the Corporation.
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prevent. The fact remained, however, that along with the assistance in funding, the
government had acquired an unprecedented level of peace-time control over the BBC
and with it greater influence over its activities.
Speaking in the Parliamentary Charter Debate the Lord President, Herbert Morrison,
who with the Postmaster-General had presented the White Paper on Broadcasting
Policy, laid out his understanding of the relationship between the Government and the
BBC,
'Clearly, it would be unthinkable for Broadcasting House to be broadcasting to
Europe, at the taxpayer's expense, doctrines hopelessly at variance with the
foreign policy of His Majesty's Government; but for reasons which I hope will
commend themselves ... it appeared to the Government to be equally
undesirable that the Foreign Office should themselves become responsible for
the foreign services. In the first place, the conduct of a broadcasting service
requires a different sort of experience and imagination from the conduct of
diplomacy... Secondly, broadcasting is a fulltime job. Thirdly, and most
important of all, we believe that the foreign services will better retain the respect
of listeners abroad and of the public at home if, like the Home Services, they
are removed as far as possible from the danger of being used to push the
interests of political parties instead of the nation as a whole'."
Morrison then went on to explain how this balance between control and independence
would be achieved,
'The Corporation will accept the guidance of the Foreign Office on the nature
and scope of its foreign language services, and there will be a very close liaison
between the two of them ...But once the general character and scope of a
89 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vo1.425, co1.1087, 16 July 1946.
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service has been laid down, the SSC will have complete discretion as to the
content of the programmes tnernselves."?
There remained, however, a need to define what was meant by the "nature" or
"character" and "scope" of the foreign services which was essential in determining
whether they had been removed from the dangers of partisanship and of excessive
Whitehall control.
It was this precise problem that exercised minds at the SSC. Haley understood the
meaning of 'character and scope' to relate to 'the time and money devoted to the
different language transmissions' but was unsure whether 'it will extend to actual
content of a service'. It was possible, he thought, that the 'Government might take a
view it had a right to order what it was paying for' - the quid pro quo of fundinq." The
relevant main conditions of the Charter were clear: a five year term for all the SSC with
the likelihood of an inquiry before the end of that time; overseas broadcasting would
continue with a global remit; External Services would accept guidance and funding
from the government; its editorial independence was affirmed although due
consideration would have to be given to the policies of His Majesty's Government.
However, it took time for the practical meaning of this settlement to be worked through.
The Charter gave the government the right to prescribe to whom, for how long and in
what languages the External Services broadcast, which was an extension of its
willingness to fund these activities. Its ability to give guidance also opened the door to
the editorial sphere of the External Services, but there were other factors that impacted
upon the tension between governmental influence and the Corporation's
independence. For example, technical matters which were the province of the
Postmaster-General had serious and complex broadcasting policy implications, such
90 Ibid., co1.1088, 16 July 1946.
91 WAC, R1/82/3, G68, 30 October 1946.
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as with the postwar allocation of wavelengths, both internationally and between the
domestic and overseas spheres of the SSC. In addition, the personal relationships
between key government and SSC figures were as important, if not sometimes more
so, in determining the temperature and tone of the day-to-day business as the
institutional architecture surrounding them. It would be wrong, however, to give the
overall impression of a government bent on influencing these foreign services purely
for the sake of satisfying its controlling impulse, or of the SSC as a damsel in distress
unable to withstand the unethical advances of this powerful leviathan. There was at the
same time in many parts of the government an understanding of, and genuine interest
in, the value to be had from a relatively independent SSC that could use its wartime
reputation for speaking the truth to represent British news, views and way of life to a
world audience. To diminish this would be to diminish the effectiveness of overseas
publicity policy. There also coexisted within the SSC an understanding of the fragility of
the Corporation's independence and the robustness with which it needed to be
defended as Major-General Jacob had made clear in his advice to staff 'not to act on
guidance received directly from the Foreign Office departmental officials without testing
it by our long-term standards'."
The variable geometry of the architecture linking the SSC's External Services and the
government defies easy explanation, made more difficult during this period as the
Corporation broadcast through a transitional phase before settling to its peacetime role.
This uncertainty was reflected in the constitutional settlement arrived at in the 1947
Charter which, despite its statements of intent, was deliberately vague on the
mechanisms that would guide the External Services output. What it did do, was to
provide a flexible realm within which an appreciation of the requirements of
broadcasting abroad could be found in light of experience as the dynamics of the
92 'Statement of Policy for the European Service', 29 July 1946. As quoted in, Briggs, Sound
and Vision, pp.142-3.
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unfolding postwar peace were revealed. In this respect, the "national interest" was a
conceptual tool employed to manage contemporary realities as well as future
developments. It also solved a far more obvious presentational problem. The absence
of strict and detailed guidelines and the reliance on broad policy strokes were
necessary devices with which to construct a constitutional distance between the SSC
and the government, both for internal and external consumption. It was a fiction of a
distance which hid the untidy subterranean competition that existed between notions of
editorial independence on the one hand and the means to exert control and influence
on the other. As such, it was an act of pragmatic and consensual politics between the
SSC and the government.
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2. NEGOTIATING THE RELATIONSHIP
With the dissolution of the Ministry of Information at the end of March 1946, the
government's new institutional machinery, within which the broad policy of overseas
publicity would be agreed, set about defining 'the picture of Britain which it should be
the aim to put over'." In July the Lord President circulated to his colleagues on the
Ministerial Committee on Overseas Information Services a paper on the 'Projection of
Britain Overseas' .94 It was this document that would then be used for general guidance
by overseas departments and it provides a very revealing snapshot of what was felt, in
1946, to be the categories of messages through which the idea of Britain should be
projected to the postwar world. Under the heading of 'Britain as a Political and Social
Democracy', freedoms of speech and political choice were emphasised along with a
comprehensive system of social services and industrial welfare 'second to none' and
the start of the 'greatest experiment in a planned economy in a free society that the
world has ever known'. 'Britain as a World Power' placed the country at the centre of a
world-wide association of peoples - very much Churchill's image of interlocking
spheres of influence - through which British systems of social and political democracy
should be spread abroad. Under the heading of 'Britain and World Trade' the belief that
'the rest of the world cannot be prosperous unless we are prosperous' was couched
within the notion of an expansionist and multilateral economic policy and system of
trading for the purpose of developing the world's economic resources for the benefit of
mankind. Lastly, the 'British Commonwealth and Empire' section advertised a non-
exploitational vision of community as both liberal and dynamic where 'Imperialism' was
dead except as a slogan used by critics."
93 TNA, CAB134/544, 01(0)(46)10, 'Projection of Britain', 6 June 1946,
94 This paper was based on one prepared by the Ministry of Information prior to its demise. See
TNA, CAB134/544, 01(0)(46)8, 'Projection of Britain - World Common Themes', 29 May 1946,
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It was on this last point, and the pejorative connotations that statements of imperial
identity permitted, that the Ministerial Committee brought about the premature end of
Empire - in publicity terms, at least - well before the wind of change swept through
Harold Macmillan's Government over a decade later. In April 1947 the Secretary of
State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Addison, advocated that while 'the terms "British
Commonwealth" and "British Empire" are strictly speaking interchangeable so far as
their geographical significance is concerned, the term "British Commonwealth" should
be preferred in publicity addressed to the Dominions and the use of the term "British
Empire" alone should be avoided' .96 In particular, the government felt vulnerable to the
criticisms of its wartime allies, the US and the USSR, of perpetuating an outdated and
unethical system of global resources and influence. One month later, ministers agreed
at a joint meeting of the Home and Overseas Committee's on Information Services that
"Empire" 'had associations that made it unsuitable for general use' and that it should be
dropped in favour of "British Cornrnonweatth"." They therefore approved this 'proposed
addition to the directive on themes of publicity', of which the Prime Minister was
subsequently informed and in doing so hastened the end of Empire, if only in semantic
terms.
Despite this emphasis on the cultural sensitivities of British diplomacy, it is clear that
the overseas committees of the Information Services, official and ministerial, were at
arms length from the day-to-day business of the External Services of the BBC. Where
the two did come together, as with the allocation of wavelengths and the broadcast
infrastructure, it was generally in terms of technical or logistical problems that required
an interdepartmental perspective. In addition, these committees met infrequently. For
example, in 1946 the Official Committee on Overseas Information Services sat only
96 Ibid., 01(47)3, 'Publicity on the British Commonwealth and Empire', 9 April 1947.
97 Ibid., 01(47)1st Meeting, 'Publicity on the British Commonwealth and Empire', 19 May 1947.
Two months later the Dominions Office merged with the India and Burma Office to form the
Commonwealth Relations Office.
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four times while its ministerial counterpart, just three. The following year the ministerial
committee met only once at a joint meeting with the Ministerial Committee on Home
Information Services. Therefore, in establishing the working organisational pattern of
relations between overseas broadcasting and the government, it is necessary to look at
the connections that really did determine the detailed nature of the relationship.
Emblematic of the primary relationship between overseas broadcasting and the
Foreign Office, and fundamental to establishing its tone in this early postwar phase,
were Major-General Ian Jacob and Ivone Kirkpatrick. This duo not only patrolled the
boundary between the two institutions at this formative stage, but effectively defined
where that boundary lay. Thus, each had an indelible effect on how the relationship
was to be negotiated for the next decade. On 21 March 1946 the BBC's Board of
Governors 'authorized the DG to take steps to secure the services of Major-General
Edward Jacob to be Controller (European Services)' and two weeks later his
appointment was confirmed." In doing so, the Board assigned to one of the most
diplomatically sensitive jobs in the BBC a man who, during the war, had played a vital
role right at the centre of government. Since 1939 he had been Military Assistant
Secretary to the War Cabinet and in this capacity had been at the very nexus of
international policy development and the prosecution of the war. He had developed a
close working relationship with Churchill and as he accompanied the Prime Minister to
Allied summits he got to know, at close quarters, American and Russian
representatives including President's Roosevelt and Truman and Marshal Stalin.99
According to Churchill's Private Secretary and wartime contemporary, John Colville,
Jacob was a 'man of tireless industry ... far above the average in both intelligence and
98 WAC, R1/12, Board of Governors meeting, 'European Service Direction', 21 March 1946. It
was by his middle name, lan, that he was more commonly known; Ibid., 'European Service
Direction', 3 April 1946.
99 General Sir Charles Richardson, From Churchill's Secret Circle to the BBC: The Biography of
Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob GBE CB DL, (Oxford: Brassey's, 1991), p.218.
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commonsense' .100 He also had an up-to-date appreciation of postwar Europe and
Britain's continental interests, and from July 1945 had sat on the Labour government's
standing ministerial European Control Committee, tasked with handling 'the day-to-day
problems arising in connection with the control or administration of ex-enemy territories
in Europe' .101 Jacob's close association with Churchill did not prevent him from being
able to work effectively within the new administration as his specifically assigned duty
of keeping Clement Attlee informed of the Committee's work testified as did his
appointment as Secretary to the Defence Comrnlttee.l'" Also, in the period between
accepting the job at the BBC and leaving government service, he was the military
representative of the unsuccessful mission led by Lord Stansgate to negotiate a new
treaty with the Egyptian Government.l'" He, therefore, had a breadth of experience and
field of knowledge that ideally suited not only his first job at the SSC, but also his
subsequent appointment in charge of all of overseas broadcasting. He was in the inner
circle of the military, diplomatic, political and intelligence spheres of British Government
by the end of the war and these were associations and links that were to provide him
with a subtle appreciation of international developments and governmental attitudes.
Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, was a government official who then worked at the SSC
before returning to the Foreign Office. With a keen interest in the uses of propaganda,
in February 1941 he became Foreign Adviser to the SSC and took charge of all
European broadcasting activities.'?' It was at first a controversial posting, but the
European Services, unlike some of their other overseas counterparts, were of particular
operational and strategic importance during the war and as this arrangement became
100 John Colville, The Fringes of Power, Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955, Volume One:
September 1939-September 1941, (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1986), p.560.
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accepted there was an increasing appreciation of the additional benefits that this new
Controller's links with Whitehall could effect. As Briggs has pointed out, 'With
Kirkpatrick in Bush House, the BBC was sure of something more than mere
protection' .105 Kirkpatrick understood the importance of broadcasting overseas, its
value and its potential as an aid to government objectives. This philosophy and the
means by which the European Services and the government produced and directed
broadcast output worked well at a time when everything was directed to the war effort
and there was a synergy of aims. Yet, as has been shown, after the war and as a
member of the Government Information Services Committee, Kirkpatrick was clear in
his mind that the new peacetime balance that should be struck would mean that 'the
Government would be fully entitled to bring pressure to bear on the BBC in order that
the [overseas] service should accord with the aims of Government policy.'!"
On 30 March 1944, just three months before the D-Day landings, the Board of
Governors agreed to 'the temporary secondment of Mr I A Kirkpatrick to the Political
Warfare Executive, to act as Deputy Director-General (Political)' .107 This move out of
the BBC was made permanent six months later when he returned to his home
department for good and it was when back at the Foreign Office that Kirkpatrick put
Jacob's name forward for his former job.'?" Both men had been government insiders
who became central and influential personalities at a very senior level of the BBC, but
there was a key difference between them. Kirkpatrick's time at the BBC had been a
necessary but temporary wartime measure and he had returned to the Foreign Office
when required. In this sense he never left the Foreign Service nor did he make the
psychological break from his Whitehall career. When he returned to Government
service and took on the responsibility of senior liaison with the BBC's overseas
105 Briggs, War of Words, p.34.
106 TNA CAB134/306, GIS(46)4 Ih Meeting, 28 February 1946.
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services it was as a man who, on the one hand, understood what the Corporation could
do and how it worked from the inside, but on the other, consistently interpreted the
relationship in, ultimately, political or policy terms. Jacob joining the BBC was,
however, a complete career break - albeit with related interests that made him
particularly suitable. This new direction would take him to the very top of the BBC, but
his management of the European and then all External Services demonstrated an
almost schizophrenic capacity to bestride the grey area between the two institutions as
he established himself as a facilitator when there needed to be co-operation between
the government and the BBC and as a firewall when it seemed that the independence
and integrity of the Corporation might be compromised.
Jacob was regarded as 'the ideal man', as Haley and Kirkpatrick had described him, to
manage overseas broadcastinq.l'" He was able to appreciate the development of
policy within, and the practices of, government which provided for a close working
relationship with Whitehall. His experience of post-war Europe and his comprehensive
understanding of international developments was a great advantage to Haley whose
main preoccupation was domestic broadcasting. It also meant that the BBC had a man
who was able to interpret the high policy and shifts in global politics and diplomacy.
Ultimately, he was plugged-in on both sides of the boundary, but this being the case
how did he see the boundary at all?
At the beginning of his tenure at Bush House Major-General Sir Ian Jacob established
rules governing his staffs relationship with the government's overseas departments."?
While Service Directors should project British 'activities and the British way of life' they
should not be swayed by 'day to day fluctuations in political poltcy'."" Neither should
they bend to pressure not to broadcast material uncomfortable for the government. For
109 Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.141.
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111 Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.142.
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Jacob there were only three reasons to 'cause the rejection of a news item': if it
jeopardised military security; if serious damage to British foreign policy would result
(and any such rejection should be made on his authority); if the report was 'both
mischievous and unsubstantiated'i'V The second reason, the most opaque but also the
most important, is a clue to understanding how Jacob imagined the place in British
society that overseas broadcasting inhabited and, therefore, his interpretation of what
was meant by the requirement to broadcast in the "national interest". Philosophically,
he saw the Corporation as representative of the society it served,
'One often hears the phrase: "The BBC says... " But the BBC has no entity in
the sense of having views and opinions of its own. It seeks to hold a mirror to
British opinion, and to reflect what the ordinary man and woman in Britain feels.
British public opinion finds its expression in the Press, in speeches and writings,
in books and periodicals. By quoting this material, and by bringing a great
variety of people to the microphone, the BBC tries to show to its listeners the
different currents of thought, the full and democratic flow of ideas, and the
diverse opinions, that go to make up the voice of the British people.T'"
In this analysis, the BBC was a morally neutral organisation that performed the function
of a national weathervane, signalling the prevailing trends of culture and thought in
society along with the dissemination of impartial news - a national zeitgeist which then
transmitted messages of British identity around the world. But from this conglomerate
of input, how did Jacob determine the principles he thought should be used to govern
the editorial policy and output of the European, and then External, Services?
Ideally, the 'spread of truth and the full ventilation of facts are highly desirable in
themselves' Jacob announced in his July 1946 directive for the European Services and
112 Ibid.
113 Major-General Sir Ian Jacob, 'The European Service Holds The Mirror Up To British
Opinion', by the Controller of the European Service, BBC Yearbook 1947, (London: BBC, 1947),
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this still stands up as a robust statement of the governing editorial pollcy.!" However,
past experience and an understanding of the forces at work on the postwar
international scene and concern over what further turbulence in Europe might result
forged in Jacob the belief that Britain must continue 'to struggle against calumny and
insidious propaganda of a different way of thinking. Our part in counteracting this is not
by refuting it, but by seizing and retaining the initiative.'!" From this analysis it would
seem that Jacob's conception of the job to be done by overseas broadcasting was
characterised by a sense of participating in a "struggle". Passive objectivity in output
would not be enough and the Corporation's role in this struggle would be to project an
image of Britain overseas that proactively confronted opposing and potentially
damaging (to British interests) ways of thinking and which would bluntly contradicted
misrepresentations of news and international developments that might affect the overall
stability of Europe and beyond.
Jacob was clear that this did not mean the BBC conducting a campaign of political
warfare, but his sense of purpose must be put in the context of having just lived and
worked through the Second World War where he would have been acutely aware of
the value of co-ordinated operations and the danger of authoritarian tyranny.116 It is
perhaps not surprising that "alignment" with the Government's foreign policy was, for
him, a necessary element of the "national interest",
'When, as now, the British people are engaged in a struggle to maintain their
existence and way of life in the face of a campaign of propaganda and
subversive activity, openly designed to overthrow them, we must not in any way
shrink from giving full expression to the British view, and to assist by all means
114 Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.142.
115 Ibid.
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in our power the national effort. Only in this way shall we be framing our
programmes in the national interest.'!"
But for Jacob, beyond this strategic orientation, there was a line to be drawn in terms of
governmental influence and one that, as has been shown, he was keen to make
explicit from the start. It was in the actual making and content of the programmes that
government involvement was to be avoided and where the editorial independence of
the BBC had to be maintained.
Orchestrating effective and efficient liaison between the two institutions was, by design,
a complex operation that was intended to be kept fluid in relation to needs. In the run
up to Charter renewal William Haley emphasised this asymmetry as a virtue when he
noted in his paper on the 'Principles and Purpose of the BBC's External Services' that
the 'methods of liaison to reach the understanding adumbrated by the Lord President
vary from service to service. It is - to my mind rightly - not formalised throughout the
Corporation.'!" The result, by the time of the new Charter, was a descending hierarchy
of evolving linkages from the most senior level of the BBC down to the individual
language services that collectively formed the relationship between the External
Services and Government.
On issues of outstanding importance the Director-General would be consulted. Other
major matters would be handled between Kirkpatrick at the Foreign Office and the two
overseas Controllers, Jacob and J.B. Clark (who, until Jacob became Director of
Overseas Services, was in charge of all external broadcasting outside of Europe).
There was then another level of liaison for the other regionally-grouped foreign-
language services. The Latin-American Services were in touch with the Head of the
Latin-American Department in the Foreign Office and took it upon themselves to be
117 Ibid.
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proactive in consulting the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the
Admiralty on related matters of quidance.!" The Director of Eastern Services attended
weekly meetings at the Eastern (Political) Department of the Foreign Office in addition
to going to monthly meetings of the Middle East Information Department (MElD) in the
same Ministry.12o By March 1947 the Far Eastern Services had arranged, using as its
model the Eastern Services meeting with MElD, to attend the Foreign Office's Far
Eastern Information Department Weekly Directive Meeting along with the British
Council.!" There were also regular meetings with the Colonial Office about Palestine
and telephone contact with the Foreign Office over Persia and Egypt.122
In addition to guidance by phone on day-to-day questions, the Board of Trade
established regular conferences at its Overseas Information Division where between 12
and 14 BBC representatives would mix with Information Officers of the Foreign Office
and representatives of the COl to discuss economic and industrial subjects.V'' In a
similar, but reversed, manner the India Office briefed the Director of Eastern Services
(DES) as a channel to all BBC departments concerned, while in the European Services
there were 'individual contacts between the various service directors and their regional
opposite numbers in the Foreign Office' .124 It was within this network of institutional and
personal links that the material nature of the relationship was revealed and worked
through. And it was through this variable geometry of liaison that the new Charter and
the future purpose of overseas broadcasting would be interpreted in light of developing
practices - and where the line between government influence and the Corporations
independence would be drawn in detail.
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Managing the culture change from wartime to peacetime relations did not, however,
always run smoothly. As Haley acknowledged in the autumn of 1946, there 'have been
occasions when it has been necessary for the SSC to take a firm line to distinguish
"information" or "guidance" from "directives'" .125 Neither did the emerging machinery of
liaison always engender better relations. Commenting on the MElD the SSC's Director
of Eastern Services, Donald Stephenson, described its staff as 'an uninspiring
collection of dug-outs and second grade women' while he thought the Chairman of the
Middle East Publicity Committee 'not only knows nothing about publicity but knows still
less about the Middle East.,126 What particularly concerned Stephenson, however, was
the 'failure on the part of the FO to distinguish between control of Foreign Office
publicity (ie, absorption of the old MOl) and control of external publicity media - the
SSC, the Press etc.' He felt there was a deliberate willingness to exploit what he called
"extra-constitutional practices", 'if ever weakness on the part of the SSC or of a
newspaper provides opportunity.'!" Haley agreed noting that 'We must take a firm line
against any nonsense' and that 'the position must remain that we are not prepared to
accept their directives or to operate outside the terms of the White Paper.'128
Despite this restatement of explicit policy by Haley it would seem that some parts of
Whitehall were slower at adapting to these postwar working conditions than the SSC
would have liked. In his own region, Stephenson was concerned that 'there has been
no evidence of any desire on the part of the FO either to leave the responsibility for
effective broadcasts strictly in our hands, or alternatively to take the SSC into free
collaboration on the basis of an independent professionally competent medium'. As a
125 Ibid.
126 WAC, R34/399, 'Meeting at Middle East Publicity Department, Foreign Office', 8 August
1946; Ibid., 'Relations with Foreign Office', 19 November 1946.
127 Ibid., 'Meeting at Middle East Publicity Department, Foreign Office', 8 August 1946. .
128 Ibid., 'Meeting at Middle East Publicity Department, Foreign Office', 10 August 1946; lbid.,
'Relations with Foreign Office', 20 November 1946.
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result, this wartime impulse to interfere in the SSC's output was 'harmful to the more
lasting interests of this country, since much of the energy which we might devote to
constructive broadcast planning is dissipated in countering ill-conceived and positively
dangerous representation from the FO.'129
It was with this in mind that the Near East News Editor, Mackenzie, wrote to
Stephenson on the issue of "inspired" news items from the Foreign Office on 26 March
1947. A recent bulletin on the SSC's Arabic Service had reported the content of a letter
to the Egyptian Gazette from 'An English Friend of Egypt' - a typical "anonymous
harangue" by the Foreign Service as Stephenson would have called it - and Mackenzie
was concerned that there was no definite policy to deal with such items and set about
trying to define one that was based 'on a proper understanding ... of the relations
between the Foreign Office and the SSC.'130 What followed, and the response to it,
make for a very interesting assessment, if only in the Eastern Service, of the nature of
liaison at the programming end of the broadcasting process just three months after the
new Charter came into effect and the type of creative problem-solving that adds a new
dimension to an assessment of the balance of the relationship between the
government and the External Services.
Mackenzie believed that 'the duty of the SSC is to follow in its broadcasts the general
policy of HMG, but it is allowed the widest freedom in the selection, editing and
presentation of day-to-day broadcast rnaterial.i':" Stephenson concurred, but then went
on to explain how he thought activities that took place on the edges of this definition
should be dealt with. On issues where 'the Foreign Office want us to implement or
support some point of policy, either by our own origination of broadcast material or by
carrying the material originated at other sources, this must always be a matter of
129 Ibid., 'Relations with Foreign Office', 19 November 1946.
130 Ibid.. '''Inspired'' News Items from the FO', NENE to DES, 26 March 1947.
131 Ibid.
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mutual agreement.' However, in order to maintain 'a proper atmosphere of cooperation
and assistance', Stephenson continued,
'where the FO particularly press us, in circumstances of urgency, to carry an
item of the kind on which your memo is based; and when we are satisfied that
the item is at least quite harmless, however, ineffective we may consider it to
be; then in such cases I think we are usually well advised to accede to such a
request.'!"
This, he argued, would then 'strengthen our arm in those other and more frequent
cases where we feel that a request item is so inept or indeed harmful that we rightly
refuse to have anything to do with it.,133 What Stephenson was describing was a
heavily qualified concept of independence that depended on a system of trades, of give
and take, to establish an editorial line that could, if required, be defended.
Negotiating the relationship between the SSC and the government in these early
postwar years was a matter of intensions and interpretations. The new Charter, and the
debates leading up to it, had mapped out a static set of intentions within which the
purpose of broadcasting overseas had been declared in relation to the duties levied on
the Corporation as the price paid for its independence from direct government control.
These arrangements and their meaning, however, required interpretation. This was
done at the level of co-ordinating the broad policy of government publicity by the
Information Services committees.
A far closer working relationship existed between the government's overseas
departments, in particular the Foreign Office, and the Corporation's External Services.
It was here that key personnel interpreted the relationship in light of their own intentions
and understanding of objectives which set the tone for the departments under their
132 Ibid., 'News Items from the FO', DES to NENE 1 April 1947.
133 Ibid.
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control. Overtly, the Charter, Licence and Agreement governed the terms of this
relationship, but in reality, as has been seen, it is clear that a far more pragmatic way of
interpreting the practical detail of either side's intentions was at play using a range of
liaison tools. At these permissive zones of the relationship definitions of policy were
forced to face the practicalities of broadcasting overseas which, by necessity, relied on
guidance from government departments and the acceptance of some extra-
constitutional practices. The result was an evolving and continually challenged debate
within and between the government and the BBC of what it really meant to broadcast
overseas in the "national interest".
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3. THE COMING COLD WAR
British government attitudes had been coming to terms with the growing threat posed
by the Soviet Union for some time. Wartime co-operation had given way to older and
deeper tensions and feelings of mistrust that resurfaced in a new geopolitical
environment which saw Russian troops occupying large swathes of continental Europe.
In March 1946, the same month that the Ministry of Information was dissolved, the
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the co-ordinating and analytical nexus of British
intelligence, attempted to assess 'Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions'. As the
JIC reported to the British Chiefs of Staff,
'The long-term aim of the Russian leaders is to build up the Soviet Union into a
position of strength and greatness fully commensurate with her vast size and
resources. They are convinced of the greatness of Russia's future under the
Soviet system. We believe it to be their firm conviction that, within the next fifty
years or perhaps a hundred years (unlike Hitler, they are not pressed for time),
the Soviet Union will inevitably become the most powerful, the richest and the
best ordered country in the world.'!"
Therefore, what was being envisaged in 1946 was a protracted struggle, characterised
at that time by Russian attempts to create of a "belt" of satellite states with
governments subservient to their policy' as part of a defensive strateqy.!" By the
beginning of 1948, after nearly two years of treaty negotiations and Soviet refusals to
co-operate with the West, the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, reported to his Cabinet
colleagues that 'It must be recognised that the Soviet Government has formed a solid
political and economic block behind a line running from the Baltic along the Oder,
through Trieste to the Black Sea. There is no prospect in the immediate future that we
134 TNA, CAB81/132, JIC(46)1 (0), 'Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions', 1 March 1946.
135 Ibid.
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shall be able to re-establish normal relations with European countries behind that
line.,136
For the BBC this breaking-up of Europe recalled an assessment made by the
Corporation's Overseas Intelligence Department in July 1940 after the Wehrmacht had
chased the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk. 'Broadcasting,' they said, 'is now
our only means of addressing a great part of Europe'i!" Less than a decade later this
was again true. However, it was the ability of broadcasting to breach the Iron Curtain
with relative impunity that led one of the new Governors of the BBC, the economist,
author and contributor to the BBC's Brains Trust, Barbara Ward, to argue at the
beginning of 1947 for disengagement by the Corporation in overseas broadcasting.
She felt that
'some nation needs to take a lead in ending the international warfare in the air
which, in however a veiled and gentlemanly form, we have taken over from the
Russians and the Nazis. I do not myself think that this competition is desirable
and I would welcome nothing more than that the BBC should set a new
pattern. ,138
Indeed, within a year there was to be a new pattern, but not one Miss Ward would
necessarily have approved of. The JIC had argued that Russia would use 'all weapons,
short of major war ... to weaken foreign countries' and key amongst them was the 'full
use of propaganda' which included radio broadcasts.l" Therefore, as the frictions
between Russia and her wartime Allies worsened the value of overseas broadcasting
increased as a means of projecting the British counterpoint to Soviet propaganda. This
was underlined at the end of 1947 when, in the context of economic austerity at home
and the need to reduce public expenditure the government considered abolishing
136 TNA, CAB129/23, CP(48)6, 'The First Aim of British Foreign Policy', 4 January 1948.
137 Briggs, War of the Words, p.209.
138 WAC, R1/83/1, G14, 'The Third Programme and the 1796 Metre Band' 14 February 1947.
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lunch-time transmissions to Europe. So important had these broadcasts become in the
conduct of British foreign publicity policy, however, that the government 'came to the
conclusion that it would be inadvisable to reduce broadcasting to Europe' and
reductions were made in the less sensitive Latin American Services instead."?
In November 1947 Bevin laid out for ministers the problem facing British foreign policy
when it came to Eastern Europe where 'Totalitarian regimes now rule'. In Yugoslavia,
'we have a pure and fully-fledged Communist regime on the Soviet model. .. In
Roumania, all legal opposition has now been eliminated, the Government has
recently been purged of all but Communists ... In Bulgaria the only legal
Opposition party and the Opposition press have now been suppressed ... In
Hungary matters have not got so far, but the Communists, by their control of the
Ministry of the Interior and its machinery and police, can terrorise all important
opponents into submission, or fliqht'.':"
What, though, should be the government's attitude towards 'the rapid extinction of
human rights and the fundamental freedoms in this area?,142 Two years earlier Bevin
had addressed the same problem in relation to Poland and Czechoslovakia where he
thought 'the provision of information about British life and culture' - essentially the
remit, outside that of providing impartial news, of BBC overseas broadcasting - 'is
probably our most effective single means of preventing them from being absorbed into
a closed and exclusive Soviet sphere of influence and of keeping open the doors
between Eastern and Western Europe.'143 This clearly had not worked by the end of
140 WAC, R1/84/1, G2, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 1 January 1948. Briggs
asserts that Haley and Jacob 'were active, too, in persuading the Labour Government itself in
April 1948 not to drop lunch-time broadcasts to European countries and so reduce the
importance of the European Services'. Whether Briggs is referring to a continuing challenge to
European lunch-time broadcasts or has simply ascribed the wrong date to the original decision
to save them is unclear. See Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.472.
141 TNA, CAB129/22, CP(47)313, 'Extinction of Human Rights in Eastern Europe', 24 November
1947.
142 Ibid.
143 TNA, CAB129/6, CP(46)7, 'Publicity Services in South-Eastern Europe', 4 January 1946.
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1947 where it was noted that 'Even in Czechoslovakia, the Communists have recently
become much more aggressive' .144
These ominous assessments bore a terrible fruit at the end of February 1948 when
communist forces in Czechoslovakia repudiated their commitment to the Coalition
government, of which they were a part, and the notion of power-sharing. With Russian
backing, they took over the country and ushered in a new and particularly belligerent
phase in the developing cold war. A decade after Czechoslovakia had last been
forcefully brought under the tutelage of a neighbouring power, the overthrow of the
government of the ageing Dr Edouard Benes was, as Bevin described it, 'a coup d'Etat
on typical Communist lines' .145 Around the world, not least because of the BBC's
reporting of developments, people began to awake to the tangible consequences of the
gathering storm brewing between countries that less than three years earlier had been
Allies.
Before the coup it was estimated by the Czech Ministry of Information that one in five
people listened to the BBC. After the coup, the United States Social Services Research
Council calculated that one out of every two owners of radios listened to the BBC - a
number that increased to three out of every four when Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart (who
was well known to Czech listeners) was broadcasting - and that the BBC's audience in
Czechoslovakia 'is far greater than that of the Czechoslovakian Broadcasting
System' ,146 Therefore, while communist control was exerted within Czechoslovakia it
was clear that the BBC had a very important function to perform in 'letting in daylight
from the whole of the outside world'. As the BBC Yearbook 1949 noted, 'it is no
144 TNA, CAB129/22, CP(47)313, 24 November 1947.
145 TNA, CAB129/25, CP(48)71, 'The Czechoslovak Crisis', 3 March 1948.
146 Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.466. In addition to his regular broadcasts in the European, and
particularly Czech, Services of the BBC during the war, Robert Bruce Lockhart had been the
British representative to the Czech government in exile in 1940 and from 1941 Deputy Under-
Secretary of State in charge of the Political Warfare Executive.
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exaggeration to say that in Czechoslovakia in February and March almost every set
capable of receiving London was doing so day by day' .147 And the BBC was able to
receive on-the-ground assessments of what was going on from its own recently
appointed correspondent in Prague, Patrick Smith, as well as transmitting his gripping
first-hand accounts of the communist take-over for the British domestic audience.!" In
fact, three weeks after the coup, at a time when the External Services were under
intense fiscal pressure from Whitehall, an increase of £31,621 in annual expenditure
was given to the BBC by the government to 'cover developments in the European
Services' despite cuts being requested from the rest of the Overseas Services.!"
In many ways the Czech coup (and later events in 1948, particularly the Soviet
blockade of the western zones of Berlin) provided a practical example of how
broadcasting overseas, while not capable of effecting dramatic or immediate change,
was an essential, and sometimes the only, means of maintaining a link with countries
and their audiences either behind the descending Iron Curtain or in particularly
sensitive regions where the strategic battle of the early cold war was being played out.
Accordingly, Bevin argued that
'We should organise our publicity with a view to appearing as strong as we can,
lest other friends of Great Britain ... should be encouraged to think that they
must compound with the Russians while there is yet time. In the long run we
shall only retain our friends if we are stronq.:""
Being strong in publicity terms had already received full ministerial attention over a
month before the Czech coup when the Cabinet debated, at the Foreign Secretary's
instigation, 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy'. The failure of the Council of Foreign
147 'Overseas: Broadcasts to Europe', BBC Yearbook 1949, (London: BBC, 1949), p.101.
148 Briggs, Sound and Vision, p.524.
149 WAC, R1/16, Board of Governors meeting, 'European Services', 18 March 1948.
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Ministers in December 1947 to resolve treaty negotiations on Germany and Austria and
Ernest Bevin's personal anger at the refusal of the Russians to co-operate, in any
forum, allowed for a different tactical approach to be applied to foreign publicity that
until then had been rejected by Bevin. Peacetime overseas publicity, Bevin reminded
Cabinet colleagues, had
'hitherto been confined to supporting and explaining the current policy of His
Majesty's Government in foreign affairs and at home, to advocating our way of
life, and publicising our social-democratic programme and achievements ....our
propaganda where Russia and Communism are concerned, has been non-
provocative, and we have not attempted systematically to expose the myths of
the Soviet paradise.'
However, he continued, with 'the Russians and the Communist Allies... threatening the
whole fabric of Western civilisation' there was a 'need to mobilise spiritual forces, as
well as material and political, for its defence.' Bevin argued that it was for the United
Kingdom
'as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not the
Americans, to give the lead in the spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the
democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the
same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning
and social justice - what one might call the "Third Force".'151
On 8 January 1948, these issues were brought to bear at a crucial discussion by the
Cabinet on 'Foreign Policy in Europe' which co-ordinated several key policy strands.
Before ministers were four memoranda by the Foreign Secretary that reviewed Soviet
policy, evaluated recent events in Eastern Europe, advanced the idea of a union of
Western European countries and laid out plans for the future of foreign publicity
151 TNA, CAB129/23, CP(48)8, 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy', 4 January 1948.
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policy.152 In the last of these, on 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy', Bevin told his
colleagues that 'we must be prepared to pass over to the offensive and not leave the
initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves' and that to do this 'We
should adopt a new line in our foreign publicity designed to oppose the inroads of
Communism, by taking the offensive against it'.153 Ministers expressed concern that
'too much emphasis' was being laid on the 'anti-Soviet aspect' and the fact that this
would 'fail to rally the Socialist forces in Western Europe and would make it more
difficult to foster cultural relations with Eastern European countries.t'" Nevertheless,
the Cabinet endorsed the recommendations for future publicity policy, 'Subject to the
points made in discussion'l'" which, in effect, gave executive authority to embark on a
non-shooting war against the Soviet Union and communist forces throughout the world
in a 'vigorous systematic attack', as Jacob at the BBC described it.156
The decision concerning overseas publicity reached on 8 January 1948 was the
culmination of nearly two years of policy development within the Foreign Office in
reaction to the growing threat believed to be posed by an increasingly truculent Soviet
Union. The first stage in this development began with a request in March 1946 by the
Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, for a paper on how to
counter Soviet propaganda which was then carried out by Christopher Warner, Under
Secretary responsible for Soviet affairs. Completed at the beginning of April, it was one
of the first papers considered by the newly established Committee on Russian Policy
(Russia Committee), a Foreign Office committee set up to 'study Soviet activities and
152 The Memoranda were: CP(47)313, 'Extinction of Human Rights in Eastern Europe', 24
November 1947; CP(48)6, 'The First Aim of British Foreign Policy', 4 January 1948; CP(48)7,
'Review of Soviet Policy', 5 January 1948; CP(48)8, 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy', 4 January
1948. See TNA, CAB 129/22 & 23.
153 TNA, CAB129/23, CP(48)8, 4 January 1948.
154 Ibid. Christopher Mayhew, then Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, attributes
these comments to the Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan. See Christopher Mayhew, Lyn Smith
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co-ordinate counter-action' .157 The paper, 'The Soviet campaign against this country
and our response to it', argued in favour of publicity denouncing communism as a form
of totalitarianism although not directly attacking the Soviet Unlon.!" The Russia
Committee supported this and a working party was set up under Ivone Kirkpatrick, then
Under Secretary superintending Information Departments at the Foreign Office. The
subsequent plan for a long term propaganda campaign against communism, which was
initially approved by Clement Attlee, envisaged a collective effort involving British
Missions overseas, the Central Office of Information and the BBC as part of the
government's information services machinery.l'" The Foreign Secretary, however,
considered the plan too negative and while still pursuing a settlement with the Russians
was unwilling to see it implemented. Therefore, when it came before the Russia
Committee it was decided that nothing should be done before the next meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers.l'"
This first attempt at a co-ordinated response to Soviet propaganda had moved too
quickly ahead of the political debate and pre-empted the political support that was
required to see it implemented. However, what it had done was to bring together key
officials at the Foreign Office - Sargent, Warner and Kirkpatrick - in agreement on the
principles of how a counter-offensive should be conducted. In addition, the new and
increasingly significant Russia Committee, which effectively set the background tone of
the government's policy towards the Soviet Union, provided an institutional forum within
which such ideas could be maintained. Therefore, when the next stage in the
development of this policy emerged there was already a constituency of thought and
prepared action from which it could feed. And this time there was no political embargo.
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In September 1946 the JIC had been 'of the opinion that it is essential that some
immediate counter-action should be taken' against the 'serious menace' that
communism represented, but at the time Bevin held back in favour of pursuing a
diplomatic solution.'?' Fifteen months later, diplomatic efforts had run their course. The
Soviet withdrawal from Marshall Aid talks in July 1947, the creation at the end of
September of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) to coordinate the
actions of Communist parties in Europe, and the failure of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in December all sounded the end for hopes of a constructive settlement.162 In
anticipation of this final diplomatic failure, on 23 October 1947 Bevin requested that
plans be drawn up for a new and more aggressive propaganda offensive.l'"
Meanwhile, returning from the United Nations and frustrated by the West's
disinclination to respond to Stalin's 'worldwide campaign of subversion and
propaganda' Christopher Mayhew, then Chairman of the Official Committee on
Overseas Information Services and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, felt that 'the time had come for a change of policy towards the Soviet Union.'164
In a memorandum to Bevin he argued that 'if the Council of Foreign Ministers failed, we
should launch a sustained worldwide anti-communist propaganda oftenslve.'!" At the
behest of Bevin, Mayhew was instructed to consult with senior officials and after a
meeting with Sargent, Kirkpatrick and Warner - the architects of the earlier proposal -
Mayhew presented to the Foreign Secretary a paper on 'Third Force Propaganda,.166
Consequently, he was invited to Chequers on 27 December to discuss the paper with
161 TNA, CAB130/17, JIC(46)70(O), 'The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the
Extent of its Direction from Moscow', 23 September 1946.
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the Prime Minister who, he thought, was 'more ready for a lead on the ideological front
than Ernest is,' and was authorised to draft a Cabinet paper on the issue.?" This he did
with the help of Warner who watered down some of its Third Force elements and who,
by the beginning of 1948, was responsible for the Foreign Office's Information Policy
Department (established in April 1946 to coordinate overseas publicity after the demise
of the Ministry of Information) and the six regional Information Departments.!" The
resultant Cabinet paper on 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy' laid out the anti-communist
publicity campaign that ministers approved on 8 January 1948 and which, after the long
gestation period, now had the political support it required and would soon have the
necessary machinery with which to implement it.
In the Cabinet debate Ernest Bevin had argued that the 'most effective method of
countering Soviet propaganda was to provide specific information refuting the
misrepresentation made by the Soviet Government' - the answering back thesis.!"
'The only new machinery required,' the MayhewlWarner/Bevin Cabinet paper set out,
'would be a small Section in the Foreign Office to collect information concerning
Communist policy, tactics and propaganda and to provide material for our anti-
Communist publicity through our Missions and Information Services abroad.:"" This
Section became known as the Information Research Department (IRD) with Ralph
Murray, a former wartime employee of the BBC and future Governor, as its first head.
During January and February 1948 Kirkpatrick and others set about its rapid
establishment with particular emphasis laid on the recruitment of the journalists and
writers from Iron Curtain countries and by 25 February (the date of the start of the
Czech coup) Sir Orme Sargent was able to inform departments at home and missions
167 Mayhew, A War of Words, p.21. . .
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overseas in Circular NO.21 of the creation and purpose of IRD.171 Funded initially by a
budget of £150,000, by the end of the year an additional £100,000 was added from the
Secret Vote. 172 This additional funding, however, was not the only secret being kept.
While the existence of the department was not concealed, it was felt that 'to avoid
creating embarrassment for the Foreign Secretary in his dealings with foreign
Governments through diplomatic channels', its output should be non-attributable and its
specific anti-communist function should be kept a secret.!"
How, though, was this new policy to be integrated with the work of the SSC External
Services? In dealing with this, the Cabinet paper had been observant of the
constitutional niceties between the government and the SSC when it stated that the
'fullest co-operation of the SSC Overseas Services would be desirable' .174 However, to
judge the extent to which such co-operation would be forthcoming it is necessary to
take note of the pivotal role played by Sir Ian Jacob. In the late summer of 1946, as
Kirkpatrick was preparing his proposals for an anti-communist propaganda campaign,
Jacob was engaged in discussing with the Foreign Office the nature of the SSC's new
language service to Russia and advocating the use of more anti-communist material.!"
By October Jacob had been invited to join the Foreign Office's Russia Committee and
as such, with Sargent, Warner, Kirkpatrick and Mayhew, was intimately involved in the
very creation of the new publicity policy and Whitehall's plans for a propaganda
campaign. Indeed, it was the Russia Committee that was given initial responsibility for
instructing the activities of IRD and to whom the department had to report.
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172 Ibid., p.6. The Secret Vote is the budget set aside by government for the Intelligence
Services.
173 TNA, CAB128/12, CM(48)19th Conclusions, 'Foreign Policy In Europe', 5 March 1948; FCO,
fRO, p.9; Mayhew, A War of Words, p.23.
174 TNA, CAB 129/23, CP(48)8, 4 January 1948.
175 Michael Nelson, War of the Bfack Heavens, (London: Brassey's, 1997), p.14.
65
While in 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy' it was deemed desirable that the BBC co-
operate, in practice it would have been known that such assistance would have been
forthcoming, albeit conditioned by the rigid strictures established by Jacob to maintain
the independence of the Overseas Services editorial policy and presentation of its
output. Nevertheless, alignment with British foreign policy also included a pro-active
role in its formulation as Jacob maintained the delicate balance between the two
institutions from the inside of both of them. This included putting forward specific
suggestions such as his a call for more ministerial speeches containing material critical
of the Soviet Union and/or communism that could then be reported across the world by
the BBC Overseas Services and to particular target audiences.!"
To use Jacob's analogy of the BBC as a mirror reflecting British opinion, the External
Services with their ties to the government, inevitably reflected key trends and changes
in, and the administration of, foreign and publicity policy. The government's relationship
with overseas broadcasting through institutional architecture - such as the Information
Services Committees, regional Information Departments and the Information Research
Department - and on more personal terms with Jacob and Kirkpatrick being the prime
example, effectively wired-up the Corporation to the development of policy in Whitehall
right up to the Cabinet and the highest level of decision-making. This was not,
however, hard-wiring and it was not the job of the BBC to conduct foreign policy. As
Bevin explained to the Cabinet in April 1948, he was not in favour of the BBC accepting
'definite official direction as to their contents' as this 'would raise very serious
issues ... and might well diminish the influence and reputation in foreign countries of the
BBC's broadcasts'i!" As such, no changes to the recently minted BBC Charter and
Licence were needed as this deliberately flexible relationship sought to attune itself to
the government's new foreign publicity policy. Nevertheless, when strategic changes
176 FCD, fRO, p.6.
177 FCD, fRO, p.17.
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did occur in the direction and administration of foreign policy at the start of 1948,
vibrations in the constitutional as well as the extra-constitutional connections between
the BBC and the government were most definitely felt in Bush and Broadcasting
House.
In the BBC Yearbook 1947 (looking back on 1946) Jacob set out his conception of
where the BBC External Services fitted into the gamut of overseas broadcasters
around the world,
'Many nations broadcast to their neighbours. Some use their opportunity to
indulge in undisguised political warfare; others seek to amuse; others combine
information with interest, in a synthesis of friendship. It is among the latter that
the BBC places itself, in the confident hope that by straightforward, friendly, and
impartial speaking it is contributing to the future peace of the world.'?"
In terms of recalibrating and retuning the overseas services of the BBC to a world no
longer at war this was a fair. reflection of original intentions both within BBC
management and Whitehall. By the time it was quoted again in the BBC Yearbook
1949, however, the task assigned to overseas broadcasting as a result of the Cabinet
decision on 8 January 1948 was anything but straightforward. The need to come
rapidly to terms with a cold war where, once again, the BBC became a principal
mediator between Britain and estranged or strategically important communities abroad
entirely recast the broadcasting mould. It remained to be seen whether under these
new conditions the ties that bound the External Services of the BBC to Whitehall would
turn out to be silken cords or chains of iron.
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II. THE COLD WAR CHALLENGE
'In a country where civil liberties have been virtually destroyed and where the regime maintains
itself against the wishes of the majority of the people, the BBC is the voice of a free world.'
John Sterndale-Bennett, British Ambassador, Sofia, Bulgaria, January 1948179
4. BROADCASTING TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
1948: the year of change
The Soviet Union's tightening grip over vast areas of Eastern and Central Europe from
1945 and its ideological and military dominance over territories so recently liberated
from the ravages of the Second World War made it clear to both the British government
and the BBC that broadcasts to these countries would have a special role to play in
'letting in the daylight' from outside and the beaming-in of the Western, and particularly
British, world view."'" As a new 'dark silence' descended on the eastern half of the
continent, the BBC was soon receiving reports of people tuning into its broadcasts 'in
the same spirit as they were listened to by inhabitants of occupied Europe during the
war' .181 Consequently, these broadcasts came under intense scrutiny both from within,
as the BBC sought to determine the requirements of audiences made ever more
distant by the descending Iron Curtain, and from outside, as the Foreign Office sought
to lead the External Services in the direction it saw as most suiting the government's
objectives in Europe. Yet as all concerned were to discover, world war and cold war
were to be quite different for the BBC.
179 WAC, E2/327, Sterndale-Bennett, Sofia, to Ernest Bevin, 23 January 1948.
180 'Overseas: Broadcasts to Europe', BBC Yearbook 1949, (London: BBC, 1949), p.101.
181 WAC, R1/80/2, G51, 'Broadcasting to Europe', 12 October 1944; TNA, F0953/228,
PE1318/55/967, 'Comments on the BBC Bulgarian Broadcasts from May 4th - May ie" 1948',
British Legation, Sofia, to Ernest Bevin, 18 June 1948.
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In January 1948 the British Cabinet had viewed the fullest co-operation of the BBC as
highly desirable in pursuit of its anti-communist foreign publicity policy and in March
Bevin requested from General Jacob information on whether the BBC was 'reflecting in
their overseas broadcasts the changed international situation resulting from recent
events on both sides of the Iron Curtain' .182 Jacob considered that this was indeed what
the BBC was doing as 'listeners to the European Services are now hearing from Britain
first a great and encouraging story of Western resurgence, and secondly an ever
sharper criticism of Communist actions and Russian policy,.183 The view from the
Foreign Office was rather different. It had detected from the results of a review of BBG
services to Central and Eastern Europe (instigated in November 1947 and carried out
by HM Representatives in the countries concerned) what it considered to be 'an over-
developed sense of objectivity' that resulted 'not so much in a reputation for
fairness ... but in pulled punches & obscured viewpoints'T" What was needed, argued
officials, was for the BBC 'to adopt a more aggressive attitude' .185
A lack of aggression was precisely what Jacob had intended when he issued a
guidance directive for the European Services covering the period from January to April
1948 when much of the Foreign Office's monitoring had taken place. In it he
acknowledged 'that the breakdown of the last Foreign Ministers' Conference has put a
stamp of extreme gravity on world affairs; but our discussion of consequences should
remain as steady in the next few formative months as in the last days just after the
breakdown. ,186 This view was in accordance with the decision of the government's
Russia Committee, of which Jacob was a member, to delay the carrying out of the new
foreign publicity policy until the machinery required to enact it was assembled, for fear
182 WAC, E2/329, Warner to Jacob, 19 March 1948.
183 Ibid, 'Note on the European Service of the SSC', Jacob to Warner, 19 March 1948.
184 TNA, F0953/227, 'SSC Central and East European Services', 9 March 1948.
185 Ibid., 'Central and East European Services', 2 March 1948.
186 WAC, E40/251/1, 'European Services Directive No.12, 1 January 1948.
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of provoking 'a violent reaction on the part of the Russians' without access to adequate
means of recourse.!" By the spring, however, the pace of events now saw the BBC
lagging behind government expectations.
The pattern of broadcasting overseas (with the exception of the General Overseas
Services in English which at that time ran throughout the day and some of the larger
individual language services such as French) was one of concentrated short bursts
made up of the presentation of news, associated comment and the projection of British
political, cultural, scientific, economic and industrial life. In Europe, and more
particularly its eastern half, this was typically done in either 15 or 30 minute broadcasts.
For example, the daily programmes to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria
and in Serbo-Croat at the beginning of 1948 consisted of two 15 minute transmissions
of news and press review and a half hour programme of news followed by comment,
features and talks produced either centrally by the European Talks and Productions
Departments or generated within each service depending on its resources. Broadcasts
to Albania and in Slovene had even fewer programme options available to them having
a transmission time of just 15 minutes a day while Poland had an extra 30 minutes over
the average and broadcasts in English to Europe covered nine transmissions totalling
two and three-quarter hours a day.188
The review commissioned in November 1947 had asked HM Representatives to
comment on what they thought the BBC should broadcast to the countries to which
they were accredited and within Bush House there was 'general agreement' amongst
the relevant Programme Organisers with the comments made by the British Missions
concerning objectivity and passivity.l'" Nevertheless, Jacob felt able to claim in
187 TNA F0371/71687, Russia Committee meeting, 15 January 1948.
188 WAC E2/209/5, European Service: Output Reports, 3 January 1946-17 April 1949. See, for
example: Output Report numbers 7, 9 & 11 for details of broadcasts to these countries.
189 WAC, E2/327/1, H.C.Eur.S to Lean, 'Foreign Office Questionnaire', 24 April 1948.
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response to their criticism that since the review had been carried out the output of the
European Services was indeed now being 'planned in line with the Government's
publicity policy' as the Foreign Secretary informed ministerial colleagues at the end of
April 1948.190 This assertion was immediately put to the test with a second review,
commissioned on 17 April, in which Missions were asked whether 'the new publicity
policy ... and change in public opinion here regarding [the] Communist threat are now
automatically reflected in their output to Eastern Europe' .191 A final report based on this
review was not compiled until August, but the months in between saw a steady stream
of replies underlying the criticisms of the previous assessment and more besldes.!"
There were four main areas of criticisms from the second review that gave the Foreign
Office an agenda for change in the BBC's broadcasts to the satellite states. The first
two were concerned, as before, with what was perceived to be the 'false objectivity' of
transrnissions.l'" This, it was argued, produced the twin effect of misrepresenting the
British case while perpetuating a misleading account of Soviet news and views. When
reporting on life in Britain, the European Services adhered to the principle of
representing a range of domestic views on the issues of the day, mainly from
newspaper reports that covered the political spectrum. However, it was felt that this
genuine attempt at an unbiased projection of Britain gave listeners without an inner
knowledge of British society and its psyche an impression 'of complete bewilderment at
the apparent conflict of opinion which conveys an atmosphere of indecision and
confusion' .194
190 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN 231/1, 'Anti-Communist Publicity', 30 April 1948.
191 WAC E2/328, Telegram No.289, 17 April 948.
192 TNA,' F0953/227, PE1053/55/967, Note by Ian Grey, 2 June 1948; Ibid., PE1090/55/967.
Note by H. Verschoyle, 1 June 1948.
193 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2030/55/967, Warner to Mayhew, 11 August 1948.
194 WAC, E2/328, Sterndale-Bennett to Bevin, 18 June 1948.
71
By contrast, news of events behind the Iron Curtain (which were to an increasing extent
unverifiable) and on international developments from Soviet sources were considered
to be presented in too straight a way and consequently bore the imprint of Soviet
propaganda without the necessary corrective comment. The result, in the eyes of the
Foreign Office, was that the 'Soviet point of view is presented in clear-cut positive form,
whereas the British view emerges as muddled and indecisive' .195 The third criticism
was that, as before, more time in these short broadcasts should be devoted to
politically-oriented material while the fourth consistent theme was that 'more attention
should be paid in the selection of news items to the particular interests of listeners' and
that content as a whole should be tailored more towards local tastes in order to attract
and keep the audience.l'" With recommendations in hand the key question for the
Foreign Office was how it would approach the European Services of the BBC to effect
change on these issues.
A few days after the Czech coup of February 1948, the British Cabinet had examined
the possibility of establishing 'some organisation on the lines of the war-time Political
Warfare Executive' (PWE) to counter the exhaustive use of political warfare made by
the Soviet government. 197 This resulted in the establishment of a committee on Anti-
Communist Propaganda just over a month later with the Prime Minister, Clement
Attlee, in the Chair along with Bevin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps,
and the Minister of Defence, A.V. Alexander. This body was augmented, in terms of
"black" or covert propaganda, by the established machinery of discreet liaison between
the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Sir Stewart Menzies, the Directors of
Plans in the Service Departments and the Foreign Office. For "white" propaganda a
new arrangement modelled on the PWE was instituted 'for closer contact between the
195 TNA FO 953/228, PE1318/55/967, Note by Storey, 1 July 1948.
196 Ibid.: PE1460/55/967, 'The BBG's broadcasts to Eastern European countries', Memorandum
bv Bowen, 11 August 1948.
19'7 TNA, GAB128/12, GM(48)19 th, 'Foreign Policy in Europe', 5 March 1948.
72
three Services and the Foreign Office' which was intended to 'form a working nucleus
which could be rapidly expanded in case of need.'198
Thus an integrated system to manage political warfare at this early point in the cold war
and to inform government departments and their information services began to
develop. For the BBC there was a crucial difference between this new arrangement
(with its subsequent revisions) and the experience of 1939 when control over the
foreign services of the BBC had effectively been ceded by the Governors to the
government. In 1948 independence from government direction was a fundamental
principle of the External Services and one that the members of the newly appointed
Board of Management, who now supported the Director-General in the day-to-day
control of the Corporation instead of the Governors, were unwilling to give up. What
was required was a method of negotiation rather than a system of direction. 199
The Controller of European Services, Tangye Lean, felt the criticisms were strikingly
unreasonable 'to anyone actually engaged in the broadcasts' and he was 'satisfied that
a very high proportion of it is unfair and that the impression of an overwhelming
indictment which steadily builds up is grossly misleading' .200 Nevertheless, he did
consider that there 'are various points ...which we find helpful' such as the need for
'more news items concerning the particular audience addressed', more "re-writing of
news items ...which are misleading or even incomprehensible unless put into the
appropriate perspective' and the need for 'consideration of the special regional attitude
of mind in comment and programme material in general' .201 Likewise, in the Foreign
198 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN 231/2 'Liaison Between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff',
Secretary of the Cabinet, 4 May 1948.
199 During the war the Governors had acted as the 'executive'.
200 WAC E2/328, 'Embassy Criticisms of the European Service', Lean, 17 September 1948.
201 Ibid.
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Office there was a sense that 'the chief defects of the services concerned could
probably be remedied without any radical alteration of existing practice'?"
Christopher Warner, who succeeded Kirkpatrick as Assistant Under-Secretary in
charge of the Information Policy Department (IPD) in the Foreign Office covering all the
regional sections, was acutely aware of this potential and invested a great deal of
energy in building a relationship of mutual respect and trust between himself and Jacob
through which contentious issues could be discussed freely.203 The two knew each
other from their attendance of both the Russia Committee and the highly influential, in
terms of cold war propaganda, Committee on Colonial Information Policy.204 Jacob also
saw the value in a shared appreciation of the challenges facing the External Services
and in April 1948 had renewed his suggestion that Lean be put in touch with the head
of the newly created Information Research Department (IRD), Ralph Murray, so that
'projects could be talked over and ... suggestions could be made by US.'205 This initiative
resulted in their meeting for the first of many times along with the Controller of
Overseas Services, Robert McCall, for lunch on Wednesday 9 June at the Cafe Royal,
Piccadilly. However, it was the IPD and not the infamous IRD that was to have a more
influential and important role at this formative stage in reorienting the BBC's overseas
services and in continuing to advise the Corporation of Foreign Office and government
opinion. IRD, by contrast, was at this point a generator of material to be used under the
rubric of anti-communist publicity rather than the architect of that policy.
As relations became increasingly managed through persuasion so the personal
chemistry of the process became more important. When the British Ambassador in
Prague, Pierson Dixon, suggested a re-casting of the BBC's Czech broadcasts in the
202 TNA, F0953/228, PE1460/55/967, Memorandum by Bowen, 11 August 1948.
203 Kirkpatrick was promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary in April 1948 and was responsible for
~olicy administration for Western Europe.
04 Warner was additionally Chair of the Overseas Information Services Official Committee.
205 WAC, E2/325/1, Jacob to Warner, 26 April 1948.
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early summer of 1948 Warner was careful to involve Jacob as a partner in discussions.
The suggestion was to provide a 'short survey of internal news about Czechoslovakia
with particular emphasis on what is distorted or omitted in the Czechoslovak controlled
press'. In addition, argued Dixon, there should be 'fuller treatment. ..of the background
of world events as applied to Czechoslovakia and British policy with comments on the
way things are leading ... in Eastern Europe,.206 Given access to the correspondence
between London and Prague, Jacob was invited to a meeting at the Foreign Office with
Warner and the Prague Information Officer. Afterwards, Jacob gave an assurance that
it would be the Czech Service's 'aim to concentrate as far as we can on items of news
which are of real interest to the Czechs in their rather difficult circumstances' and to
'also try to avoid the practice, which is sometimes noticeable, of giving news items
which in themselves convey distortions without at the same time giving the
corrective'?" This was an important step in accepting some of the key criticisms to
come out of the wider review of overseas Missions and one that Jacob was well aware
that Warner would attempt to apply to services broadcasting to the other satellites.
General Jacob, unsurprisingly for a former insider, was 'taken fully into the confidence
of the Foreign Office', as Bevin informed his colleagues on the Anti-Communist
Committee.i'" However, the head of the sensitive East European Services, Gordon
Fraser, was considered by many officials in the IPD to be less cooperative than they
would have wished, preventing the kind of hard-hitting material they wanted from being
broadcast. By contrast, his counterpart in the Central European Services was seen as
much more amenable to Foreign Office overtures and it was noted by one IPD official
that
'the relations we have been able to establish with Mr Gregory MacDonald
enable us to do a good deal more by way of inserting material direct into the
206 WAC, E2/328, Dixon to Warner, 16 June 1948.
207 Ibid., Jacob to Warner, 16 August 1948.
208 TNA, CAB 130/37, GEN231 /1, 30 April 1948.
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Czech and Polish broadcasts at the suggestion of ourselves or HM Missions in
Prague and Warsaw than seems to be the case e.g. in South East Europe.,209
Nevertheless, it was Jacob and Warner who were the lynch-pins in this cold war
process with all major issues, of both contention and future development, being
deferred to their mediation. This was evident from the reprimand issued by Warner to
Foreign Office staff after a meeting with representatives of the SSC at which it was
suggested that the European Services institute a series of four-minute commentaries
after news broadcasts 'as a means of countering false objectivity, give local flavour,
and counter misrepresentations' .210 This had resulted in immediate objections from the
SSC with the Assistant Head of Central European Services, R.A.L. O'Rourke,
particularly concerned 'that transmissions to Central Europe were already so sharp in
tone that a sudden increase in special comments ...might not be desirable at this
stage'.211 Warner, who was supportive of the idea (which had clearly sprung from his
conversations with Jacob about the Czech and other services during the summer of
1948), considered the manner of its suggestion as both premature and inappropriate
and, as such, a tactical misjudgement: 'I regret that a proposal for a change in the
SSC's services was taken up...when the question of the extent to which the SSC's
Services are aligned to HMG's foreign publicity policy is under discussion ...with Gen.
Jacob,.212
209 TNA, F0953/228, Note by Hankey, 27 August 1948.
210 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2222/55/967, Note by Bowen, 25 October 1948. The suggestion was
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211 WAC, E2/206/8, 'Meeting at Foreign Office', 14 October 1948.
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The delicate issue of alignment had been at the centre of discussions between the
Foreign Office and the BBC since the results of the November 1947 review began to
filter back into Whitehall and revealed an apparent gap between Foreign Office
expectations and BBC practice. It was thought, as one IPO official confidently
commented, that 'General Jacob will be prepared to listen to suggestions from Mr
Warner about any changes provided that they are made in the informal way which is
now a common practice between them'."" Reliant on the Foreign Office for his budget,
required by Charter to avail himself of the advice of his colleagues in Whitehall and
genuinely desirous to stay in touch with government thinking, Jacob was indeed
prepared to listen to such suggestions. However, both he and Warner knew that any
argument for change would have to be vindicated against long-term assessments of,
rather than short-term reactions to, the emerging international picture in 1948.
Consequently, the case for change had to be assembled and proved.
Having prepared much of the ground over the preceding months, by the beginning of
September 1948 Warner at last felt in a position to discuss with Jacob in their entirety
'the views that we have formed as a result of the reports received from our overseas
posts'F" At a meeting between Mayhew and Warner, Jacob and Lean, the former
hoped to extract from the BBC executives, on the basis of the evidence provided, a
commitment to harden the Corporation's broadcasts to those countries under the
shadow of communism through a sharper critique of communist doctrine and practice
and a more unequivocal representation of the British case and attitude towards
international developments.
As Bowen informed Missions in Central and Eastern Europe after this key meeting,
Jacob had accepted that at times 'the BBC broadcasts suffer from what has been
213 TNA, F0953/227, Note by Dudley, 17 March 1948.
214 WAC, E2/328, Warner to Jacob, 4 September 1948.
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called "false objectivity'" and that a contextual balance needed to be found 'to avoid
giving too much weight to minority views as regards the Soviet orbit and
C ., 215 Th h .ornrnurusm . ere was, owever, a reticence to embark on a full-scale programme
of refuting Soviet misrepresentations not least, as Jacob argued, because the
Corporation's emphasis on the truth already did 'broadly counter misrepresentations'
and occasionally steps were taken to refute specific Soviet "lies".216 He also felt, and for
this there was some measure of sympathy in the Foreign Office, that a policy of
answering back would hand the initiative to the Soviet propagandists - a position that
had been assiduously avoided when dealing with Geobbels' political warfare machine
during the Second World War.
The other major issue on which the Foreign Office wished to see change (and for which
there was already a constituency of support within the European Services) was the
selection of broadcast items relevant to particular audiences. This had constitutional as
well as practical implications for the BBC when it came to the central component of its
overseas broadcasts - news. The government's July 1946 White Paper on
Broadcasting Policy had stated that the 'treatment of an item in an Overseas news
bulletin must not differ in any material respect from its treatment in a current news
bulletin for domestic listeners'r'" This central tenet had subsequently come under re-
consideration when HM Representatives were asked 'whether you consider these
regulations should be varied' .218 The response was mixed, but in general it was
concluded that while there was no need for a specific change 'more attention should be
paid in the selection of news items to the particular interests of listeners. ,219 Back at the
BBC the implications of this resulted in a fundamental discussion of principle between
215 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2030/55/967, Bowen to Gainer, 19 October 1948.
216 Ibid.
217 Broadcasting Policy, Cmd.6852, HMSO, July 1946, para.59.
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Jacob, the Director of the Spoken Word George Barnes, who was nominally
responsible to the Board of Management for the Corporation's News Division, and the
Director-General, Sir William Haley.220
Barnes believed that if the idea of the BBC as a single organisation was to survive the
pressure to speak in varying tones to different audiences then it was essential that
there was at least 'one service which is unaffected by considerations of home or
overseas policy' .221 News, he argued, should be 'determined by what happens and not
by what anyone wants to happen or the effect anyone wishes to make,.222 For Jacob
the cold war had made this purist approach, even from a broadcasting point of view,
anachronistic in the current climate: 'The truth of the matter seems to me to be that
broadcasting to one's own people is quite a different professional job from broadcasting
to foreign countries, and efforts to try and escape from this difference are efforts to put
one's head in the sand.,223
The News Division which had always had as its primary focus domestic broadcasting,
acted as the central hub through which the entire Corporation's news was processed.
And although within this structure there was a Foreign News Department, an Overseas
News Department and a Latin American News Department, very little assembly of
content was delegated to the External Services. Jacob was now seeking a degree of
flexibility not catered for within the current system of news production and distribution.
Renowned in government circles for his fierce defence of the Corporation's
independence, William Haley, a newspaper man to the core, also appreciated the need
220 The Director-General remained, of course, the BBC's Editor-in-Chief and constitutionally
responsible for its news output.
221 WAC, E40/252/1, George Barnes to DOS, undated.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., Jacob to DSW, 5 October 1948.
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for news bulletins to have relevance for audiences.F" Consequently, in trying to
overcome the combined problems presented by internal editorial objections, as argued
by Barnes, and constitutional requirements, as laid before Parliament, he firmly
acknowledged the 'overriding' principle that the treatment of overseas news would not
differ from that of domestic news.225 Nonetheless, "treatment" was not synonymous
with "selection" and he saw no 'objections to providing, within the framework of its
requirements, regional news bulletins assessed with an eye to the audiences' particular
interests' .226 In effect, this meant that the quality and integrity of the news put out by the
BBC would continue to be judged by the same professional standards across the
Corporation, although the balance and selection of the news would be somewhat
devolved. Although nuanced, the extra degree of latitude this afforded the External
Services did see the beginnings of a divergence in news production outlook between
the domestic and overseas services of the BSC.
In 1948 the resolution of this sensitive issue was the precursor to the internal
publication of a very important paper by Jacob in October that marks a fundamental
stage in the postwar development of the External Services. As he informed his senior
staff, the role of the BBC 'has been defined very broadly by Parliament in a White
Paper on broadcasting, and again in the Charter and Licence,.227 In light of the
significant changes in internal reorganisation and external contexts, both national and
international, it was now necessary to issue 'further interpretation ...for the guidance of
those concerned in our output' and 'to establish basic principles and methods' that
could be employed in order to meet an up-to-date understanding of what it meant for
224 Haley, who had edited the Manchester Evening News before joining the SSC, left the
Corporation in 1952 to edit The Times.
225 WAC, E40/252/1, Haley to DOS, 1 October 1948.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., Jacob to Heads of the Overseas Services, 6 October 1948.
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the External Services to 'frame their programmes in the national interest' .228 Entitled
'The Task of the Overseas Services of the BBC' it might be considered the first cold
war directive issued by the BBC for broadcasts abroad. To a very large extent its
contents reflect the substantive issues that had been discussed with the Foreign Office
over the previous months and which had been brought to bear at the September
meeting.
The triumvirate of overseas broadcasting principles - presentation of objective news,
reflection of British views on current affairs and the projection of British life - remained
as before, but as Jacob noted it was 'in striking a correct balance in our output between
the three main ingredients that our real problem lies'. Accuracy of news remained 'the
first importance' but while the object continued to be the presentation of a world picture,
'each bulletin should be built specifically for the audience to be addressed. The bulletin
when heard by that audience must not only sound objective, but must be highly
relevant and of close interest.' It was also necessary to impart a contextualised
appreciation where 'statements, speeches, etc... , which we quote and which may
contain inaccuracies, or which are misleading, should be placed in their true setting by
reminding the listener of the facts'. Accordingly, although the 'BBC has no view of its
own', in 'matters of international controversy a fair statement of the issues involved
must always be given, though, the audience must be left in no doubt what the British
view is'. But, where the Foreign Office had argued that clarity demanded the
elimination of confusion amongst the competing voices of Britain, Jacob was adamant
that 'conflicting opinions which have serious backing in this country should be allowed
expression in proportion to the weight of this backing. Apparent contradictions that may
arise from presenting these views helps to demonstrate the tolerance which is a
228 Ibid.; WAC, E2/208, 'The Task of the Overseas Services of the SSC', Note by the Director of
Overseas Services, 4 October 1948.
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cardinal feature of British democracy.' It was the application of this principle concerning
balance that would ultimately send the relationship with government fissile in 1956.229
Weighing these ingredients was a major preoccupation for the BBC and one that
revealed as much about the broadcasters' intentions as did the principles underpinning
them. The defining criterion was relevance: 'first to the general world situation, and
secondly and more particularly to the situation in which our listeners find themselves'.
This was fundamental and anchored the output of the External Services to its
geopolitical context while at the same time bringing the audience's needs into the
editorial process in a way that had not been done before. In this enhanced
broadcasting outlook where 'nothing should figure in our output which is not
consciously planned as being there for an object' the particular demands of
broadcasting to Central and Eastern Europe meant that the 'exposition of British life
and achievement in its main social, economic, scientific and cultural aspects' was to
have an increasingly diminished role: 'When we are speaking to people under great
political stress, we may have to confine our output almost entirely to news and current
affairs, as anything less relevant to their situation would prove exasperating,.23o
With this document, Jacob underlined his control over the higher direction of External
Service's policy and steered it on a course that reflected his own appreciation of what
the BBC should be broadcasting overseas. This was understood in the Foreign Office
where much effort had been made to convince him to follow a particular editorial path.
This focus on Jacob, however, presented its own problems as had become clear to the
Fa during the summer of 1948. In his memorandum based on the review of BBC
broadcasts, Bowen argued that
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
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'one of the reasons why the adoption of the new publicity policy has not been
reflected more thoroughly in the BBC's broadcasts to Eastern Europe appears
to be that some of the responsible officials are either not aware of the existence
of that policy, or else have not received directions to follow it' .231
Jacob's directive to the External Services issued on 1 January 1948 had called for
restraint in light of international developments and while there was clearly talk at a
senior level within the External Services of the direction broadcasts to Eastern and
Central Europe were taking through the Spring and Summer of 1948 this did not
necessarily mean that this discourse permeated to the output end of the broadcasting
process. As Michael Nelson noted, 'organisations concerned with external
communication are not, of course, usually any better in dealing with problems of
internal communication' and it was not until October 1948 that Jacob issued formal
guidance that reflected an accommodation with the intent of the government's foreign
publicity policy.232
Internal communications were only one part of the flow of information that needed
improving in 1948. Information about conditions in reception countries, the likes and
dislikes of audiences and their listening habits were assembled in a number of ways. In
Western Europe, for example, it was possible to conduct surveys on the ground to
supplement the evidence gleaned from correspondence and listener competitions.
Likewise, overseas trips by BBC staff helped foster personal appreciations of
broadcasting requirements and re-acquainted broadcasters with an audience they may
not have come in contact with, except through the ether, since before the war. In
Central and Eastern Europe surveys were simply not an option for western
broadcasters and fact-finding visits by BBC staff, when allowed, were an increasingly
fruitless endeavour. Numbers of letters from listeners behind the Iron Curtain also
231 TNA, F0953/228, PE1460/55/967, Memorandum by Bowen, 11 August 1948.
232 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, p.28.
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began to diminish as national authorities sought to tighten their grip on the ways and
means of communication with the outside world and correspondents became wary of
being identified as listeners of foreign radio stations. More and more the BBC had to
balance its own increasingly limited appreciation of life behind the Iron Curtain with the
information it received from the Foreign Office.
While the requirement on the BBC to seek the advice of overseas government
departments was certainly seen as an exploitable provision by the Foreign Office to
open up the External Services' internal editorial process it was also seen, by the
Corporation, as a necessary and important part of informing its programme output.
From the beginning, the Russian Service, which began broadcasting in March 1946,
had relied upon the British Embassy in Moscow to report back on the appropriateness
of the tone and content of the BBC's broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Jacob soon
stressed to his colleagues on the Russia Committee 'the urgency of making available
to the BBC background material' .233 After his arrival at the BBC in the summer of 1946
as Controller of European Services, Jacob set up a Political Information Section as part
of his office to act as the processing centre through which information from the Foreign
Office would pass. Here documents supplied by the Foreign Office and other
government departments would be kept in safe custody and used to draft 'background
notes and guidance directives' as well as to produce summaries in order to provide,
first the European and then the whole External Services, a 'complete picture of the
international scene'.'?' The staff employed in the Section also served the News
Division as Diplomatic Correspondents which in effect made them the appointed
agents of liaison between Whitehall and the BBC to 'supplement by personal contact
the information received in documents' .235
233 TNA, F0371/56886, N13979/5169/G38, Russia Committee meeting, 24 October 1946.
234 WAC, E2/208, Controller's Circular No.1, 'Political Information Section', 16 August 1946.
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Under this arrangement the BBC routinely received telegrams from the Foreign Office.
Until November 1949 these came under headings such as 'Political Distribution',
'German NO.1 Distribution' and 'European Reconstruction Distribution' .236 Following a
reclassification of the Foreign Office system the BBC received a reduced service under
the heading of 'Foreign Office and Whitehall' supplemented by 'Economic and Social',
'Weekly Political Summary from Berlin to Wahnerhide' and until June 1951 the
'FRAME' series on European Reconstructlon.F" In addition, at the start of 1948 the
British Ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Peake, had wondered whether it would be
useful to 'institute a system whereby all events which require mention or comment in
the BBC's Yugoslav service shall at once be reported to you in separate telegrams,.238
A few days later Sterndale-Bennett in Sofia also told his London colleagues that he
would 'try to keep you constantly advised by telegram of items of news which could
with advantage be emphasised here' .239 By the summer of 1948 a separate system of
telegrams from Eastern and then also Central Europe was established under the prefix
'ASIDE' which specifically contained 'information which has been ignored or wrongly
reported in those countries, and guidance on the treatment of such material' for the
BBC.240 In this way British Missions behind the Iron Curtain, especially in the absence
of other forms of feedback, became a critical ear with an important part to play in
advising both the Foreign Office and the BBC on the requirements of broadcasting to
these territories.
236 WAC, E2/327/2, J.B. Clark to Speaight, 14 March 1950.
237 WAC, E2/327/2, Miss Baker to C.Eur.S., 27 April and 26 June 1951.
238 WAC, E2/327/1, Peake, Belgrade, to Attlee, 12 January 1948.
239 Ibid., Sterndale-Bennett, Sofia, to Bevin, 23 January 1948.
240 In a letter to Jacob on 20 May 1948, Warner noted that 'by an oversight we have not replied
to Peake's suggestion in Paragraph 12 of his despatch [of 12 January 1948] that he shou~d
send us special telegrams on any events which seem to him to require mention or comment In
your Service and it is for that reason I suppose that he has not started doing s,o. We, ar~ now
asking him to begin.' It is unclear whether other Missions had started to do this earlier In the
year or only at this point. See, WAC, E2/324/2, Warner to Jacob, 20 May 1948 ;TNA,
F0953/543, PE233/1/967 Comments on the BBC broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries.
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Foreign Office telegrams of 'general importance or exceptional interest' were passed
by the Political Information Section to Tangye Lean, in his capacity as Editor of the
European Services, in time for his daily meetings with senior service chiefs at 10:30am.
It would then be up to Lean to decide what elements of these documents would be
passed on. In addition, Service Heads would be given a number of less sensitive
telegrams, relating to their services, to look at after the meeting. Ostensibly designed to
ensure the safe carriage of important and potentially sensitive information, while
protecting the confidentiality of the (sometimes highly classified) sources, the system
was considered, on the one hand, potentially too lax with 'a real danger of small, single
pieces of paper getting mislaid' while, on the other, unduly restrictive to the point of
getting in the way of the dissemination of lnforrnation.i" For example, as Jacob
informed Warner in September 1948, apart from the Diplomatic Correspondents, 'SSC
people never saw the ASIDE telegrams' .242 This came as a great surprise to Warner
and it was clear that this degree of security-conscious self-censorship was not what the
Foreign Office had anticipated when the ASIDE system had been set up. This was
soon remedied with ASIDE's being added to the list of telegrams passed to Lean.
The SSC's decision, at the end of November 1948, that 'sight of the FO telegrams must
be greatly restricted', and the subsequent overhaul of handling arrangements was
intended to provide both an increased degree of security and a more candid distribution
of inforrnation.r" More was to be put in Lean's morning file with a clearer guide to the
contents that could be passed on, but the most important change was the imposition of
the principle that no-one outside the Political Information Section, other than the Editor
241 WAC, E2/327, Mitchell to D.O.S., 24 November 1948.
242 TNA, F0953/228, PE1773/55/967, Note by Warner, 3 September 1948.
243 WAC, E2/327, Mitchell to D.O.S., 24 November 1948.
86
of the European Services, should have access to original docurnentaton.P" Instead,
telegrams received by the Political Information Section
'will in future be summarised in this office and sent to the interested individuals
under some such title as "Regional Gleanings". There will be no mention in
these Gleanings that they are based on FO telegrams, but the source will, of
course, be understood...and we shall feel able to write somewhat more freely if
Service Heads are not permitted to retain them.'
In this way the Political Information Section acted as an important filter in the flow of
information from the Foreign Office and other departments controlling, to some extent,
both the nature and quantity of information reaching individual services and the degree
to which official Whitehall output penetrated the inner reaches of the External Services.
Soth Jacob and Warner were keen to supplement these more formal arrangements for
liaison with informal personal contact between key individuals in the Foreign Office and
the SSC, as had been the case between Murray of IRD and McCall and Lean. During
the summer of 1948, IPD staff began to consider the need for a similar development
between HM Representatives in Central and Eastern Europe and the programme
makers in the External Services. At their meeting in September Warner had put this to
Jacob suggesting that they 'should keep up a two-way correspondence, our Missions
sending material which they would like to see used by the SSC (apart, of course, from
short-term material included in ASIDE telegrams), and criticisms of the SSC
broadcasts' .245 This was welcomed by Jacob and instructions were sent out by the
Foreign Office in the middle of October to Information Officers suggesting, perhaps
rather optimistically, that if they kept up a 'running commentary on their output we
should be able to avoid much of the misunderstanding and friction that has arisen in
244 Ibid. It was still possible, in special circumstances, for certain staff to view the contents of
Foreign Office telegrams and secured documentation from other sources in the Political
Information Section on approval from Jacob or Lean.
245 TNA F0953/229A, PE2030/55/967, Bowen to Gainer, Warsaw (also sent to Budapest,,
Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia and Prague), 19 October 1948.
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the past'.246 By the end of 1948, therefore, the distinct voice of HM Missions overseas
had been comprehensively added as a new ingredient to the mix of official voices
"advising" the BBC on its broadcasts to Europe.
After months of debate and negotiation and a year on, almost to the day, from the
Cabinet's decision to adopt an anti-communist publicity policy, Warner at last felt
confident that the strategic realignment of BBC services signalled as a result of that
decision had in large measure been achieved. As he informed Mayhew at the
beginning of 1949,
'the BBC have moved a long way in the direction of gearing their transmissions
to Eastern Europe to the Cabinet's publicity directive. My impression is that
General Jacob has completely accepted the principle that the programmes to
Eastern Europe should be almost entirely political, hard hitting and designed to
enlighten the BBC's listeners on the matters which their Communist masters
conceal from them or distort and that the necessary reorganisation of the
transmissions to Eastern Europe is now bearing fruit and they will continue to
get better.,247
This positive review was based on a report prepared by Barbara Ruthven-Murray of the
East European Information Department who, as Warner noted, 'has always been one
of the BBC's severest critics' .248 Ruthven-Murray observed that there had been
'a radical improvement in the BBC Services to the Soviet Satellite countries
over the past few months so that the services as a whole are adequately
reflecting our publicity policy in: (a) attacking the principles and practices of
Communism, representing it as a threat to Western Civilisation, and describing
in some detail the Communists' control and exploitation of the Eastern
246 Ibid.
247 TNA, F0953/543, PE233/1/967 Warner to Mayhew, 5 January 1949. In this context the
ohrase 'Eastern Europe' also covered Central European territories.
~48 Ibid.
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European countries; (b) stressing the high standard of living, the civil liberties,
social progress, and cultural development enjoyed in this and other western
countries; and (c) supporting the development of Western Union in all its
manifestations. ,249
Such changes accorded with the BBC's own assessment of its output at the beginning
of 1949. Reviewing the Central European Services, Patrick Ransome of the External
Services' Research Unit found that 'during the past year certain very marked changes
have occurred in the output' .250 In particular he noticed several altered characteristics
such as a much greater emphasis on news of world affairs which was of interest and
importance to listeners, at the expense of the projection of Britain which was much
reduced, and a heavy reliance on press reviews as a vehicle for this. As he wryly
noted, 'time is certainly not wasted on descriptions of camping in Cornwall or
recordings of noises at a wildfowl exhibitlonl'P'
By the beginning of 1949 there could be seen throughout the BBC's broadcasts to
Eastern and Central Europe an ever increasing engagement with the cold war. The
voice of Britain was beginning to speak in the context of a new idiom that, on the one
hand, reflected contrasts between Britain and these nations (and by extension between
ideas of East and West) while, on the other, reached out to emphasise a communality
249 Ibid., Memorandum by Ruthven-Murray, 4 January 1949; In September 1949 the Regional
Information Departments, except for the German Information Department, were replaces by a
Regional Adviser 'to advise Information Policy Department, Information Services
Department. .. Information Research Department and Cultural Relations Department on regional
aspects of their work, and for that purpose to maintain continuous contact with the appropriate
political departments. They will also continue ... the duties of the Regional Departments as
regards contact with visiting journalists, &c., and liaison with the Regional Directors of the BBC
Overseas Services.' Ruthven-Murray became regional Adviser for Eastern Europe. See, WAC
E2/327/1, Circular No.0108, 'Regional Information Departments', Ernest Bevin, 12 September
1949.
250 WAC, E2/120/3, Critical Notes No.25, 5 May 1949. Critical Notes were critiques of the
'Output Report' summaries sent to Jacob and the relevant Service Director as the basis of
discussions on the output of a particular service. See, WAC, E40/251/1, European Services
Directive No.3.
251 Ibid.
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of mind between the people of Britain and those listeners suffering under communist
domination. The argot of political and ideological differentness was employed to shine
a light on oppressive methods of internal governance and the part these states played
in the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time a direct appeal was
made to listeners in a vernacular that spoke of universal principles of justice and
freedom denied to them, but demonstrably in evidence in Britain. Output also
emphasised a sense of connection and empathy between peoples with a shared sense
of human dignity and rights, but who were divided by the Iron Curtain. Inherent in much
of this was the message that the plight of listeners was not forgotten in the lives of the
people of Britain.
Did these developments begin to undermine the balance of forces within the BBC
between domestic and overseas broadcasting and the sanctity of the Corporation's
independence from government? By the end of 1948 the tone of the External Services'
output had clearly changed and was plainly allied to an editorial policy that had an anti-
communist agenda, but did this mean that control had shifted from Bush House to
Whitehall? Such was the pertinence of this question towards the end of 1948 that the
BBC Board of Governors felt required to deal with it after receiving a report by Jacob in
which he had lamented the rise in negative broadcasting at the expense of the positive
projection of Britain. After a discussion that examined the 'question of direction by the
Foreign Office' the Governors 'felt strongly that control of broadcasts to Europe and
overseas generally should remain with the BBC' .252 But had this control already been
ceded?
In terms of specific content and the reliance of programme-makers on the Foreign
Office for output material, the answer was no. The agent of the government's anti-
252 WAC, R1/16, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', Board of Governors meeting, 11
November 1948.
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communist publicity policy, IRD, had limited success in getting its product directly used
by the European Services at this stage. Its "Digest" of activities in communist countries
and special papers on related issues such as 'Forced Labour in Russia' and 'Trades
Unions in Russia' were used by many services as valuable background information, but
very little direct use was made in broadcasts of material supplied by IRD.253 It was in
terms of the overarching administration of editorial policy within the European Services
that the influence of the Foreign Office, supported by the ears of the Diplomatic
Service, was much greater. This was demonstrated by the success with which, in
particular, Warner had argued for changes in BBC output. However, the very nature of
the method used by Warner revealed the acceptable limits of the Foreign Office's
power in this respect. Consensus and negotiation were the watchwords of this
relationship and the Foreign Office's success in shaping the nature of the BBC's
broadcasts to Europe, and by extension to the rest of the world, depended on its
powers of persuasion and a subsequent acceptance within the BBC of those
arguments as set against the Corporation's own outlook and interests. What is
significant, however, was the extent and manner in which the Foreign Office and its
relevant constituent parts, IPD, IRD and Diplomatic Service, had rapidly become a
fixed point in the ecology of cold war overseas broadcasting.
Jacob was keen to emphasise the reflective nature of broadcasting in the national
interest: the BBC as a 'mirror held to reflect the views and activities of the British
people,.254 In this analogy the External Services' job was to transmit an aggregated
image of British life in its broadcasts around the world. It is consequently possible, with
this simplistic conception of the national interest in mind, to see a linear progression in
253 WAC, E2/327/1, Murray to Lean, 1 January 1949. In January 1951 Gretton (A.H.E.Eur.S)
noted that 'with the exception of "Life in the Roumanian Peoples Republic", which went out in
Swedish and Turkish, I do not think any of these have been broadcast outside the Roumanian
Service... 1 think it answers Murray's point, that they have certainly not been generally
broadcast.' See, WAC, E2/327/2, Gretton to C.Eur.S., 11 January 1951.
254 WAC, E2/208, 'The Task of the Overseas Services of the SSC', Note by the Director of
Overseas Services, 4 October 1948.
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the changes the External Services experienced through 1948. In his directive to the
European Services covering the first quarter of that year Jacob had argued that
'opinion in Britain ... does not believe there is a fatality in events which cannot be
modified, and it is our task to reflect this impression' .255 The currents of the cold war
had been flowing ever stronger through 1947, but the following year saw them break
the surface and the waves made by the events of 1948 awoke the British public to the
growing international crisis. By November 1948, remarking on the 'striking
intensification of the antagonism between the East and West', Jacob acknowledged
that
'the "cold war" is now spoken of quite openly by responsible people. The British
Delegation at the United Nations has been making a succession of attacking
speeches, the battle against Communism in the Trade Unions has been joined,
and the press is full of articles on the Communist menace in all forms.'256
Accordingly, the point at which the cold war became an issue of widespread domestic
concern and debate in Britain, a point clearly reached by the end of 1948, it was
perceived to be in the nation's interest that the External Services take up an anti-
communist stance, in line with the direction of public opinion.
This was a development with which Jacob was not entirely comfortable preferring, as
he told his colleagues on the Russia Committee, 'to emphasize the advantage of living
under a democratic regime than to try and explode the "myth" of the Soviet Union,.257
He was a realist, however, and saw that the 'positive projection of Britain in the long
term sense tends to get crowded out by the mass of important current events revolving
round the great world struggle which has developed'F'" Despite his reservations, and
those of others in the BBC that 'we are tending to become too preoccupied with Russia
255 WAC, E40/251/1, European Services Directive No.12, 1 January 1948.
256 WAC, R1/84/5, G103/48, Report by Director of Overseas Services, 4 November 1948.
257 TNA, F0371/71687, N11882/765/G38, Russia Committee: Minutes of a Meeting held on 28
October 1948.
258 WAC, R1/84/5, G103/48, 4 November 1948.
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and with events taking place in Eastern Europe, at the expense of the more positive
exposition of Western civilisation', he could see towards the end of 1948 that the 'kind
of readjustment that I think we shall have to consider is doing rather more in Eastern
Europe at the expense of Western Europe or elsewhere' .259
Why these changes took place in the BBC's broadcasts to Central and Eastern Europe
can only be partially explained, however, in this reflective mode. Certainly Jacob and
the BBC were guided by public opinion in Britain, but the national interest was not
something that could, itself, be reflected. It was figurative, an extrapolation, an
existential spirit not visible in Jacob's mirror. Instead, the internal voices of Britain had
to be heard, listened to and translated into a form that collectively had something
resembling a national character. In short, they had to be interpreted, and it was the
manner of, and principles driving, that interpretation - its formula - that really epitomised
and gave meaning to the BBC's sense of the national interest. And it was at this point
of rendering that the External Services framed its output on the basis of government
advice balanced by public opinion, set against the Corporation's own experience
(heavily influenced by the recent war) of foreign-language broadcasting.
A prism may have been a more accurate analogy than a mirror - refraction according
to a prescription for overseas broadcasting, not reflection. In the case of Europe, the
Foreign Office's desire for the BBC to take a tougher stance in its broadcasts to Central
and Eastern Europe early in 1948 was not supported by a similar public appetite and
the European Services had to be coaxed along by Warner and others. By the end of
the year both public and government opinion was such as to permit the BBC to accept
this new tone in its broadcasts overseas. Such a combination of factors was powerful
259 WAC, E2/206/8, 'Output', D.O.S. to C.Eur.S., 24 November 1948; WAC, E2/325/1, Jacob to
Dudley, 14 October 1948.
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and helps explain a paradigm shift in broadcasting for the BBC forged in 1948 and
thereafter.
Entrenchment
Despite Jacob's wish for a more positive approach, the manner of the European
Services' editorial engagement with the cold war inevitably resulted in the move to an
increasingly tough broadcasting ethic in parallel with the general direction of British
foreign policy. And against a background of hardening cold war attitudes, restraint in
the conduct Britain's anti-communist policy was, by degrees, lessened. In January
1948, when Jacob asked his colleagues on the Russia Committee 'whether our
publicity would go so far as to encourage opponents to Communism in Europe',
Kirkpatrick replied that 'while it was our intention to attack the suppression of freedom
in... [the satellites states] ...we did not intend to incite opponents of the existing regime
to opposition' .260 By the end of the year, however, a sub-committee was already
investigating 'loosening the Soviet hold on the orbit countries' by
'promoting civil discontent, internal confusion and possibly strife...so that they
will be a source not of strength but of weakness to Russia and a drain on her
resources of manpower and trained personnel. We must hope to make the orbit
so disaffected that, in the event of war, it would be a dangerous area requiring
large armies of occupation and not a source of useful manpower for Russia.,261
Incitement to rebellion in British propaganda to Iron Curtain countries had, from the
outset, been prohibited by the Foreign Secretary on the basis that 'we are unable to
260 TNA, F0371/71687, N765/765/G38, Russia Committee meeting, 15 January.
261 Ibid., N13016/765/G38, Russia Committee meeting, zs" November 1948, Annex A, 'Terms
of Reference for "Cold War" Sub-Committee'.
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give them active assistance in overthrowing the regimes' .262 The quickening pace of
cold war imperatives and the hardening of attitudes towards them, meant that by the
end of 1949 even this principle was subject to amendment by the ministerial committee
on Anti-Communist Propaganda. On the back of a report by a committee of officials,
ministers removed 'existing restrictions forbidding (i) subversive propaganda in or to
the Communist-controlled countries; (ii) propaganda in other countries designed to
stimulate subversive activities in the Soviet orbit'. Proposals were in future to be
considered on a project by project basis by ministers.i'"
An upping of the tempo of Britain's anti-communist stance was also taking place
amongst the country's military planners which had implications for the conduct of
overseas publicity. In May 1950 the Defence Committee of the Cabinet considered a
report by the British Chiefs of Staff entitled 'The Need for an Increasingly Offensive
Cold War Strategy'. In it they argued that Britain should 'give the Russians no ground
for a degree of apprehension that might drive them to a preventative war'. Equally, the
'moral victory in the Berlin airlift (when, if ever, they were in a position to defeat us if
they had chosen to resort to force) shows that their historic tendency to hold back in
the face of determined opposition still holds good'. As a consequence, Britain and her
allies 'could afford to adopt a more forward strategy in the cold war' without being
'unduly anxious about provoking the Russians' .264 A year later, a reinvigorated
Overseas Information Services Ministerial Committee defined the aim of overseas
publicity as,
'To further our ends in the "cold war" by exposing Soviet and Communist ideas,
regimes, ends, policies and manoeuvres, by encouraging resistance to them
262 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN231/1, 'Anti-Communist Publicity' Memorandum by the Foreign
Secretary, 30 April 1948.
263 Ibid., GEN231/3rd Meeting, Confidential Annex, 'Anti-Communist Propaganda: Policy and
Machinery', 19 December 1949. These restrictions were removed 'on the understanding that
particular proposals for action ...would be submitted for Ministerial approval'.
~64 TNA, CAB131/9, 00(50)34, 'Defence and Global Strategy', 1 May 1950.
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everywhere in the free world and, behind the Iron Curtain, by enlightening the
ignorance imposed upon the peoples of the Soviet Union, China and the
satellite countries ... ,,265
The Foreign Office considered the BBC 'by far the most important propaganda weapon
we have in the "orbit" countries', but in this escalating context what direction did the
BBC's editorial line take in relation to its broadcasts overseas and to Europe in
particular?266 By 1949 the output of these services, while certainly not malign, was
hardly benign. The independent control exercised by the Corporation had prevented
overseas broadcasting from becoming a mere tool of British foreign policy, but what
were the limits to which the BBC was prepared to go in the robustness of these
transmissions?
In his October 1948 paper on the 'Task of the Overseas Services of the BBC', Jacob
had meditated on whether the rise of negative broadcasting 'implies that we are to
conduct political warfare' .267 His answer appeared to be an emphatic no, 'the BBC itself
is not conducting anything' .268 But on closer examination, what he then goes on to say
seems more equivocal:
'When as now the British people are engaged in a struggle to maintain their
existence and way of life in the face of a campaign of propaganda and
subversive activity openly designed to overthrow them, we must not in any way
shrink from giving full expression to the British view and to assist by all means
in our power the national effort. Only in this way shall we be framing our
programmes in the national interest.,269
265 TNA, CAB134/549, OIS(51 )5, 'Overseas Publicity', 16 July 1951.
266 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2030/55/967, Bowen to Gainer, 19 October 1948.
267 WAC, E2/208, 'The Task of the Overseas Services of the BBC', 4 October 1948.
268 Ibid.
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The Foreign Office, for its part, found it equally hard to define 'what it is legitimate for
the SSC to do in this respect', but on one key issue there was an accord of outlook
which effectively put a ceiling on the extent of the SSC activities: the External Services
would 'stop short, in their broadcasts to the Orbit, of inciting listeners to subversive
action vis-a-vis their qovernrnents'."? The Foreign Office SUbsequently informed
Missions in Eastern Europe that, with respect to the SSC's broadcasts,
'we have to guard against arousing false hopes that our strength will be used
within a foreseeable term for the liberation of the peoples now suffering under
the Communist yoke; and, indeed, there is some evidence that the peoples of
Eastern Europe in their despair are likely to be too easily encouraged to hope
that the forces of the West are about to march."?'
An interesting new development at the beginning of 1949 that gave effect to the
tougher line the SSC was taking in its broadcasts was the transmission of a series of
talks on the Russian Service by Grigori Tokaev, a Colonel in the Red Army and
specialist in long-range rocketry, who had defected to Britain at the end of 1947.272 This
was the first time the SSC had put a Soviet defector on air and in doing so broke what
until then had been somewhat of a taboo in the External Services over the practical
value as well as the ethical correctness of using such people as part of the anti-
communist armoury. Sut when the Foreign Office had approached the East European
Services suggesting the use of Tokaev its new head, Hugh Carleton Greene, was far
more amenable to the idea than his predecessor, Gordon Fraser, would otherwise
have been.
270 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2222/55/967, Note by Bowen, 25 October 1948; TNA, F0953/545,
PE1401/1/967 'Comments on criticisms by Lord Vansittart in the House of Lords about BBC
Services to Eastern Europe', 17 March 1949.
271 WAC, E2/327/2, Foreign Office to East European Missions, 9 June 1950.
272 For an account of Tokaev's opposition to Stalin's Russia see, Grigori Tokaev (translated by
Alec Brown), Comrade X, (London: Harvill Press, 1956).
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Throughout the early part of 1949 the use of defectors, emigres, dissidents and
refugees in broadcasts from Britain back to their former countries became highly topical
both in Parliament and in the more secret parts of the Whitehall machine. In a House of
Lords debate at the beginning of March the former Permanent Under-Secretary at the
Foreign Office, Lord Vansittart, raised the issue when he criticised the poor use of
refugees and emigres by the BBC.273 At the same time the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) was making great efforts to encourage deserters to the West and in cooperation
with IRD hoped to make use of the BBC's German and Russian Services.274 Following
a subsequent meeting between the Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office,
Lord Henderson, and the Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors, Lord Simon, the
BBC was told that the Foreign Office 'would like them to be as free as they can in
getting emigres to broadcast' .275 Care had to be taken, however, with this tactic as was
demonstrated later in the year when the British Embassy in Moscow criticised
broadcasts by the BBC in which the former Prime Minister of Russia, Kerensky, talked
on the topics of displaced persons and labour camps, as being possible to interpret as
mciternent.?"
In line with these developments, at the end of 1949 it was made clear to senior staff in
the BBC that services to Eastern Europe were indeed 'engaged in open political
warfare'."? This was the conclusion of Patrick Ransome of the External Services'
Research Unit in the regular monthly summaries of 'factual information about the
output' he prepared for the Board of Govemors.i" Much more emphasis, he
concluded, was being placed on examining developments in Eastern Europe as
compared with world affairs in general with services making increasing use of the same
273 WAC, E2/327/2, Foreign Office to East European Missions, 9 June 1950.
274 TNA, CAB159/6, JIC(Germany)(49)18 Final, 'Encouragement of Deserters', 11 March 1949.
275 TNA, F0953/545, PE1401/1/967, Note by Hankey, 18 March 1949.
276 WAC, E2/329, 'Broadcast by Kerensky on Displaced Persons and Labour Camps', 26
November 1949.
277 WAC, E2/120/4, Output Report No.29, 23 December 1949.
278 WAC, E40/251/1, European Services Directive No.3: 'Output Report', 3 October 1946.
98
scripts in pursuit of a regional agenda. This was augmented by comment on internal
affairs in countries such as Rumania and a much greater degree of "special angling" by
individual services.'?" Despite this, there was one communist country in respect of
which the BBC took a rather different approach.
At the end of 1948 there had been considerable disquiet in the Foreign Office and in
the British Embassy in Belgrade over the BBC's services to Yuqoslavia. The expulsion
of the Yugoslav delegates to the Cominform in June 1948 and the Soviet denunciation
of Tito had shown, as Lean noted, 'more vividly than anything else that has happened
the extent of subservience Russia demands from her satellites'."? Accordingly, he told
staff, 'We must prolong this sudden flash of light so that glimmers of it penetrate into
the most rigidly Communist minds.,281 The peculiar position of Yugoslavia - a
communist country, but no longer part of the Soviet "belt" - also led to peculiarities in
BBC services to Yugoslavia. As broadcasts to other countries in Central and Eastern
Europe became markedly more anti-communist in tone the desire to prolong the light
emanating from the Balkans meant that criticism of communist Yugoslavia itself was,
as far as possible, avoided. As a result the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Sir Charles
Peake, argued that the BBC's service did 'not make an adequate contribution to the
projection of the Government's anti-Communist policy' .282 In particular, Peake thought
that 'those responsible for the programmes seem primarily anxious not to "offend" this
country by too open a recognition of the fact that it is a militantly Communist state,.283
At the same time he recognised the need to 'widen the gulf that now separates the
Yugoslav leaders from their former allies ...... to the point when it becomes
unbridgeable, so long as that does not entail the fall of the Tito faction to their
279 WAC, E2/120/4, Output Report No.29, 23 December 1949.
280 WAC, E40/251/1, European Services Directive N.20, 29 June 1948.
281 Ibid.
282 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2779/55/967, Peake to Bowen, 11 December 1948.
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Cominform enemies' .284 Consequently, a tension and contradiction existed in the case
of British publicity to Yugoslavia between the wish to encourage the split with Russia
while adhering to the current anti-communist policy which by default necessitated
criticism of that country's leadership.
In walking this tightrope the BBC's broadcasts in Serbo-Croat and Slovene had
contained very little in terms of political talks programmes or comment outside the
press reviews, but there was an additional reason for these omissions. The Yugoslav
Service was understood to enjoy a fairly large audience even though no exact estimate
of its size was possible.285 This had been communicated through anecdotal evidence
such as that gathered by the Assistant Head of the East European Services, James
Millar, when he visited the country in the spring of 1948. Waiting in the Rumanian
Embassy for a visa for his onward journey a representative of the Yugoslav Committee
for Culture and Art informed him that a concert that week in Belgrade by the British
pianist Kendall Taylor had failed to be publicised and as a consequence very few
tickets had been sold. 'Then in your Serb broadcast' she told him, 'you announced he
was to play in Belgrade, and put him on the air. And the next morning we sold every
ticket.,286 This would not necessarily have come as a great surprise to Millar who during
the war, along with Gordon Fraser, had put a substantial effort into cultivating the
friendship of communist Yugoslav partisans and as a result had helped engineer a
listenership that had remained relatively loyal in the ensuing years. And it was this,
according to Bowen at the Foreign Office, that made both he and Fraser 'loath to put
out anything more than they were absolutely obliged to which might be unwelcome
hearing to the same audience now' .287 Nevertheless, there remained a need to come to
terms with broadcasts to Yugoslavia and the resolution of this dilemma in 1949 was to
284 Ibid.
285 WAC, R1/85/2, G42, Report by Director of Overseas Services, April 1949. Appendix:
'Listening to the BBC in Europe'.
286 WAC, R1/84/6, Ga11, 'Visit to Yugoslavia by James Millar', 26 April 1948.
287 TNA, F0953/229A, PE2222/55/967, Note by Bowen, 25 October 1948.
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have a much wider effect on all of the BBC's services across the Iron Curtain over the
coming years and would remould a key element of their governing editorial policy.
The essential difference between Yugoslavia and the Soviet satellites for the purposes
of broadcasting was that however much the Yugoslav public might have been opposed
to communist rule, they still took 'pride in their leaders who were the heroes of the
Yugoslav resistance during the war and, unlike Communist leaders in the other Eastern
European countries, were not appointed by Moscow' .288 The Foreign Office had
estimated that 80 per cent of the population in Iron Curtain countries at the beginning of
1949 were "anti-regime".289 The same could not be said about Yugoslavia. In addition,
the Tito/Cominform split had established an undeniable differentiation between the
oppressive and exploitative style of communism imposed by Russia on her satellites
and a model more akin to national self-determination. The trick was to avoid offending
these national sensibilities, while still managing to represent themes that were critical of
communism but which did not, as Warner explained to Jacob, 'militate against our
desire to attract Tito away from the Soviet orbit and towards co-operation on practical
grounds with the West'.290
Writing to Jacob on 12 January 1949 Warner suggested that in order to square this
circle
'we should avoid attacking Tito's regime and the Communist ideology on which
it is based and should concentrate entirely upon differences between the
Cominform and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Tito on the other, and on
factual information about the factors which might constitute common ground
between Tito and the West, without of course drawing the moral'.291
288 TNA, F0953/543, PE233/1/967, Memorandum by Ruthven-Murray, 4 January 1949.
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Two weeks later, after a meeting between Jacob, Warner and Mayhew, and on the
basis of suggestions made by Peake, a new line was agreed and adopted.i" No
opportunity should be neglected 'of reminding the Yugoslav listeners of the implacable
hostility of the Soviet Union and its satellites ... to Tito and his Government.' Time
should also be given to 'positive publicity for Western democracies, using every
possible opportunity of contrasting the freedom which their inhabitants enjoy with the
servitude of the subjects of the Kremlin,.293 What was missing from this agreement was
Peake's request that 'we should not (repeat not) ignore any gross manifestations of
Communist policy in Yugoslavia itself .294 Instead it was decided that any criticism
'should be subject to over-riding proviso that such attacks should not be such as might
tend weaken Tito's authority & regime' .295
Having decided that the 'best way to treat this sensitive aspect of the Yugoslav problem
was to give talks positively describing British institutions etc. and not directly
intervening with criticism of the Yugoslav set-up', the abstention from comment on
internal Yugoslav affairs in broadcasts continued.i'" Meanwhile, a great deal of effort
was put into widening the gulf between Yugoslavia and her former Soviet allies with
coverage of East European affairs and talks on conditions in the Soviet Union such as
Inside Soviet Russia written by the region's chief commentator, Walter Kolarz,
providing the primary focus.?"
Broadcasts to Yugoslavia retained an air of peculiarity in the coming years with
programmes, as Ransome described it, having 'more in common with our broadcasts
to democratic countries than with those designed for other communist regimes in East
292 Ibid., Warner to Jacob, 7 February 1949.
293 Ibid., Telegram No.40, Peake to Warner, 21 January 1949.
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Europe' .298 The effect of this was to open up a critical discourse on the different genres
of communism, which until then had not been systematically explored by British
publicity to Central and Eastern Europe. In November 1949 the Russia Committee
questioned whether all manifestations of communism should be treated as Soviet
inspired. At the meeting Jacob noted 'that the present British propaganda line was that
communism meant subservience to the Kremlin' .299 The example of Yugoslavia (and
that of China) suggested that other interpretations were possible and in doing so
changed a key aspect of the government's anti-communist publicity policy.
The Sovietisation (as opposed to the communisation) of the satellites led, in August
1949, the British Ambassador in Budapest, Geoffrey Wall inger, to argue that the
'underlying aims of our publicity on this theme should be to nourish and sustain the
traditional and deep-rooted pride of the Hungarians in their own history and culture and
their resistance to the imposition of an alien culture' .300 Based on similar analyses of
East and Central Europe, the idea that 'our publicity should be aimed at detaching the
Communists in the satellite countries from their allegiance to Stalinism, using the Tito
deviation as an example,' gained considerable ground amongst Mission staff as well as
Foreign Office officials in London.'?' So much so that by the time Warner came to
discuss this with Jacob in May 1950 the government's anti-communist publicity policy
had, in practical terms, already changed. Now it was possible to differentiate between
anti-communism and anti-Sovietisation/Stalinism in a way that better reflected the
reality of Soviet control over these countries and which, in turn, provided greater scope
for British publicity overseas.
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Far from reacting to these developments the External Services had, in this instance,
stolen a lead on Whitehall. At the end of 1949 it was noted that in broadcasts to Central
Europe the 'primary and undisguised purpose is to expose the imperialist character of
Soviet foreign policy and to discredit Stalinism as a corruption of the original ideas of
the Russian Revolution' .302 This had been skilfully done in David Graham's serialisation
of Isaac Deutscher's Stalin: a Political Biography, and in his scripts on banned sources
for a history of the October Revolutlon.P" In talks widely used by both the Central and
East European Services, Kolarz examined speeches made by members of the
Politburo 'to illustrate the remarkable and unscrupulous changes in Soviet policy' in his
series Ten Years AgO.304 The general picture that emerged 'was one of economic
strain, political terror and administrative oppression; against this background could be
perceived the figure of a mammoth Russia dominating the USSR, and threatening the
national life of the satellites should they ultimately be incorporated into the Soviet
system' .305 In tune with this approach, in November 1949 the Bulgarian Service's
weekly Dobson's Political Chronicle (written by the broadcaster and historian Malcolm
Mackintosh) attacked the recently introduced system of 'communist justice', and asked,
'Is there anything Bulgarian left in Bulgarian public life?,306
When it came to examining East European affairs, the main focus inevitably continued
to be the Tito-Stalin split and talks like Foundations of Titoism appealed to the idea of
'national deviationism'. Others focused on 'the extent to which the USSR is gaining
more and more control over the domestic concerns of these countries and is using that
302 WAC, E2/120/4, Output Report No.29, 23 December 1949.
303 Ibid., 'Critical Notes', 6 January 1950. The BBC programme was called Life of Stalin. Isaac
Deutscher moved to Britain from his native Poland, where he had been expelled from the Polish
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control to further its own selfish and expansionist ends?" Accordingly, when Warner
met with Jacob and Carleton Greene on 17 May 1950 about the changes in anti-
communist publicity policy it was, in effect, to confirm a change that had already taken
place. But it was only one part of a set of proposals for overseas broadcasts the
Foreign Office had been examining over the previous year.
In 1949 the Russians had embarked upon a new offensive in its propaganda to its
satellites and to the world. The 'Peace Campaign' was designed to engender a benign
interpretation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives at a time when the West's
growing unity could be portrayed as a prelude to aggression against communism,
particularly in light of the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. The campaign also
argued that rather than being a source of menace. 'Soviet might,' as Wallinger
characterised the Russian position, was 'by its very mightiness, a factor for peace,.308
To counter these assertions Wallinger suggested that 'we might ourselves develop a
slogan of our own in the word "Truth".,309 In fact, the 'Use of Words in Propaganda' and
the construction of a lexicon critical of communism, was a theme that had already been
investigated by a Working Party of the Colonial Information Policy Committee. Led by
the head of IRD, Ralph Murray, the Working Party recruited the expert help of the BBC
European Services' Walter Kolarz and the Hungarian born author Arthur Koestler,
who's The Yogi and the Commissar had recently attacked to great effect the evils of
Stalinism."? With the subsequent paper approved by ministers in March 1949, it was
hoped that the persistent use of particular words 'may contribute to bringing home to
world opinion the reality of the state of affairs which the Soviet Union have created
within their own borders and those of their satellites, and also of their foreign policy' .311
When presented with the results of the committee's work, Jacob informed the Foreign
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105
Office that there was little the SSC could do directly, 'but if the suggestions in the
memorandum gain public currency through their use by speakers and in the Press etc.
that fact will make itself apparent in our output' .312
Meanwhile, after examination by IRD, Wallinger's proposal was brought to the attention
of the Russia Committee in September 1949 where it was suggested that perhaps the
best antidote to the Soviet peace campaign was 'the publication of a steady flow of
facts to prove Russian insincerity.?" Jacob, who was at that meeting, was uncertain
that the Soviet strategy could be countered by 'a series of elaborate proofs that it was
fundamentally fraudulent. A simple, positive reply was needed.'314 Whether he
specifically agreed that 'the most successful method was likely to be some positive
campaign with a simple slogan' as the Russia Committee concluded that day, is not
entirely clear. However, when the proposal that 'our publicity services should run a
"truth" campaign to counter the Communist "peace" campaign, using some slogan or
refrain similar to the wartime device of the "V" sign' reached him in his capacity as
Director of External Services it was met with a stern refusal. As Warner subsequently
informed Missions in Eastern Europe, the 'SSC's reputation for presenting the truth is
already an accepted fact, and it would not be likely to be further enhanced
by... constantly proclaiming it'.315
Jacob objected to the idea of a campaign preferring instead that any 'theme of this
kind, while systematically planned and carried through over a long period, should fit in
as a natural part of the output, and should not appear to the listener as being a special
312 Ibid., Jacob to Speaight, 27 April 1949.
313 TNA, F0371/77624, N8665/1052/38G, Russia Committee meeting, 27 September 1949. For
comparative details on the American 'Campaign of Truth' see, Detty, Anti-Communist
Propaganda, pp.139-143.
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stunt or an obvious line of propaganda'.316 For example, the rule of law and the
contrasts between the British and Soviet judicial systems had for a long time been the
subject of regular programming in such series as Freedom Under the Law by Lord
Justice Denning and The Law at Work which presented trials in Britain 'as illustrations
of the application of fundamental legal principles'. 317 This approach drew its dividend
when it was able to put into relief, in the course of regular transmissions, judicial
abuses such as the trial of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Rajk, on the
politically-motivated charges of conspiracy to overthrow his own government and his
subsequent execution in October 1949. Even when Warner suggested that the concept
of freedom could be made the 'counter to the Communist "peace" motif, Jacob's
objection, as Warner noted, remained: 'the repetition of a slogan can do no more than
implant a message which, if it creates an atmosphere of expectancy and bears no fruit,
is likely at the worst to create irritation and at the best to be ineffectual' .318
Another Foreign Office proposal at the end of 1949, to hold up to ridicule the
techniques of communist propaganda, was more favourably received by the BBC.
Proposed by the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Donald Gainer, it was supported
by other such as Pierson Dixon in Prague who thought it was 'a powerful weapon with
which to penetrate into the enemy's carnp?" The value of 'current political jokes'
behind the Iron Curtain to the topicality and incisiveness of BBC broadcasts overseas
was already understood and now it was thought that satire, in particular, could play an
important part in deflating communist propaqanda.F? This was a suggestion readily
accepted by Jacob and one on which the BBC already had some form with the satirical
programmes Les Trois Amis and Kurt und Willi considered as some of the BBC's 'most
316 Ibid., Jacob to Warner, 21 June 1950.
317 WAC, E2/120/4, Output Report No.32, 20 April 1950.
318 WAC, E2/327/2, Foreign Office to East European Missions, 9 June 1950.
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320 In April 1949 Hugh Carleton Greene asked British Embassies and Legations in Eastern
Europe to 'provide us from time to time with current political jokes'. The instruction was sent out
on 3 May 1949. See, TNA, F0953/545, PE1374/1/967, Greene to Bowen, 22 April 1949.
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successful wartime broadcasts'Y' Warner was concerned, however, that this 'vigorous
systematic attack' should not be reduced to 'mere sniping': 'We do not want to
advertise individual lies, but shake the faith of the Soviet and Communist listeners in
the whole of Soviet publicity and to indoctrinate non-Communists as to how to guess at
the truth behind Communist propaganda' .322
Guessing at that truth lay at the heart of a separate suggestion by Dixon whereby the
main objectives of communist propaganda and the likely themes and methods
employed to achieve them would be examined and anticipated by the SSC. These
techniques would be explained to listeners 'in advance of the many anniversaries and
other occasions used by Communist propaqandaF' The audience would then 'be
invited to make its own guess of the gambits likely to be employed and compare results
with the eventual treatment of the subject by the Communist machine,.324 It was hoped
that 'not only will we be able to help our audiences see through Communist
propaganda by mildly holding it up to derision, but we may also be able to cause some
disruption to the Communist machine by making it change its tactics at the last
minute,.325 Interestingly, when the information for this calendar of criticism was
collected by the Foreign Office, a major source was the SSC's own Monitoring Service
which was able to provide detailed accounts of how the authorities in Russia and the
satellites had handled these targets of propaganda in the past.
Discussions such as these over the approach to be taken in broadcasts to Europe were
enhanced by further liaison between officials at the Foreign Office and the SSC. In April
1949 Carleton Greene had asked for an increase in information received from the
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324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
108
Missions in Eastern Europe as programmes to the region became increasingly reliant
on these sources for guidance, reports on propaganda trends and items of internal
news.
326Writing to Information Officers across the region, the Foreign Office's Eastern
European Information Department remarked that,
'in some respects our activities now almost resemble those of the war-time PID
[Political Information Department] in the way that we not only give the SSC
guidance on and the background to current political events, but also bring to
their attention items from Orbit propaganda, domestic and external, which they
can turn to account' .327
A year later, in the summer of 1950, an arrangement was worked out between Tangye
Lean Ralph Murray, to consult on issues of long-term planning. For some time the SSC
European Service's Walter Kolarz had been in very close touch with IRD and, as
Murray noted, 'has had the run of the department to a large extent'.328 For example,
when preparing an important new series for the European Services entitled
Communism in Practice he had consulted with IRD 'in conformity with his usual habit of
discussing the most useful themes for broadcasts and the material which can be made
available to illustrate them,.329 News of this venture led Murray to suggest that there
may be 'advantage in our forming some sort of a joint body' in which to discuss
'forwardly planned output on Cornmunisrn'r'" As a result, it was arranged for G.G.
Mosley (Overseas Talks Manager) and D. Hodson (Head of European Talks) to meet
on a quarterly basis with Murray at the Foreign Office to keep each other 'informed of
the trends ... and also to discuss any forthcoming points of foreseeable tmportance.t"
The first of these meetings was held in November 1950.
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By the early 1950s, the editorial shifts of the previous few years meant that BBC
services to Central and Eastern Europe were primarily intended for audiences 'already
overwhelmingly hostile to communism,' and programmes sought to 'inform and sustain
our friends and hardly attempt to shake the faith of the ruling minority' .332 The loss of
civil liberties, the Sovietisation of the satellite armies and the exploitation by Russia of
these countries' natural resources in the interests of the Soviet war economy became
regular themes in output.f" And as the cold war intensified, the BBC's European
Services remained on the auditory and psychological frontline beaming the voice of
Britain into the darkest reaches of communist Europe.
The massive broadcasting effort directed to Europe from Britain at the end of the 1940s
and into the 1950s was an acknowledgment not only of the continents' continued
strategic importance after the Second World War, but also the value of the BBC's
European Services as a means of carrying the voice of Britain to its populations. This
value, especially in reaching those countries in Eastern Europe increasingly
inaccessible to other forms of communication, was well recognised by the Foreign
Office and singled-out radio as the most important tool of British propaganda to the
region. That the BBC was an outlet for propaganda is uncontroversial. By merely
sticking to its most basic purpose of broadcasting objective news, adding comment and
projecting British attitudes the BBC was engaged in a type of propaganda that sought
to inform listeners, for the purposes of persuasion and understanding, of the British
point of view. However, as the strategic environment changed the pressure on the
External Services to change with it grew.
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The decision by the Cabinet in January 1948 to adopt an anti-communist foreign
publicity policy did not have an immediate effect on the BBC's European Services, but
by the time of the signing of the Atlantic Pact over a year later the character and output
of the Central and Eastern European Services had changed significantly. The
projection of Britain fell victim to broadcasting requirements that increasingly devoted
the major share of transmission time, beyond news bulletins, to political comment.
Programmes began to be designed specifically to undermine Soviet propaganda and
targeted Russian oppression in the Satellites. The reason for this change was the
BBC's reinterpretation, under pressure from the Foreign Office, of what it meant for the
External Services to broadcast in the national interest. As a consequence, by the end
of the decade, these services were clearly engaged in political warfare with an
important proviso - the BBC would not encourage incitement to rebellion.
The government's wish that the BBC's External Services should be a key advocate of
its new publicity policy was tempered by an understanding that their independence
from direct government control was also of vital importance to the credibility of the
voice of Britain. The BBC, for its part, reasserted its commitment to retain control of
broadcasts overseas despite the intense external pressures that made international
broadcasting a powerful weapon in the cold war. As the tempo of the crisis increased
so to did the prominence and influence of this broadcast effort. In managing the internal
changes that inevitably shadowed developments in the outside world, Jacob relied on
three orientating factors to guide him. The ideas and opinions of the people of Britain
combined with the advice offered by the government gave the raw material for the third,
the corporate mind of the External Services heavy in experience of broadcasting in war
conditions, to assemble an editorial line based on its interpretation of the national
interest. This was augmented by an enhanced system of liaison and better flows of
information between Bush House and the Foreign Office supported by representatives
in Missions overseas.
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Although there may have been little change in the basic format of transmissions to
Central and Eastern Europe from the late 1940s into the 1950s - relatively short
broadcast periods with news at the centre supported by press reviews, comment, talks
and features - the tone of these programmes radically altered. A means of
broadcasting for the cold war was forged, one that continued to depend on the
objectivity of the news output, but which had gained an editorial selectivity used to
criticise the oppressive methods of communism and advertise the freedoms of British
and Western democracy. What was established in this period was metabolised by the
External Services so that the very nature of broadcasting overseas by the BBC was,
henceforth, infused with cold war purpose.
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5. BROADCASTING TO RUSSIA
The BBC Russian Service
1948 had proved to be a very important year of transition for the Central and Eastern
European Services setting in motion many trends in output that were to mature in the
coming years of the cold war. More attention was paid to disputes between the Soviet
Union and the West as the political content of these broadcasts was increased and
sharpened. In addition much greater emphasis was put on local and regional news as
Bush House sought to address its listeners on issues of particular interest. In stark
contrast to these developments, however, the BBC's broadcasts to Russia remained,
as one Foreign Office official noted towards the end of 1948, 'almost entirely non-
political', consciously avoiding the kind of critical engagement that had become such a
marked characteristic of its regional counterparts.F" This apparent imbalance reflected
an editorial belief that unlike the populations of the satellite countries the Russian
listener had been 'so oversupplied with Soviet political propaganda that he required
enticing to listen to the BBC with a good deal of culture and entertainrnent'r'" As a
consequence, the output of the Russian Service reflected this conventional wisdom,
but it was not long before dramatic changes altered both the purpose and reception of
these broadcasts.
Broadcasts by the BBC in Russian to the USSR began on the evening of 24 March
1946 with the words 'Govorit London' - 'This Is London' .336 In that programme,
transmitted just one month after the Foreign Office had requested the BBC to start
broadcasts, listeners in Russia were given a talk on what to expect from the European
334 TNA, F0953/229A, Note by Bowen, 15 November 1948.
335 WAC, E2/329, Warner to Jacob (written by Bowen in Warner's absence), 2 March 1949.
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Services of the BBC.337 That they did not already know was the result of a curious
combination of factors which had prevented regular broadcasting in Russian during the
Second World War while the BBC spoke to the rest of Europe in its various native
tongues. In the first place there was considered to be little demand in Russia for news
from Britain. In addition, there were only a relatively small number of privately owned
radio sets that could be tuned to the BBC while the majority of the listening Russian
public only had access to radio through shared wired wireless and cabled speaker
networks over which a large degree of control could be exercised.P" Most significantly,
however, the decision not to broadcast to the Soviet Union was motivated primarily, as
Julian Hale has noted, by 'fear of upsetting the delicate relations between Britain and
her essential but difficult ally'. 339 At the beginning of 1946, as it became increasingly
important to the government to construct a counter-offensive against Soviet
propaganda aimed at the West, this crucial stricture was swept aside.340
It was not the intention, however, that broadcasts to Russia should in any way be
combative. Indeed, quite the opposite was true. The purpose of these programmes, as
the BBC's Board of Governor's noted, was 'to build up a large and friendly audience'r'"
Their object was to
'present listeners in the Soviet Union a straightforward, honest News Bulletin, a
comprehensive review of Britain, Parliament, and other British institutions,
scientific and cultural achievements and sporting events (particularly football
and chess) which we know to be of interest; and to elucidate in a varied manner
and from as many fields as possible the British way of life.,342
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It was certainly not the intention to 'indulge in polemlcs'P" Accordingly, the visit of the
Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the BBC on the first anniversary of
the Russian Service provided an 'admirable opportunity for the projection of Anglo-
Russian friendship' .344 Although members of the delegation declined the offer to speak
on the Russian Service, Colonel-General Gromov expressed the hope, in a speech at
Bush House, that these broadcasts would help to create an understanding between the
British and Soviet peoples.t" This was certainly the intention behind the sympathetic
broadcast description of the Delegation's visit to the Marx House library which
'reflected the emotion felt by the Russians on seeing the room where Lenin edited his
newspaper' .346
Regardless of intentions, however, there was still great difficulty in arriving at an
appreciation not only of what the audience wanted to hear, but how many could
actually pick up the BBC's Russian Service. Soon after broadcasts began the British
Charge d'Affaires in Moscow estimated that there were two million receiving sets in
Russia.?" By 1947, using Soviet projections of its postwar 5-Year Plan it was thought
that there were five and a half million radios (in addition to 6 million wired wireless radio
points) in the USSR.348 Starved of anything other than these official figures, British
assessments rose to between six and seven million sets by the end of 1949 and 8
million by 1951.349 These increases provided a substantial enough perceived audience
to make broadcasts by the BBC an essential element of Britain's communication
strategy to Russia.
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The Russian Service soon settled into a pattern of three daily transmissions of 'news
and programme' (0430, 1645 and 1945 GMT). While news bulletins were intended to
give 'full and accurate reports of world events' in the rest of the programme
'controversial topics were usually not handled directly' resulting in a predominance of
projection of Britain material 'carefully angled for an audience largely ignorant of many
of the assumptions of West European life and long subjected to a thorough process of
conditioning by Soviet propaqanda'P" Discussion of world affairs was restricted to a
weekly talk by the regional commentator, Anatol Goldberg, the twice weekly selection
of press comment and other very occasional talks. Assessing whether this approach
was successful, though, was significantly hampered by the increasing lack of feedback
from sources in the Soviet Union.
Information about listening habits and tastes was already difficult to come by, but as
Russia became increasingly closed off in the years after the war this reduced flow
hardly even trickled. The British Embassy in Moscow became the major provider of
information about BBC broadcasts to Russia, primarily in terms of audibility and critical
assessments of the tone of voice used, though occasionally there were snatches of
local human intelligence. In 1946-47 130 letters were received from listeners across the
USSR, but this figure dramatically ebbed in the following years. Interviews with visitors
to Russia provided an important source of information as did talks with members of the
Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Europe which revealed listening by some Red Army
units despite strictures against this. Finally, refugees also helped provide the
semblance of a profile of the Russian listener.351 Such information as was available,
however, did receive careful attention. This was never more so than with the case of
Mrs Watts, an English woman who had lived in Moscow for 11 years, who reported to
the British Embassy about the 'English and White Russian intonation' of BBC Russian
350 WAC, E2/209/5, 'Output Report No.11', 27 August 1947.
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Service announcers that gave an 'old world' atmosphere to the broadcasts.F' This
negative critique of the voice with which the BBC spoke to Russia was supported by a
Listening Panel established at the Embassy which led the Press Attache there to
describe the tone of these broadcasts as 'exaggerated Oxford' - most unpopular with
the Russian listener.353 As a consequence a great deal of reorganising effort was put
into developing contemporary accents and improving translations which by the
beginning of 1948 (after, for example, the recruitment of staff from Displaced Person
Camps in Germany) was considered to have been successtul.P"
By the summer of 1948, broadcasts to Russia maintained the same format as those of
a year earlier, but there was an important shift occurring in the nature of the output.
When reviewing them for the Board of Governors, Patrick Ransome of the BBC's
Research Unit noted that the very clear policy guiding these transmissions to Russia
had 'been modified in some important respects'. While Ransome thought the 'approach
to our audience' had not changed, using a tone that was 'invariably a friendly one' that
tried 'to insinuate into the minds of our listeners a picture of British foreign policy and of
the British domestic scene that does not instantly arouse a hostile or incredulous
reaction', he did think that 'the subject matter of our programmes has become less
unbalanced in that they no longer preserve so great a detachment from the real and
therefore controversial issues of the day'.355 The combined effect of this could most
readily been seen in the broadcasts of Goldberg. His regular Sunday commentary
entitled Notes By Our Observer now dealt with issues 'immediately affecting the clash
between Russia and the West', although Goldberg's 'approach was always a friendly
one, the note being one of regret at the strained relations between East and West
rather than of reproach for Russian behaviour'. For example, in a talk on the Berlin
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blockade in July 1948 'he produced a completely objective account of what had
actually happened ... though when dealing with the Moscow conversations [secret talks
between Britain, America and Russia] he made it clear that the Western Powers would
refuse to negotiate under duress'. Likewise, the press reviews also 'showed no
tendency either to avoid controversial topics or to conceal the gravity of the situation as
seen through the eyes of responsible British joumalists'r''"
Nevertheless, it was certainly true that the Russian Service lagged behind other BBG
programmes to Eastern Europe that had became progressively tougher in their
criticism of communism and Soviet policy. This seeming divergence, however, masked
the undercurrents of change that were also at work in the Russian Service. Already by
August 1948 Ransome was tentatively suggesting that while 'Goldberg's cautious
approach is probably the correct one at the moment. ..a time may come when a more
robust attitude will be indicated' .357 That time was not far off, and, by the end of the
year, a wholesale re-evaluation of the output of the Russian Service was under way.
In July 1948 the British Embassy in Moscow had come to the conclusion that the
'BBG's programmes would probably be more attractive if they contained more politics'
and by November the Russian Service had introduced a new series of weekly political
talks entitled The International Scene as I see it from Britain in which well known
commentators gave their interpretation of current affairs.358 An early set of these, four
critical talks by the editor of the New Statesman, Kingsley Martin, very quickly became
the subject of attack in Soviet publicity. This delighted staff at the Foreign Office's
Information Policy Department (IPD) as it proved that the broadcasts 'are really getting
under the skin of the Soviet authorities and if the BBG material is having this effect then
356 WAC, E2/120/2, Output Report No.19, 25 August 1948.
357 WAC, E2/120/2, Critical Notes No.19, 1 September 1948.
358 WAC, E2/328, Moscow Embassy to Grey, 13 July 1948; WAC, E2/120/3, 'Output Report
No.2?', 3 August 1949.
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we can be sure that the broadcasts are exercising an influence on the minds of
ordinary listeners' .359 It was on the question of how to address these listeners, and
identifying who they were, that the future development of the Russian Service
depended.
The belief that entertainment in Russian broadcasts drew an audience for the more
serious and political elements of the programmes had, by the end of 1948, become a
topic of hot debate. In January 1949 evidence from Moscow, though scant and hardly
definitive, brought Embassy staff to the conclusion that 'news and politics build up an
audience for the 'entertainment' rather than the other way round,.360 Diplomatic staffs
were not alone in questioning the make-up of broadcasts to Russia and back at home
renewed analysis in Whitehall and at the BBC was bringing about an irresistible
consensus for change.
Writing to Warner at the start of the year, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Mayhew, questioned the effect of Soviet indoctrination
on the BBC's audience in Russia:
'If it means that they are so indoctrinated that they have strong moral inhibitions
against listening, I should have thought that this would deter them from listening
to our broadcasts whether or not entertainment was mixed in with them. If,
however, it merely means that they utterly disbelieve our propaganda, it is
surely a reason for changing the nature of our political broadcasts, rather than
for cutting them down in favour of entertainrnent.?"
Likewise, at the BBC the newly appointed Head of East European Services, Carleton
Greene (who had just returned to the Corporation after two years in charge of the
British controlled Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk radio station in Hamburg) agreed that
359TNA, F0953/544, PE1197/1/967, Note by Ian Grey, 7 April 1949.
360 WAC, E2/329, Peterson, Moscow, to Bevin, 26 January 1949.
361 TNA, F0953/543, PE233/1/967, Mayhew to Warner, 11 January 1949.
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'it is the political items which attract the average listener'. Accordingly, Greene noted in
a paper for Jacob in March 1949 (after an extra half an hour had been added to the
Russian Service's broadcast time) 'the percentage of political talks in our Russian
programmes has been considerably increased during recent weeks and non-topical
material has been sharply reduced'. 362 But what was the analytical framework upon
which these changes were being made?
The Foreign Office considered the BBe's audience in Russia to be being largely
composed of the intelligentsia and it was thought profitable to exploit 'the uneasiness of
the intellectuals over the growing regimentation to which they have lately been
subjected'. Especially, it was believed, as 'the traditional claustrophobia of Russian
intellectuals is growing, and perhaps also communicating itself to wider sections of the
Russian public.' Accordingly, it was thought that the time was right for seizing the
'opportunity of increasing the doubts they already feel about the correctness of the
Party line as well as the reliability of Soviet propaganda' .363 There were, however,
certain criteria for this new approach, as Warner suggested to Jacob:
'attacks on the Russians as a people would obviously be absurd; but we agree
that even attacks on Stalin, and to some extent on the Soviet Government,
would be likely to defeat our object. But Soviet publicity is evidently the Achilles
heel of the regime, and as such is an obvious target.'364
As the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson, told his colleagues in
Whitehall, 'the main attack should not be on the Soviet Government, leaders, policy, or
outlook - the defences around these are too strong - but on Soviet sources of
information' .365
362 WAC E2/329, Greene to DOS, 22 March 1949.
363 WAC, E2/329, Warner to Jacob, 2 March 1949.
364 Ibid.
365 Ibid., Peterson, Moscow, to Bevin, 26 January 1949.
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In Bush House there was little disagreement with the view that 'it must. ..be one of the
main objects of our broadcasts to Russia to drive a wedge between the people and the
regime,' as Greene put it. There was, though, a more nuanced appreciation of the
BBC's audience in Russia:
'It seems, however, unnecessarily pessimistic to assume that our audience
stands solidly behind the regime and resents any criticism of its present
Government. I am speaking of our audience (which, it should not be forgotten,
includes the armies of occupation outside Russia: the morale of the army is
inclined to be rather shaky) and not the Russian people as a whole.'366
In addition, although listening to the BBC was not forbidden, evidence of Communist
Party members being expelled for doing so meant that there must have already been a
sense of 'committing a misdemeanour' by those tuning in: 'In such circumstances
listening is by itself evidence of doubt and becomes more and more the first faint sign
of opposition' .367
In arriving at this conclusion - that the process of subversion had already started, in
however small a degree, by the time the listener sought out the BBC's transmissions -
Greene was able to argue that rather than concentrating purely on the 'weak spot' that
was the Soviet information services and running the risk 'of thinking too exclusively in
terms of counter-propaganda' the BBC should be engaged in 'attacking the Marxist-
Leninist ideology and the whole basis of the Soviet regime,.368 This opened up many
more broadcasting possibilities for serious investigation on world-common themes and
combined much more effectively both positive and negative aspects of broadcasting.
The experience of the Second World War, which still held currency, emphasised the
need to force your opponent to feel compelled to reply to your lead and this was a view
fully subscribed to by Greene.
366 Ibid., Greene to DOS, 22 March 1949.
367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
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In the Middle of March 1949, a week after the transmission of the first of a series of
"defector" broadcasts by Colonel Tokaev, a Foreign Office official noted that 'during the
last few months the Russian Service has taken on a completely new cornplexlon'P" At
the time it was one still in the process of transition. Sy July, however, when Ransome
was again assessing the Russian output, it would appear that the transformation was
near complete. Since his last comments on the service a year earlier he perceived that
'a complete change has taken place in the policy of the Section'. 'Cautious methods ...
have been abandoned, and have, it would seem, given place to undisguised political
warfare'. Sy this time, however, another change had taken place that was to epitomize
the broadcast effort to the Soviet Union for the next 40 years as much as alterations in
the content of the programmes. On 25 April 1949 the Russians started jamming SSC
broadcasts on a systematic basis. As Ransome noted, 'the gloves are off'."?
Jamming and Counter-Jamming
Hugh Carleton Greene, who as Head of the East European Service had regional
responsibility for Russian programming, was later to write that 'even in the coldest of
cold war conditions the objective of propaganda to Soviet Russia was rather different
from what our hot war objective had been in the case of Germany'. The SSC's main
aim, he noted, was 'to get our audience to accept our view of events ...and a subsidiary
aim was to shake the faith in Stalin'. However, unlike transmissions to the satellite
countries where 'Russian rule might be shaken off, Greene recalled that 'no one in his
senses could believe that it should be any part of our objective to contribute to the
overthrow of the Soviet regime or to "liberate" the Soviet people, who had probably no
369 TNA, F0953/545, PE1401/1/967, Note by Bowen, 17 March 1949.
370 WAC, E2/120/3, Critical Notes No.27, 2 September 1949.
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desire to be liberated anyway, at least from the outside' .371 While emancipation from
communist rule in Russia was patently not a possibility in April 1949 and was certainly
not the intention of the External Services, Jacob did believe that there were greater
'divergencies of view and cleavages of opinion' in Russian society (and the BBC's
audience in particular) than the British Embassy in Moscow and the Foreign Office had
hitherto given credit for.372 The attempt to stop external voices being heard in Russia by
jamming the BBC seemed to underscore this view, and broadcasts in Russian sought
to exploit these perceived gaps and whatever capital could be made from them.
This appeal to nonconformity and diversity was a tactical move, as Ransome described
it, 'in our general strategy of trying to discredit the picture of the international stage in
general and the British scene in particular as presented in the distorting mirror of Soviet
propaganda' .373 With a much heavier emphasis on world affairs, broadcasts to Russia
by July 1949 'now openly criticise the Soviet regime, correct its anti-Western
propaganda, and inform listeners of facts and ideas which their own authorities
withhold [sic.] from them'. Goldberg 'preserved the fundamentally friendly tone which
has always characterised his broadcasts to Russia', though was increasingly resolute
in his criticism, as when he discussed the Soviet Union's attempt to impose a system of
exploitation masked by illusory treedorns.V" The approach of fellow regional
commentator David Graham (who spoke as an 'indignant outsider' rather than a
'disillusioned friend') was far more denunciatory, while another speaker on the Russian
Service, Mme. Frolova, provided an 'adulatory depiction of British life' in contrast to her
371 Hugh Carleton Greene, The Third Floor: A View of Broadcasting in the Sixties, (London:
Bodley Head, 1969), p.29.
372 WAC, E2/329, Jacob to Warner, 2? April 1949.
373 WAC, E2/120/3, Critical Notes No.2?, 2 September 1949.
374 Ibid.; 'Output Report No.2?', 3 August 1949.
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memories of living in Russia - one of the few remaining programme elements aiming to
project Britain.375
These variations in the pitch of the Russian Service were not purely tonal, but also
extended to the content of the broadcasts. Analysis of Soviet propaganda techniques,
which the Foreign Office had considered so important, started to become a regular
feature as did, as Greene had argued, a wider critique of the Soviet regime and its
ideological underpinning. These elements were very usefully brought together in, for
example, a talk which used an article by Karl Marx condemning censorship as an
abhorrent form of tyranny to put into relief current Soviet practice, and by Graham in
another talk that utilised a piece in the Belgrade Communist newspaper to refute, on
orthodox communist grounds, the Soviet conception of "cosmopolitanism", an
accusation the Russian authorities had repeatedly made of Yugoslavia since the
Cominform split.376 Another voice increasingly heard on the Russian Service was that
of the defector, as was the case when Victor Kravchenko (who had defected to
America in 1944) broadcast soon after the series of talks by Colonel Tokaev.
Merely stating the Western case was no longer the editorial objective of a service
which now 'sought to expose both the duplicity and expansionist purpose of the foreign
policy of the USSR and also the ruthless and despotic nature of the Soviet regime
itself, But there was some concern at the BBC about whether 'these distinctly diverse
elements combine to form a comprehensive and coherent propaganda campaign, or
whether listeners conditioned to expect the expression of one single and clear-cut point
of view only might convey an impression of uncertainty and even dishonesty'. For
example, the use of Kravchenko and Tokaev 'might suggest a willingness by the BBC
375 Ibid. Ransome found her approach as 'rather natve and enthusiastic' though 'no doubt
effective in a frankly propagandist way',
376 Ibid,
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to use any convenient weapons'."? In the absence of adequate audience research
such issues of editorial policy had to be resolved in the space between the objectives
and assessments of the Foreign Office and its diplomatic service and the broadcast
experience and independent outlook of the BBC. From April 1949, though, the Soviet
jamming campaign raised the very genuine question of whether the Russian Service
had any listeners left at all?
On Monday 25 April 1949 BBC services to Russia were jammed for the first time on all
short-wave frequencies.?" The Corporation's receiving station at Tatsfield initially
identified over 60 separate Russian transmitters jamming BBC broadcasts from the UK
in addition to Voice of America (VOA) programmes to Russia from New York and
Munich which were also being jammed. This figure soon rose to between 200 and 300
and reports from Moscow and Turkey indicated that 'broadcasts in Russian were
completely obliterated'. Although the full extent of jamming across the whole of Russia
was not known it was assumed in the BBC that the Russians had 'built up a fairly
effective system of jamming to cover the main centres of populatlon'P"
The BBC had experience from the Second World War of being jammed, but it was
immediately realised on both sides of the Atlantic that the scale and permanence of this
obstacle required a co-ordinated response from Britain and America. In March 1948,
soon after the British Cabinet agreed an anti-communist publicity policy, the Foreign
Secretary had argued against 'any system of collaboration which would commit us to
377 Ibid., Critical Notes No.2?, 2 September 1949.
378 An initial report on 'Russian Jamming' by J.B. Clarke stated that jamming began on Sunday
24 April. All subsequent reports of the start of jamming, however, gave the date of
commencement as 25 April. See, WAC, E2/119/1, DDOS to DOS, 29 April 1949. The jamming
initially began on short-wave, but was later extended to medium-wave transmissions. See,
WAC, E2/119/1, 'Russian Jamming', 23 May 1951.
379 WAC, R1/85/3, G?3, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 1 June 1949.
125
following a common Anglo-American policy in anti-Communist propaqanda'P" As the
Russia Committee noted at the time, following a meeting between Warner and his new
opposite number at the US State Department, George Allen, it had been agreed that in
British and American foreign publicity 'there would be advantage in aiming at the same
targets from somewhat different angles'.381 Sy the following year, this attitude, which
was shared by the External Services of the SSC, still held. However, an editorial veto
did not preclude technical collaboration or the sharing of resources in pursuit of a
common aim, and jamming provided just such a purpose.
The immediate response by the State Department was to suggest that the SSC and
VOA should broadcast continuously for 24 hours a day on two transmitters carrying
repeats of their Russian language programmes. The SSC, with a close eye on the
expense of these counter-jamming measures, thought differently. Already fighting to
stave off cuts in the External Services budget, J.S. Clark informed Jacob that a
cheaper alternative was an 'increase in the frequencies employed for any of the
existing UK or USA bulletins' .382 This was subsequently translated by Jacob for
consumption by the Soard for Governors: 'Experience has taught us that the only way
to defeat jamming is to increase the number of frequencies on our transmissions in the
hope that there will not be enough jamming transmitters at work to blot them all out
everywhere'. It was also important, Clark thought, 'not to take panic measures without
careful thought,' as 'any change which did not affect the Jamming and which was,
therefore, abandoned would constitute a minor Russian victory,.383
Accordingly, on 7 May 1949, in addition to the regular half hour SSC broadcasts to
Russia at 0430, 1645 and 1945 GMT two new simultaneous SSC and VOA
380 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN231/2, 'Liaison Between the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff:
Collaboration with the United States', 31 March 1948.
381 TNA, F0371/71687, Russia Committee meeting, 1 April 1948.
382 WAC, E2/119/1, DDOS to DOS, 29 April 1949.
383 WAC, R1/85/3, G73, 1 June 1949.
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transmissions were introduced at 0315 and 1415 GMT (0615 and 1715 Moscow time)
for an experimental period of one month.384 At these times, the maximum number of
transmitters were available to the BBC and VOA including stations in Honolulu and
Manila used by the US and Singapore by the BBC. On average over the first two
weeks of this experimental period it was estimated that between 12 and 25 per cent of
BBC and VOA broadcasts got through the jamming, between 17 to 32 per cent were
partially jammed and between 50 and 60 per cent were completely jammed.P"
The British Embassy in Moscow reported that they had no difficulty in getting the two
new transmissions on an ordinary receiver in the first few days of this period and
although reception did deteriorate, the Cabinet's Colonial Information Policy Committee
(CIPC) summed up the position at the end of Mayas being one where 'a listener in
Russia who really wanted to do so could hear the BBC and the Voice of the USA, but it
would not be at all easy'.386 Collaboration, though, seemed to be the key to any
possible success in breaching an Iron Curtain that had now taken to the air. In a
telegram from the US Embassy in Moscow to the State Department it was argued that
'long-range research' into counter-measures should be given due priority as 'our
relative superiority over Sovs is greater' and, in a compelling reference of the most
spectacular US/UK joint project, suggested 'time on our side if best US and Brit brains
resources pooled as in development of A-bomb' .387
The Foreign Office agreed that particular stress should be laid on planning ahead and
close co-operation. It is interesting and perhaps indicative of the different tone taken in
384 Ibid. The Board of Governors gave approval to an increase in rate of £22,915 per annum to
cover the costs of these additional broadcasts. See, WAC, R1/17, Board of Governors meeting,
12 May 1949.
385 WAC, E2/119/1, Clark to Carter, 19 May 1949.
386 TNA, CAB134/99, CI(49)8(1), Trends of Communist Propaganda: Russian Jamming', 24
May 1949. Original emphasis.
387 WAC, E2/119/1, US Embassy, Moscow to State Department, in Harrison, Moscow, to
Speaight, 24 May 1949.
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US broadcasts to Russia and the desire, on both sides, to keep separate their editorial
positions, that the Foreign Office felt their US colleagues tended to 'exaggerate the
importance of broadcasting as a weapon in the Cold War' when they asserted that the
'drive for air mastery is vital part of drive for world mastery'. 388 However, it was
becoming clear that a combative "radio race" had emerged. In preparing counter-
measures it was now important
'to realise that we are up against a determined attempt, planned well in advance
and likely, so far as can be foreseen, to continue for years, to stop up a channel
through which Western ideas were reaching the Soviet public. Indeed, the
jamming is likely not only to continue but, if necessary, to be intensified.'389
And just as in other vital collaborative spheres of the emerging special relationship
between Britain and America, the broadcast effort, if only in terms of resources, would
have to be highly integrated.
In the years after the Second World War the BBC had considered a number of
proposals for the use of its transmitters for relaying broadcasts of the Voice of
Arnerica.P" The position was taken, albeit contingent on the views of the Foreign Office
and ruling of the General Post Office, that although airtime could be provided when the
Corporation itself was not broadcasting, no frequencies used by the BBC should be
made exclusively available.?" In addition, the Americans should not be allowed to run,
using their own personnel, a radio station in the UK. It was, however suggested at the
beginning of 1948 that they might like to use, at their expense, the Woofferton
broadcasting station near Ludlow on the Shropshire and Herefordshire border which
388 Ibid.; Ibid., Speaight to Harrison, 7 June 1949.
389 Ibid., Harrison, Moscow, to Speaight, 24 May 1949.
390 For example, in October 1946 the Board of Governors had considered a proposal to offer the
use of two transmitters to the Americans for relaying broadcasts to Russia and in January 1948
the US State Department approached the BBC as to what facilities could be made available for
VOA broadcasts to Europe and the Middle East. WAC, R1/14, Board of Governors meeting,
'Director-General's Report', 17 October 1946; WAC, R2/45/1, BM8, 'Availability for relay over
BBC facilities of VOUSA programme', 14 January 1948.
391 WAC, R2/1, Board of Management meeting, 'America Calling Europe', 19 January 1948.
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had been scheduled for closure in April 1948.392Accordingly, on 18 July the first of two
regular daily transmissions of VOA were broadcast from Woofferton.393
In the time between the invitation to use this transmitter and the offer being taken up,
American broadcasts to Russia were jammed first in the Far East and then from April in
Europe. Three months later jamming of Vatican Radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union
also started as did the VOA transmissions relayed by the SSC.394 The occasional
interference of SSC Russian Service programmes led Ernest Sevin in May 1948 to
declare that if SSC broadcasts were being jammed 'it would be to their credit'.395 It was
not until nearly a year later, however, that the SSC received the full attention of the
Russian jammers. That it happened - a response to the increasing tension between
East and West and the desire of the Soviet authorities to eradicate external voices that
sought to undermine internal support for the state - was perhaps easier to understand
than why, after three years of the SSC broadcasting to the Soviet Union, it had taken
so long.
Equally curious, Jacob thought that previous reports of interference could be ascribed
to the Russians 'preparing an organisation for jamming and were trying out parts of it,
rather as a battery of artillery registers on the target before opening fire for effect'.
Accordingly, he speculated, soon after the SSC started broadcasting in Russian 'the
Soviet authorities must have come to the conclusion that the only hole in the Iron
Curtain would become dangerous and must be stopped up' and that 'it had probably
392 Wooferton was also known as OSE10. The Shropshire and Herefordshire border actually
runs through the site bisecting the aerial field.
393 The programmes were 'picked up at the Tatsfield receiving station and fed by line to Bush
House, there to be mixed with local announcements and passed to the transmitters at
Woofferton'. See, Edward Pawley, BBC Engineering, 1922-1972, (London: SSC, 1972), p.348.
394 WAC, E2/119/1, 'Russian Jamming', 23 May 1951. Post-war Russian jamming had started in
1946 when short-wave transmissions from Madrid became a target. Sy April 1949 it was
thought by the SSC that Russian broadcasts from Yugoslavia, Greece and Persia were also
being jammed. See, WAC, E3/285/1, 'Listening Sehind the Iron Curtain: USSR, 1947 - 1955'.
395 TNA, CAS130/37, Gen 231/1 st Meeting, 'Overseas Services of the SSG', 11 May 1948.
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taken them a year or two to perfect their system and organisation for jamming' .396 In
this analysis April 1949 represented nothing more than the time at which, in a cold
conflict that relied on vicarious displays of strength, a comprehensive jamming
campaign against UK and US radio could be mounted. The considerable success of
that offensive, regardless of its timing, now required a co-ordinated and well considered
response.
That response came into effect on 9 July 1949 after further consultation between the
State Department, the SSC and the Foreign Office. This resulted in the abandoning of
the experimental transmission schedule and the institution, despite the US desire for
consecutive broadcasting periods, of three half hour SSC broadcasts a day to Russia,
synchronised with transmissions of Voice of America at 0315, 1415 and 2115 GMT.397
In addition, a new scheme was introduced to make it 'more difficult for Russian
jamming stations to operate with complete efficiency'. For example, the 2115 broadcast
was carried on 23 transmitters, but from a larger pool of frequencies. Accordingly, the
SSC was 'able to vary each time to a small extent the actual frequencies used', which
meant any jamming operation had to anticipate that all of the available frequencies
would be used thereby dissipating their grouped coverage of the ones that were in
use.398
Initial reports from Moscow suggested that this new schedule was relatively successful
with 95 per cent audibility of SSC broadcasts being claimed soon after the change.399
Hard evidence was difficult to come by, but reports from cities around Russia such as
Helsinki, Warsaw, Istanbul, Tokyo and Tehran suggested 'that the present large scale
396 WAC, R1/85/3, G73, 1 June 1949.
397 WAC, E2/324/2, DOS to McLean, 13 June 1949. The first two transmissions were fully
synchronised while the evening broadcast was only partly synchronised due to technical
difficulties - the VOA programme ran from 2100-2130 GMT. See, WAC, R1/85/6, G117, 'Report
bv the Director of Overseas Services', undated.
39'8 Ibid.
399 WAC, E2/608/1, European Services Meeting, 'Jamming', 29 July 1949.
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effort provides possibilities of listening over large areas of the USSR,.400 There were,
however, other reports in July which indicated heavy local jamming of broadcasts in the
large centres of population and that reception there was increasingly problematic.'?'
While it was thought that the 'less keen' listener might have been discouraged from
tuning in by the jamming 'it was equally probable', Jacob informed the Board of
Governors, 'that those who are really keen will have been spurred to greater efforts to
hear our Services,.402 Predicting the psychology of audience listening habits in the
absence of reliable indicators was becoming a necessary, though intangible, part of the
broadcasters' practice. Far more material was the continuing development of the
combined British and American effort in the radio race against the Soviet Union.
In the autumn of 1949, as the BBC was dealing with the consequences of sterling
devaluation and facing the prospect of a massive cut in the government's overseas
information services' budget, the US Congress granted a non-recurrent appropriation of
$11,000,000 for use in improving facilities for international broadcastinq.f" This was
very nearly the entirety of the External Services budget for 1949/50 and puts into sharp
contrast the relative means at the disposal of these two broadcasting operations and
their outlook when it came to new collaborative projects. The disparity was reflected in
discussions between Jacob and first Charles Thayler, and then his successor in the
State Department in charge of VOA, Foy David Kohler, which looked at 'the
possibilities in various parts of the world for the establishment of new broadcasting
facilities' either by the Americans alone or jointly with the UK.404 Although they had no
detailed plans, with these new funds the Americans proposed to improve their existing
400 WAC, R1/85/6, G117, undated.
401 This had been the conclusion of British and American officials who had visited Lenningrad,
Novosibirisk (Siberia) and Tiflis (Georgia). WAC, E3/285/1, Listening Behind the Iron Curtain:
USSR, 1947 - 1955.
402 WAC, R1/85/6, G117, undated.
403 WAC, R1/85/8, G150 'Report of the Director of the Overseas Services', 17 November 1949.
Using the recently devalued rate of conversion of $2.80 to £1, this equates to £3,928,571.
404 WAC, R2/46/8, 'Voice of America', Note by DOS, undated.
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facilities, add to their short-wave operation new facilities that could be useful and erect
two powerful medium-wave transmitters in the Western Pacific and the Middle East to
broadcast primarily to Russia and the countries bordering her as well as to China and
Japan. In pursuit of this they were asking for assistance and expertise and even
suggested that the SSC install and run the Middle East station.?"
Financial constraints alone meant that the Corporation was unable to commit to
anything more than assisting with technical surveys, but there were also other
concerns with these plans for expansion. In particular, it was felt that America should
be discouraged from establishing any more broadcasting stations in Europe.t'" As
Jacob pointed out to senior colleagues, the SSC should not
'take part in the erection or operation of broadcasting stations in order to save
the Americans the trouble of doing the job themselves. Any new stations that
were brought into operation would be carrying American programmes only
because we should not have the money to make use of any time on the air
which might be available.'?"
Meanwhile, there was no objection to the extension to the type of scheme that had
been employed at Woofferton, although there were potential difficulties over origin,
ownership and operation of transmitting equipment in these circurnstances.t'"
Consequently, while a high degree of technical co-operation and sharing of information
was maintained between the SSC, the US State Department and VOA, another great
collaborative leap forward at that time was to prove too costly for the SSC and without
adequate benefits for the Corporation.
405 WAC, R1/85/8, G150, 17 November 1949.
406 On 1 September 1949 a medium-wave transmitter in Munich began to relay VOA broadcasts
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While Britain was examining the parameters of the broadcasting special relationship in
1949 the United States Information Service (USIS) of the State Department was also
eager to explore ideas of co-operation with as many partners as it could find. Following
the advent of blanket jamming in April it was the view of the American Embassy in
Moscow that a counter-offensive should be worked out not just with Britain, but with
'other like-minded countries' as an essential part of any plans.t'" Tapping into the
opportunities offered by new cold war-related international structures, Jacob was
informed in October of their 'idea of approaching the other Atlantic Treaty powers with
a request that they should help strengthen our Russian broadcasts' either by
broadcasting simultaneous Russian programmes of their own or by relaying VOA and
BBC programmes. The Foreign Office saw no diplomatic objection to this and agreed
to joint US/UK approaches to a number of countries as well as the Brussels Treaty
Powers."? A year later, however, these parallel advances had achieved relatively little
with only Italy responding positively to the suqqestions."" Indeed, when the question
was raised at The Hague and at the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty in
London 'considerable resistance was shown on all sides to the idea that countries
should relay Voice of America' .412 While the Foreign Office informed the BBC of this
reaction, it conveyed to the Americans the more diplomatically-framed suggestion that
more support might be raised through NATO.413 This route, though, proved equally
unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, in Whitehall the reality of broadcasting to Russia under jamming
conditions raised serious questions concerning the viability of BBC services. Very soon
after the new permanent schedule was introduced, the government felt it necessary to
409 WAC, E2/119/1, US Embassy, Moscow, to State Department, 24 May 1949.
410 WAC, E2/324/2, Speaight to Jacob, 7 October 1949.
411 Ibid., Carter to Browne, 21 August 1950.
412 Ibid., Carter to Jacob, 23 August 1950.
413 Ibid., Carter to Browne, 21 August 1950.
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consider whether 'it would be wiser to abandon our broadcasts in Russian,.414 A quick
review revealed that 'all Departments concerned are in agreement that, on balance,
these broadcasts should be maintained' .415 The reasons for this conclusion, though,
deserve explanation. In the first place, a simple calculation revealed that there was little
redistributive gain to be made from the money and transmitter time saved by cancelling
broadcasts to Russia which would 'provide at most for only about an hour's
broadcasting a day in one other language which we are using already, or perhaps three
quarter-hour extensions to three existing programmes', In the more intangible arena of
audience reaction the effects of broadcasts to a country where the political importance
of public opinion was negligible was difficult to calculate, but it was considered
inevitable that jamming would result in a significant loss of listeners. Nevertheless,
experience had shown that it was precisely in those 'countries deprived of freedom of
information by their own governments' that the SSC was most listened to and that, in
the long run, 'results might be achieved', Certainly, it was felt that if the transmissions
were stopped, 'minds which are being kept just open would be completely closed and
cut of from the West' .416
There was another vitally important reason for keeping the Russian Service going that
had very little connection to its audience and far more to do with tying-up Soviet
resources:
'The Soviet jamming operation, which in practice is likely always to be
incomplete, is estimated to be (at its present level) ten or twenty times as
expensive, especially in skilled manpower of which they are believed to be
short, as our counter-operation. If our broadcasts were stopped, most of these
Soviet resources might not be immediately employable in increasing their
output of propaganda, since the equipment required for jamming is not as a rule
414 TNA, CAB134/99, CI(49)11(1) 'Trends of Communist Propaganda', 21 July 1949.
415 TNA, CAB134/1 01, CI(49)72 'BBC Broadcasts in Russian', 9 September 1949.
416 Ibid.
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useful for broadcasting; but they would of course be most valuable to the Soviet
authorities for other purposes'?"
Meanwhile, reports of the effectiveness of Soviet jamming were generating further
concerns about the value of broadcasting to Russia. Despite the implementation of
'crash starts' in August - to reduce the ability of the jammers to fix on a transmission
before the broadcast started - it was subsequently reported that the SSC's afternoon
programme 'was generally unintelligible on all wavelengths except in the 13m band'
and the early morning and evening programmes were only partly lntelliqible.t" From 8
December, at which point winter atmospheric conditions reduced the short-wave range
available, it was reported from Moscow (and confirmed by Tatsfield) that 'all
wavebands in all three SSC transmissions have been completely obliterated' .419 This
precipitated a re-evaluation within the SSC of the future of Russian-language
broadcasting which had the effect of honing down the Corporation's appreciation of the
various segments of its audience.
In a paper prepared by Greene in January 1950 it was argued that there were four
categories to be considered as, listeners: officers in the Army; small numbers of
intellectuals, high officials and managers with good sets and homes away from centres
of population; a few enterprising political prisoners in remote parts of Russia; the official
monitor and a restricted number of high officials who receive the monitoring reports.V"
In a note to Jacob covering this and another report by the Head of European
Programme Operations, H.G. Venables, the Controller of European Services, Tangye
Lean, argued that 'if we are only going to broadcast to a tiny minority, and accept that
417 Ibid.
418 WAC, E2/608/1, European Services Meeting, 'Jamming', 29 July 1949. Crash starts are
when programmes begin on a particular frequency without being preceded by test
transmissions; WAC, E3/285/1, 'Listening Behind the Iron Curtain: USSR, 1947 -1955'.
419 Ibid.
420 WAC, E40/259/1, Report by H.E.Eur.S., 4 January 1950.
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limitation so completely, then I doubt whether it is worth the tremendous effort we are
making' .421 Greene, however, interpreted his findings to mean that broadcasters should
not worry about 'offending, and losing, listeners who are loyal to the regime as distinct
from the country'. In Greene's mind this gave greater, not less, latitude to output and
made Army Officers the primary target as the combination of their experiences - direct
contact with the West and less affected by jamming when posted outside of Russia _
gave them either greater opportunity for desertion, or when they returned from duty,
more cause to become agents of disaffection.422 The British Embassy in Moscow, by
February 1950, had also come to the conclusion that 'the BBG are now broadcasting to
a mere handful of people in the Soviet Union' and that 'the effective audience is
confined to members of the Soviet armed forces outside the Soviet Union'.423
Listening conditions continued to be better outside the major centres of population
where it was possible to hear entire BBG and VOA proqrarnrnes.?" This was especially
so after the introduction in January 1950 of Intermediate Frequency jamming, Whereby
modern Soviet radio sets were internally-tuned to an intermediate (medium-wave)
frequency that when broadcast on by the authorities could, it was thought, block out
any other broadcast within an area of about 12 square miles of the transmitter. There
was also a gradual improvement in reception through the spring and summer of 1950
to the point where it was estimated that even the most heavily jammed BBG broadcasts
could be heard 'on at least one wavelength during the 0315 and 2115 transmissions,
although in some cases it is only for part of the transmission'. Like the previous year,
however, conditions worsened with the onset of winter. Despite these assessments,
direct testimony of listening was very hard to come by. In 1950, for example, the only
real indication was received when a member of the British Embassy in Moscow spoke
421 Ibid., Lean to DOS, 4 January 1950.
422 Ibid., Report by H.E.Eur.S., 4 January 1950.
423 TNA, F0953/701, Embassy, Moscow to IPD, 24 February 1950.
424 WAC, R1/87/1, G8 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 10 January 1951.
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with a young Russian who commented, 'Oh, yes! They come through occasionally.'
The following year, 'no hard evidence of continued listening' reached the BBC with the
Corporation relying on indirect reports of listening, for example by army officers and
Control Commission officials in Germany and Austria, and attacks on the BBC in the
Soviet press and radio, to infer the impact of its broadcasts.?"
There was one initiative taken by the BBC, however, that had a very clear outcome.
This was the establishment on 12 February 1950 of a weekly religious programme for
the Slavonic Orthodox Church following a successful experimental broadcast on the
Orthodox New Year in January. With announcements made in Russian, Bulgarian and
Serbo-Croat the services in Church Slavonic included readings from the liturgy of the
Orthodox Church and recordings of Orthodox choirs.f" The intention of these
programmes was to allow this expression of religious freedom to contrast with anti-
theological doctrine of communism and complement the messages of political and
cultural freedom being carried in the other broadcasts of the BBC European Services.
While these programmes were obliterated in Moscow, to begin with good reception was
reported in Belgrade and Sofia.427 After just over six months, though, increased
jamming and poor propagation conditions in the target areas led Jacob to inform the
Governors that 'it is of no value to continue the experiment' and the programmes were
dropped - perhaps the first such cancellation by the BBC as a result of jamming.428
Also in 1950, Tatsfield started reporting an increase in the amount of jamming during
BBC and VOA bulletins to Cominform countnes.f" This was a major concem for both
the BBC and the government, as Jacob reported to the Colonial Information Policy
Committee in June, because if 'the Russians were likely to extend their jamming to our
425 WAC, E3/285/1, 'Listening Behind the Iron Curtain: USSR, 1947 -1955'.
426 WAC, R1/86/1, G30 'Report by the Deputy Director of Overseas Services', 7 February 1950.
427 WAC, E3/285/1, 'Listening Behind the Iron Curtain: USSR, 1947 -1955'.
428 WAC, R1/86/4, G107 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 20 June 1950.
429 WAC, E3/285/1, 'Listening Behind the Iron Curtain: USSR, 1947 -1955'.
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programmes for the satellite countries ...Apart from any questions of expense (which
might be got over) it would not be possible to concentrate enough transmitters on the
services to all the satellite countries without entirely disrupting our programmes
elsewhere,.43o Instead, it was VOA broadcasts to the satellites that attracted the
attention of Soviet jammers from May 1950. As a consequence, between 21 and 23
July the BBC began to prime audiences in Central and Eastern Europe for this
eventually:
'Listeners may have noticed from time to time sporadic interference to our
broadcasts in the form of intentional jamming from stations in the USSR. We
want to assure you that if this jamming intensifies to the point at which you are
regularly unable to listen at the usual times, we shall make efforts to maintain
our service to you by every means at our disposal. To do this will almost
certainly mean a change of broadcasting time and of wavelengths and listeners
will have to search for the new broadcasting periods.r'"
Jamming had certainly quickened the pace of US and UK cooperation in the
broadcasting field but, according to a BBC paper on jamming in May 1951, not quick
enough. The Russians had 'kept pace with, and possibly gained on, the combined and
extended United Kingdom and USA broadcasts to the USSR and satellite countries'.
Nevertheless, it was thought that 'on average three or four or sometimes more
frequencies are clear of interference out of the fifty or more frequencies' used by the
UK and the USA. The radio race, beyond the initial rush of exploration, action and
reaction, was settling into a protracted period of attrition. Beside Intermediate
Frequency, which had limited application, short-wave jamming was split into two
categories: schedule jammers 'working to a fixed frequency schedule which is modified
as necessary, but taking, in some cases, several days', and; monitored jammers, 'a
430 TNA, CAB 134/102, CI(50)4(4) 'Overseas Broadcasting: Europe; Jamming', 20 June 1950.
431 WAC, E2/119/1, Greene to H.C.Eur.S., 20 July 1950.
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more flexible group which stops transmissions at intervals to listen to the target
broadcast and rapidly change frequency in pursuit if necessary'. Using different types
of noise such as 'Rotary' (variable low pitched modulation with a grunting effect),
'Noise' (thermal agitation or shot effect) and 'Multi-tone' (a sequence of several tones
known as 'musical box'), these various jammers were remarkably efficient indicating
'an effective central control which by means of rapid communication to sub-centres
exercises full and effective control over the jamming orqanlsatlon'<"
What, though, would the determined listener have been able to hear on the few
frequencies that got through? The pattern of all three of the BBC's broadcasts was a
nine to twelve minute news bulletin followed by two talks. As a necessary concession
to the success of jamming, the morning and afternoon programmes were usually
repeats of the transmission from the previous evening. The main emphasis remained
on world affairs and even the few remaining projection of Britain programmes were
'designed to counter communist misrepresentations, to demonstrate the inferiority of
Soviet Russia in material resources and to illustrate the advantages of living in a
democracy where state planning was not synonymous with absence of individual
freedoms'. The Defector series continued in which the cause of disillusionment was
explained and was joined by weekly instalments of Dr Margolin's eyewitness account of
life in forced labour camps for Detained Counter-Revolutionaries in The Land of the
DC's.433 Meanwhile, in a talk on 'Marxist Philosophy and Communist Practice' in the
London Calling Europe series, the Jesuit priest and author of A History of Philosophy,
432 WAC, E40/259/1, 'Russian Jamming', 23 May 1951. Other jamming noises recognised at
that time were: 'Gulls', a quick rise, slow fall variable AF, sounding like seagulls; 'Revs', slow
regular cots like a WIT 'reversals'; 'Pulse', fast revs or rapid pulse; 'Tone', continuous tone
modulation; 'Wobbler', a wobbled or slow frequency modulated carrier.
433 WAC, E2/120/5, 'Output Report No.40', 22 May 1951.
139
Father Coplestone, attempted to show 'how the original Marxist conceptions had been
distorted by Lenin and Stalin' .434
In reviewing the broadcasts to the Soviet Union, Patrick Ransome noted that 'the whole
of our Russian output is infused with the single aim of countering Soviet propaganda
and of presenting the British point of view'. But he was concerned that these
broadcasts might not have 'much effect on those who have scarcely begun the
adventure of independent thought' .435 The Assistant Head of East European Services,
David Graham, disagreed and wondered if they would be
'listening to a foreign radio station at all if they had not begun this adventure
rather seriously? Both jamming and frequent articles in the press make it clear
that no good Soviet citizen listens to a foreign radio. It is a wicked and rather
dangerous thing to do, and must, I think, imply some degree of disillusionment
with Soviet doctrine and practice.'436
As such, programmes like Walter Kolarz's Public Opinion in Soviet Russia in which he
detailed the Party's system of internal propaganda, and Estonian Government
Changes where he listed recent dismissals designed to eliminate 'bourgeois
nationalism' continued.?" But this time, the future of the Russian Service was once
again in doubt.
By the summer of 1951 a major debate was emerging between the Foreign Office and
the External Services on the future direction, if at all, to be taken by the Russian
Service. The May report on jamming by the BBC had suggested that the current level
of broadcast penetration through the Iron Curtain was unlikely to get any better for the
foreseeable time. This had prompted a rethink in the Foreign Office and on 17 August
434 Ibid., 'Critical Notes No.40', 1 June 1951. Frederick Coplestone, A History of Philosophy Vol.
1: Greece and Rome, (London: Burns & Oates, 1961).
435 WAC, E2/120/5, 'Critical Notes No.40', 1 June 1951.
436 Ibid., Graham to Ransome, 1 June 1951.
437 Ibid., 'Critical Notes No.40', 1 June 1951.
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A.C.E. Malcolm wrote to Jacob asking for advice on a series of questions that left the
BBC in no doubt what Malcolm and his Whitehall colleagues were thinking. Was it
possible, he wondered, for broadcasts to the satellites (where attacks on Soviet
communism were more likely to have an impact) to be increased at the expense of
those to Russia? Was it worth continuing to broadcast on such a scale in order to
oblige the Russian jammers to operate at maximum pressure? Could a skeleton
Russian Service be preserved, capable of being revived in case of emergency? Could
programmes be carried by 'slow morse' in order to at least supply the needs of the
Russian monitoring service and the officials who read their reports? In short, the
Foreign Office was looking for a 'means of increasing the political dividend that can be
got from broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit' at the expense, if necessary, of the Russian
Service.438
The view from the BBC was that the abandonment of Russian broadcasts in favour of
services to the satellites was simply not practicable.v" Venables pointed out that the
very small savings made by a reduction in the Russian Service would not be enough to
increase broadcasts to the Orbit countries and that other services to Western Europe,
Scandinavia, Iberia, Germany, Italy, the Middle Eastern and on the General Overseas
Services would have to be reduced for this to be achleved.t" Besides, as Graham
noted, if 'the Soviet Government wants to jam our broadcasts to satellite countries, its
jammers at Minsk, Lvov and Simferopol are well placed for the job ... If we cut down our
Russian output we will ourselves provide the means for jamming our satellite output.'
Meanwhile, it would be a futile exercise to broadcast to Russia solely for the purpose of
'drawing the jammers fire away from others'. Within the External Services the result
would be 'profoundly discouraging, and would weaken morale and lower professional
standards, with effects which could not be made good "quickly in the event of an
438 WAC, E40/259/1, Malcolm to Jacob, 17 August 1951.
439 Ibid., Jacob to Nicholls, 1 October 1951.
440 WAC, E2/119/1, Venables to C.Eur.S., 24 August 1951.
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emergency" .'441 Finally, while slow morse was used during the Second World War (in
the face of heavy Nazi jamming) to carry summaries of battlefront movements, no more
than 600 words an hour could be transmitted and was quite unsuitable to the task of
replacing the spoken word.442
Jacob's response to the Foreign Office concluded that
'we should leave the Russian operation as it is, and that the first charge on any
additional money that could be found should take the form of increasing the
technical facilities used for broadcasting to the satellites. In other words, we
should try to give them better coverage rather than more time.'443
On 26 October 1951, the day the Conservative Party returned to power in Britain, the
Foreign Office signalled its acceptance of the BBC's view and dropped the proposals
outlined by Malcolm in August. Just five weeks later jamming of BBC broadcasts to the
satellites began, thereby ushering in a new phase in cold war broadcastinq.t"
BBC services to Central and Eastern Europe had undergone great change in the early
years of the cold war, accommodating the shifting geopolitical landscape and the
British government's response to it, in pursuit of broadcasting what was judged to be in
the national interest. The Russian Service, however, had undergone perhaps the most
radical and surprising changes of all. The aim in the first years of the service had been
to convey an appreciation of British life, its institutions and outlook. Particular pains
were taken to avoid controversial and contentious issues to the point where its output
was positively anaemic in contrast with the dynamic struggle of the cold war. The
gradual, but ultimately great, change that took place in the Russian Service revolved
around the issue of who its audience was. The fear of offending, of switching off
441 Ibid., Graham to C.Eur.S., 31 August 1951.
442 Ibid., Venables to C.Eur.S., 24 August 1951.
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listeners, had guided the mind's eye picture of audience needs and wants until 1948.
Changes in the international environment prompted a rethink of these requirements
and redefined attitudes towards the SSC's audience. The realisation that the SSC was
broadcasting to listeners who had already transgressed by tuning into its programmes
and who were seeking political comment in particular, allowed a far greater freedom to
engage in programme-making that attempted to provide a more accurate and therefore
more controversial picture of the world in which Russians lived. Consequently, by the
spring of 1949 the cautious methods underpinning previous output had been
abandoned and a far more robust critique of conditions in Russia and of Soviet
domestic and overseas policy became the mainstay of the service.
At this point, the second great agent for change in the short history of the service
appeared in the form of jamming. From the resulting challenge of getting the SSC's
broadcasts heard flowed subsequent developments in the mechanics of broadcasting,
in radio as a cultural emblem of the cold war, in the cooperative broadcasting
relationship with the Americans and, once again, in arrivinq at a more defined picture of
the SSC's Russian audience. Apart from the first three years of broadcasting to Russia
there was little evidence that transmissions were even audible in most parts of the
Soviet Union, let alone the impact they may have had. Jamming had produced an
escalating radio race East and West where decisions on what to broadcast to Russia
were as much based on the intuition of the SSC's programme makers as they were on
the very scarce evidence of audience reaction. Soviet army officers in post-war Europe
and Russian monitors and the Communist Party officials who read their reports
became core targets through which to exploit, on the one hand, cleavages between the
individual and the state and, on the other, concern on the part of the Soviet leadership
about what their comrades might be listening to. This was certainly political warfare, but
it is essential to understand that the purpose and value of broadcasting to Russia was
always judged, within the SSC, in terms of its long-term impact. As a result, the SSC's
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Russian Service sought to interpret for listeners the world around them, the place that
Russia took within it, and provide them with alternative explanations of conditions at
home and events overseas.
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III. THE COST OF OVERSEAS BROADCASTING
'In assessing the value of the External Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation as a
weapon of national propaganda we have applied the same test which we have applied to all
other forms of propaganda. That is to say we have examined the extent to which it is likely to
advance the political or commercial interests in this country either now or in the future.'
Extract from the Report of the Drogheda Committee, April 1954445
6. AUSTERITY
Change and adaptation in tone were defining characteristics of the External Services'
output at the end of the 1940s as the imperatives of the cold war were knitted into its
remit. Meanwhile, the fiscal relationship between the BBC and the government
underlying these modifications was the cause of constant instability and uncertainty.
From the enshrining of Grant-in-Aid funding for overseas transmissions in the 1947
Charter to its renewal five years later, the amount of money provided by government
and the means by which it was calculated were subject to the vicissitudes of the
economic climate of the time. The cost of domestic policy initiatives such as welfare
reform and nationalisation, the increasingly complex pressures arising from Imperial,
Commonwealth and European responsibilities, the slow recovery from war and the
effort of reconstruction both at home and overseas resulted in economic crises that
stretched the nation's financial resources to breaking point. Added to these were the
almost crippling costs of the escalating conflict between East and West (and the re-
emphasis on defence spending) in which Britain attempted to maintain its position as
445 Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services, Cmd.9138 (London: HMSO, April 1954), p.42.
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one of the Great Powers. It was amongst this melee of competing financial priorities
that the External Services sought its slice of the Exchequer's cake.r"
At a meeting on 12 March 1947 attended by the Treasury, the Foreign Office,
Dominions Office, Colonial Office, General Post Office, the Service Departments and
the BBC a reduction of £100,000 in the External Services budget was agreed on the
basis of proposals submitted by the Deputy Director of Overseas Services, J.B.
Clark.447 This was the first step in a process of negotiation and renegotiation
concerning the Grant-in-Aid over the next few years that pushed the External Services
to the limit of their operational capacity and engendered an acute disagreement
between the Corporation and the Treasury over the value, in real terms, to be placed
on overseas broadcasting. By the end of 1947 BBC spending plans were again revised
to accommodate a government request for a ten per cent cut in the overseas budqet.?"
As a consequence, from 1 April 1948 overseas services were forced to make major
reductions in output.?" Although lunch-time broadcasts to Europe were saved a
revised budget for 1948/49 of £4,025,000 saw daily programme hours for non-
European Services cut by 20 per cent with a 25 per cent reduction in overall transmitter
hours."? The section which bore the brunt of this, and future reductions, was the Latin
American Service where daytime broadcasts were abandoned. Other government
reductions had already led the British Information Services and the British Council to
close down in four of the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic and
Paraguay. The result was a major loss of influence for Britain in the region with BBC
446 See, for example, Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British economic policy 1945-51,
~London: Methuen, 1985), pp.17-46.
47 TNA, CAB134/545, 01(0)(47)12, 'Working Party on Estimates for BBC Overseas Services
and other Services Performed for Government Departments', 16 April 1947. The Government
departments attending this meeting were all 'Prescribing Departments' as laid out under clause
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Burma Office and the Control Office for Germany and Austria.
448 WAC, R1/84/2, G23, Report by Director of Overseas Services, 11 March 1948.
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May 1949. . .
450 WAC, R1/84/1, G2, Report by the Director of Overseas Services, 1 January 1948; Ibid. Dally
programme hours came down from 64 to 52. Transmitter hours were reduced from 400 to 300.
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afternoon bulletins unavailable as 'an important source of news guidance for the
afternoon Press in Latin America,' and 'no one to look after the distribution of
transcription material and the Voz de Londres in these countries'f'"
In the summer of 1948, just as the European Services were working towards an
accommodation with the Foreign Office as to the tone of Britain's voice abroad, there
was increasing pressure within the Cabinet to examine the overall cost of the
government's overseas information services, of which the External Services were a key
part. Still reeling after the end of Lend-Lease three years earlier, and having spent the
majority of the $3,700 million American loan negotiated by John Maynard Keynes by
the summer of 1946, the implementation of sterling convertibility in July 1947 (a
condition of the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944 which led to the establishment
of the International Monetary Fund a year and a half later) had induced an economic
crisis in which a dollar drain of $650 million was lost before convertibility was
suspended the following month.452 Over the next three years Britain received $2.7
billion of Marshall Aid, but the government's relative inability to exercise control over its
macro-economic environment compounded the problems it had in meeting the needs
of its micro-economic responsibilities.f'" This meant that by the time of the Berlin
blockade in June 1948 the government was increasingly willing to re-examine its
spending plans and realise savings. For its information services this was to result in
harsh budget cuts.
At the beginning of August 1948 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, put
the cost of the overseas information services at £11,621,700, over a third of which went
451 Ibid. Voz de Londres ('This is London') was the SSG's regional publication containing
schedules and features. . h
452 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy & World Power In the 2d Century,
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to the External Services via Grant-in-Aid.454 When added to the £5 million spent at
home, he argued that 'the total expenditure on these services had now reached a level
which exposed the Government to risk of public criticism' .455 By the time this
submission was considered by ministers at the end of October much had been done by
overseas Whitehall departments to orchestrate their response to Cripps. In July the
committee of senior ministers on Anti-Communist Propaganda had decided to set up a
small body consisting of the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries at the Foreign Office,
Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office, at the latter's suggestion, to 'co-
ordinate the collection and presentation of publicity material regarding British Colonial
policy and adrnmistration'Y" It was intended that it would present Britain's conduct in
this field as progressive and constructive while, in a more destructive vein, 'give the
world a true picture of Russia's conduct in Eastern Europe and its own territories' .457
This was the beginning of the Colonial Information Policy Committee (CIPC) and added
to its permanent membership were the head of the Central Office of Information,
Robert Fraser, and Ian Jacob from the BBC. By the time it started meeting in
September, the challenge presented by Cripps to the overseas information services
budget provided a galvanizing focus of attention for CIPC that would significantly
broaden its remit and increase its importance as a key part of the Whitehall machinery
employed to prosecute the government's campaign against communism.
On 22 September, Bevin wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
Philip Noel-Baker, requesting that CIPC 'should be charged with the duty of examining
urgently what extensions of the British Council's work in the Colonies, India, and
454 TNA, CAB129/29, CP(48)199, 'Cost of Information Services', Memorandum by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 August 1948.
455 TNA, CAB128/13, CM(48)66(4), 'Government Information Services', 25 October 1948.
456 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN 231/2 nd Meeting, Minute 1, 'Colonial Propaganda', 22 July 1948;
TNA, CAB134/98, CI(48)1, Committee on Colonial Information Policy, Note by the Acting
Secretary of the Cabinet, 12 August 1948.
457 TNA, CAB 130/37, GEN 231/4, 'Anti-Soviet and Pro-British Colonial Propaganda', Note by
the Secretary, 16 June 1948.
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Pakistan will be necessary over the next three years,.458 In addition, he put it to Noel-
Baker that 'they should also consider whether the work of our Information Services in
and about the Colonies and in the Dominions, especially India, Pakistan and Ceylon,
should not also be much expanded. The Under Secretaries would then draw up a
three-year budget of expenditure on overseas publicity.,459 Accordingly, Noel-Baker
informed the Cabinet that a three year programme for the overseas information
services was being planned and that economies would be examined as part of this
process. Mindful of being outmanoeuvred in this deliberate attempt by overseas
departments to seize the initiative for setting the information services budget away from
the Treasury, Cripps appointed, with Cabinet approval, the Financial Secretary to the
group proposed by Bevin."?
This move coincided with another development whereby the activities of CIPC were
widened to cover 'the whole field of overseas propaganda, with the object of repelling
Communist campaigns by both positive and destructive counter-propaqanda?" And in
October the Cabinet were informed of the Foreign Secretary's view that far from being
cut back, the work done by the overseas information services should be enhanced.t'"
This, however, was an argument difficult to make convincing in light of the fiscal
pressures the Treasury. Nonetheless, by the end of the year overseas departments
458 TNA, CAB21/2499, Bevin to Noel-Baker, 22 September 1948. The Parliamentary Under-
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had control of an increasingly important part of the government's anti-communist
machine and as such CIPC was a vehicle with which to advocate the case of the
information services across Whitehall.
A consequence of the widening remit of CIPC was the removal of Jacob and Fraser
from its permanent list of members. Jacob, though, remained in close contact with the
work of the committee and still received its papers (except for those put in a
confidential annex) and continued to attend meetings at which matters affecting the
BBC were drscussed.?" As such, he was an influential occasional member of the
committee particularly, as will be seen, when it came to the budget for the overseas
information services.
While forecasts were being made about the future of the government's information
services, more immediate concerns were raised at Bush House when at the start of
1949 the Treasury asked the External Services to accept a further cut of £280,000 for
the coming financial year.464This was achieved by deferring capital projects amounting
to £200,000 and by making further 'unspecified savings,.465 An under-spend on the
Grant-in-Aid for 1948/49 had allowed Treasury to use this as an excuse to lower the
amount for the next financial year and although a solution was quickly found, Jacob
made it clear to the BBC Governors that 'we shall be hard put to make two ends meet
and any new developments will certainly have to be financed by reductions
elsewhere,.466 The finances of the External Services had reached a precarious balance.
A great deal of effort had been put in by Jacob to effect organisational and
administrative efficiencies, but any slack there may have been was fast disappearing. A
463 TNA, CAB134/98, CI(48)5(1), 'Composition and Terms of Reference of the Committee', 29
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ten percent cut the previous year followed by a further reduction on that figure of
around seven per cent left almost no room for rnanoeuvre.?"
It was the devaluation of sterling in September 1949 from $4.03 to $2.80 that was to
cause the next big headache for the External Services. Its effect was immediately felt
at the BBC where a special Board of Management meeting was held to discuss
'proposals which would at the least keep the expenditure in foreign currencies to the
present authorised sterling totals and, wherever possible, reduce them below these
totals' .468 The External Services were hit hard by a £12,000 cut required in programme
allowances (which it was felt could be made) and a saving of £42,000 on offices in New
York, Colombia, Mexico City, Brazil and Argentina out of a total spend of £94,000.469 A
choice had to be made between a proportionate reduction in expenditure on these
offices or to leave the activities of some unimpaired and make a heavier cut on the
others. Following discussions with the Foreign Office, who considered BBC services to
Latin America 'as the principal agent of Britain in the information field there' and which
had already been badly affected by cuts, it was decided that the 'surfeit of radio, press
and magazine fare which surrounds the people of the United States, the great
distances, the immense population, and the absence of any centralized broadcasting
system into which we might gain entry, make it a somewhat unprofitable field for work'.
Accordingly, a 50 per cent reduction in expenditure on the New York office was made
by cutting staff from 29 to 14 and putting an end to 'specialised projects in the North
American Service' .470
467 WAC, R1/85/6, G119, 'Report on Finance: Quarter Ended so" June', 31 August 1949.
468 WAC, R2/2, Board of Management meeting, 'Devaluation', 19 September 1949.
469 The Canadian Office was described to the Board of Governors by Jacob as 'small and
cheap, and yet very valuable'. WAC, R1/85/8, G150, 'Report by the Director of the Overseas
Services', 17 November 1949 ;WAC, R2/2, Special Meeting of the Board of Management,
'Devaluation', 28 September 1949.
470 WAC, R1/85/8, G150, 17 November 1949.
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Meanwhile, the need for fiscal restraint continued and by the end of the year
government departments were asked to make a five per cent cut in their budqets. On
this occasion the External Services avoided any decrease in its Grant-in-Aid, but
another problem was looming. The cumulative effect of previous cuts had made it
essential that in order to maintain services at their present level, Bush House argued,
the External Services would require between £200,000 and £300,000 more in Grant-in-
Aid in its budget for 1950/51.471 Ominously, when Jacob put the higher figure to
colleagues on the Colonial Information Policy Committee it was in the context of a
discussion on a further reduction in the overseas information services budget, as
proposed by the Chancellor, to a new ceiling figure of £9.5 million - a drop of £1.5
million from the amount proposed by the CIPC as a result of its reassessment of
expenditure. Here Jacob explained that if this need was not met cuts would have to be
looked for in the quality of programmes, the cancellation of complete services (as
stopping 'one or two individual services would not effect any substantial economy'),
and a reduction in coverage and time on the air. Calculated to create maximum impact
Jacob then explained that if 'an appreciable economy was to be made in this direction,
it would involve cancelling, for instance, the whole of the dawn transmissions for
Europe,' which was 'our only way of reaching the skilled workman class in a number of
countries and also that considerable body of important people in Europe that listened
regularly to these transmissions. These would be serious disadvantages to set off
against the financial saving which would be made.'472
With the next year's budget pending a decision by senior ministers, Jacob ordered a
standstill on the construction of a major transmitter station being built in Singapore.
This was a long-term and important capital project for both the government and the
BBC that was intended to transmit the voice of Britain to a region that was becoming
471 Ibid.
472 TNA, CAB134/99, CI(49)15th Meeting, 'Three-Year Plan', 17 November 1949.
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increasingly important to the UK in terms of the cold war and a project that the CIPC
considered as 'axiomatic that the BBC should proceed with' .473 A week before the
Committee on Anti-Communist Propaganda met to discuss, among other things, the
'Three Year Plan for Overseas Publicity', the BBC received 'an assurance from the
Government that there would be no cut on the Singapore project' and the standstill was
withdrawn.?" It was at this meeting, on 19 December, that the Prime Minister along
with Ernest Bevin, Stafford Cripps, AV Alexander (Minister of Defence), James Chuter
Ede (Home Secretary), Arthur Creech Jones (Secretary of State for the Colonies), and
Philip Noel-Baker (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) debated the three-
year plan prepared by the three overseas Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. Taking its
lead from the arguments made by Jacob a month earlier at CIPC, the paper presented
ministers with the argument that 'a broadcasting service is not something that can be
turned on and off like a tap, since its audience and its reputation can only be built up
slowly and laboriously'. It was also particularly significant that 'broadcasting is our only
means of injecting anti-Communist publicity into the "iron-curtain" countries'.
Accordingly, it concluded, 'we feel convinced that any reduction in the output of the
BBC's foreign language services at this juncture would be a false economy and would
result in a loss of British influence which would take many years to recover' .475
The case for wholesale inviolability for the BBC's overseas services was not received
with the same enthusiasm by non-overseas ministers. Cripps, for example, was
possessed of a far more protean view of the aims and means of broadcasting to other
countries. In the pursuit of reductions he was willing to argue that 'the Overseas
Information Services must be regarded ... as an aspect of defence', and as defence
spending at that time was also being reduced (before the flames of war flickered on the
473 Ibid., CI(49)17(2), 'Revised Three-Year Plan for the Overseas Information Services', 20
December 1949.
474 WAC, R2/2, 'Points for Report', Board of Management meeting, 12 December 1949.
475 TNA, CAB130/37, GEN 231/7, 'Colonial Information Policy Committee: Revised Three-Year
Plan for the Overseas Information Services', Note by the Committee, 12 December 1949.
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Korean Peninsula) so must that of these services. It was far better, he thought, 'that we
should concentrate largely on the anti-Communist side of overseas publicity and should
consider abandoning certain spheres of operation altogether, e.g. Latin America'.
Similarly, Attlee felt 'that we should concentrate on the most dangerous areas. Could
we not consider abandoning Information Services altogether in such parts of the world
as Scandinavia?' By the end of the meeting a compromise position was reached
whereby expenditure on the Overseas Information Services would be restricted 'to as
Iowa figure as possible between £10 and £11 millions'.476
As it was already understood that expenditure on these services would be somewhere
between £9.5 million and £11 million, senior ministers did little to settle the issue at this
stage. Nevertheless, it did illuminate a clear divide between home and overseas
departments in which the final arbitrating voice, that of the Prime Minister's, was in
sympathy with the views of the former. However, a period of extra time had been given
to this debate and the tone was now set for some very hard bargaining over the next
year and a half. In the meantime, as an overall budget decision hung in the balance,
operating estimates had to be set for 1950/51. In this the External Services, unlike
other parts of the information services, received a net increase of £195,000 on its
budget from the previous year which went some way to maintaining the status quo at
Bush House. The future, though, was uncertain. With next to no reserve funds, rising
annual costs, the expense of countering Soviet jamming and ageing technical stock the
External Services of the BBC were in danger of getting stuck in a state of inertia. Jacob
understood this. Accordingly, he informed his Governors in the spring of 1950:
'It would be quite wrong in my opinion to become static and have to stifle all
new ideas for improved or extended Services. As it seems unlikely that we shall
be given any more money in the future than we have now, some axeing of the
476 Ibid., GEN 231/3rd Meeting, 'The Three-Year Plan for Overseas Publicity', 19 December
1949.
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less essential Services to make room for necessary improvements seems
unavoidable.'?"
The short-term requirement of balancing the nation's budget in tandem with ministerial
division on the question of the overseas information services' financing eroded the
fiscal rationale behind CIPC's three-year publicity strategy. Instead, an annual ceiling
for all services became the practical method of establishing expenditure and the focus
of continued Whitehall contention. For 1950/51, this was £10.82 million with a
subsequent agreement to keep costs down to £10.5 million.478 Below this headline
figure, the BBC maintained the practice of annually reviewing and submitting its
estimate in the autumn and winter for the coming financial year. So far the External
Services, with the agreement of the Treasury and overseas departments, had so far
avoided the severest cuts which had been borne, for example, by the British Council
and the Foreign Office Information Services. But as an estimate somewhere between
£5.2 and £5.3 million for 1951/52 was prepared by Bush House through 1950 it was
clear that BBC services would face major reductions unless there was a fundamental
rethink in Whitehall of the whole basis of government accounting for the overseas
information services.?"
It was with this threat in mind that Jacob set about challenging the government's
budgetary mindset. As he informed the Board of Governors in the summer of 1950:
'We have been supporting the Foreign Office and other Departments in an effort to
alter this attitude, and to get His Majesty's Government to adopt an active policy not
governed solely by financial consideration.Y" At a meeting of CIPC on 20 June 1950,
477 WAC, R1/86/3, G69, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', undated.
478 TNA, CAB134/460, IS(51)2, 'Overseas Information Expenditure', Memorandum by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 February 1951.
479 Ibid.; WAC, R1/86/7, G177, 'Grant-in-Aid Estimates for 1950/1 (Revised) and 1951/2', Note
bJ6 Director of Overseas Services, 17 November 1950.
40 WAC, R1/86/6, G160, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 19 October 1950.
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Jacob began the fight back against the year on year cuts by providing the basis of an
argument intended to recast current policy. He understood that economic pressure was
a spur to efficiency, but he also believed that 'when carried to the point where all
developments, and any new idea, can only be applied by lopping off some part of
existing services, it leads to stagnation and apathy' .481 What was required was to
champion a new, braver, policy that argued for expansion, rather than trying to hold
back the tide of cuts. As he told his CIPC colleagues, 'the £10.5 millions provided for
overseas information work was insignificant compared with the £700 millions for
defence; the Information services could do much towards winning the cold war, but if
that was lost all the money spent on defence would have been wasted,.482 In this way,
Jacob sought change by reinvigorating and renewing the argument in favour of
overseas publicity - by taking the initiative.
Jacob's thoughts were fed through to the Working Party of CIPC where they were co-
ordinated with the needs of the other information services. In this forum Jacob and the
Chair of the Working Party, the Head IRD Ralph Murray, worked together on a paper
that focused on getting the principle of an overall ceiling removed. This they did by
arguing that rising costs produced not stabilization, but progressive run-down and that
extra finance, not less, was needed as 'a means of political warfare to strengthen the
forces of democracy wherever they are most threatened'. The Korean War had
'quickened the tempo of the struggle against the Kremlin and increased the importance
of the role of overt as well as covert information work'. In addition, now that the British
and US information services 'have now started to exchange information, pool ideas,
481 TNA, CAB134/1 02, CI(50)21, 'The Overseas Services of the BBC' Memorandum by the
BBC, 19 June 1950. Jacob made it clear at the meeting of CIPC the following day that the
memorandum 'represented at the moment his purely personal views and had not been
approved by the Board of Governors'. See, Ibid., CI(50)4(4), 'Overseas Broadcasting: General
Jacob's Memorandum', 20 June 1950.
482 Ibid., CI(50)4(4), 20 June 1950.
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and generally co-ordinate their activities both at headquarters and in the field' there
was a 'need to keep in step with the Americans'Y'
'The prime need,' Jacob argued, 'was to persuade Senior Ministers to adopt an entirely
new attitude towards the overseas Information Services and to agree that a
considerable increase of effort was necessary in this quarter'. Money spent on
information services, should be regarded as a 'form of insurance' against a much
greater degree of expenditure if they did not play their part in the struggle between East
and West:
'The Information side of the "Cold War" ...might be likened to a campaign which
we must fight as efficiently as possible; and, as in a military campaign, it was
necessary for us to have the funds readily available, so as to seize each
opportunity as it presented itself, without being subject to long delays required
to obtain Treasury approval for each item' .484
Consequently, on the basis of the Working Party paper the three overseas ministers
approved the recommendations that a reserve fund should be established to allow for
contingencies and that ceilings on expenditure should be removed 'and a return to the
more normal practice whereby the estimates are worked out in conjunction with the
Treasury on the basis of the requirements which the Committee consider necessary' .485
Opposed by the Treasury, Attlee called a meeting between the exchequer and
overseas ministries in an attempt to once again resolve the matter.
It had been acknowledged from an early point by CIPC that to change the culture of
thought concerning overseas information expenditure was going to be a very difficult
483 Truman asked Congress for an extra $89,000,000 (£31,785,000). Ibid., CI(50)32, 'The Case
for an Increase in Overseas Information Expenditure', Memorandum by the Working Party, 21
July 1950.
484 Ibid., CI(50)5(2), 'Overseas Information Expenditure', 26 July 1950.
485 Ibid., CI(50)37, 'The Case for a New Approach to Overseas Information Expenditure',
Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, 19 September 1950.
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task. Jacob, though, had induced the overseas departments to tackle this fundamental
problem. However, when ministers met on 14 November there was a shock in store. A
month after succeeding Cripps, Hugh Gaitskell (who as Minister of State for Economic
Affairs had written the initial Treasury reply opposing these proposals when they were
passed to No.11 by Attlee) informed fellow ministers that 'far from considering an
increase in overseas information expenditure he was contemplating a decrease which
might amount to about £2 million,.486 This robust response was based on the view that
while there 'was value in some aspects of propaganda, particularly in the front line of
the anti-communist campaign' he felt that the government 'could afford no "frills" at the
present time' ,487 Such frills included, for example, services to Latin America. It was now
suggested by the Treasury that the SSC External Services budget for 1951/51 should
be reduced by nearly £1.5 million to £3,750,000.488 Now fighting a rear-guard action,
the Ministry of Defence and Chiefs of Staff were brought in by the Foreign Office to
defend the Grant-in-Aid. In a paper defending the cost of overseas broadcasting the
military Chiefs agreed that 'it was most important to maintain to the fullest possible
extent the Overseas Services of the SSC on account of their value in the prosecution of
the cold war' and provided detailed arguments to be used in support of this view. 489
Notwithstanding this intervention, an agreement on the overall information services
budget and the External Services' Grant-in-Aid remained elusive at the beginning of
1951. But with the new financial year looming, a final ministerial judgement was
required. The matter was referred to the Ministerial Committee on Information Services
(ISC). The Chancellor was 'not convinced' that the External Services 'have been
reorganised on to a new basis appropriate to even the present' while overseas
ministers noted that when it came to costs, 'the floor rose while the ceiling came
486 Ibid., GI(50)7(1), 'Overseas Information Expenditure', 21 November 1950.
487 Ibid.; GI(50)45, 'Overseas Information Expenditure', Note by Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, 23 November 1950.
488 WAG, R1/87/1, G8, 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 10 January 1951.
489 TNA, DEFE4/38, GOS(50)200(9), 'Overseas Services of the SSG', 8 December 1950.
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down' .490 The Minister of Defence, meanwhile, had informed the ISC that it 'would be
wrong to deprive ourselves of any weapons useful for that effort' and said in relation to
the proposal to cut down the Overseas Services of the SSC, 'the Chiefs of Staff have
once more drawn my attention to the damaging effects of a change of policy' that 'could
not fail to cripple the SSC's efficiency as a cold war instrument' .491 The strength of the
Chiefs of Staff views had been helped by an informal meeting between the SSC and
the War Office at Langham House at which it was made clear what the consequences
of such a cut to SSC services would be.492 Gaitskell now proposed a cut in the
Overseas Information Services to £9.8 million of which £4.4 million would be for the
SSC.493The overseas departments, however, argued for a reduction of £900,000 from
the original estimate for 1951/52 of £11.7 million which would leave a budget of £10.8
million (the amount that had originally been authorised for the previous year).494
Persuasive though the arguments of the overseas minister's and the country's military
leaders were, they did little to shake the view of the Chancellor. The issue of defence
spending had been a key element of the debate from early on when Cripps had used
its decline as a reason to make cuts in the information services. Subsequently, when
defence costs rocketed in response to the Korean War and the rearmament
programme this galvanised, in a reversal of misfortune the sheer scale of the
expenditure made reductions in other departments inevitable. In a report for the Soard
of Governors, Jacob seemed taken aback by what was happening:
490 TNA, CAB134/460, IS(51)2, 'Overseas Information Expenditure', Memorandum by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 February 1951; IS(51)3, 'Overseas Information Expenditure',
Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, 8 February 1951.
491 Ibid., IS(51)4, 'Overseas Information Services', Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 8
February 1951.
492 TNA, DEFE4/39, COS(52)22(2), 'Annex: Overseas Services of the BBC', Note by the War
Office, 31 January 1951.
493 TNA, CAB134/460, IS(51)2, 7 February 1951.
494 Ibid., IS(51)1(2), 'Overseas Information Expenditure', 12 February 1951.
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'It seems hardly possible that His Majesty's Government would proceed in this
drastic fashion at a time like the present, particularly as any Services now
abolished would have to be started up again if there were a war, and in the
meanwhile we should have lost the frequencies, the staff and the audlence.r''"
Gaitskell, however, was firmly of the opinion that the offer of an overall reduction on
£900,000 was not nearly enough.496 Without an agreement, the final arbitration of the
Cabinet was sought.
By the time of the Cabinet meeting on 2 April 1951 Gaitskell had adjusted his offer to
£10.15 million, but the consequences of this cut remained dire for the information
services and the BBC. As a combined Cabinet Paper by the overseas departments
pointed out, the 'figure of £900,000 was reached after much thought, and represents
the limit to which, in our considered opinion, we could go without grave damage to the
national interest'. Under this plan the BBC Grant-in-Aid would have been reduced by
£250,000 involving serious disruption to services to Latin America, India, the Far East
and South Africa. Now that the Chancellor was proposing final cuts of £430,000, they
argued, counter-jamming measures and planned improvements in services to Far
Eastern and Arabic audiences would be affected. Moreover, European services would
also be badly hit.497 For his part, the Chancellor believed there were still economies to
be made in the administration of the External Services. In particular, 'some overseas
services could be reduced or even abolished without serious loss to the national
interest' .498
495 WAC, R1/87/1, G8, 10 January 1951.
496 Ibid., IS(51)1(2), 12 February 1951.
497 TNA, CAB129/44, CP(51)53, 'Expenditure on Overseas Information Services, 1951-52',22
February 1951.
498 Ibid., CP(51 )59, 'Overseas Information Expenditure', Memorandum by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 28 February 1951.
160
Both sides presented an intransigent face in their submissions to the Cabinet, but in
truth the die in this dispute was cast even before Ministers met. On 9 March 1951
Ernest Bevin, whose health had been failing fast and whose presence around the
Cabinet table was in decline, was made Lord Privy Seal. Although he was given
responsibility for questions concerning broadcasting policy, the real influence on the
overseas side passed to his successor as Foreign Secretary the former Lord President,
Herbert Morrison. Morrison was possessed of a different outlook from Bevin when it
came to the financing of the information services and the BBC. Over a year earlier
when the overseas departments had contested Cripps' proposed reductions in the
committee on Anti-Communist Propaganda, Morrison had 'indicated to the Prime
Minister his view that, on the merits of the case, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was
right' .499 A year later when the problem of finance was brought before the Information
Services Committee, which Morrison chaired, he did not really believe that the estimate
for the External Services could be justified and 'felt that the targets of overseas
broadcasting should be more carefully selected,.50o Since becoming Foreign Secretary,
he told colleagues at this crucial Cabinet meeting, he had 'discussed this matter further
with the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations, and had
persuaded them to accept the lower figure proposed by the Chancellor'P'"
A three-year attempt to argue against successive reductions in the overseas
information services budget and the BBC External Services Grant-in-Aid had ended in
the biggest cut of all. Despite a valiant, though, doomed attempt to reengineer
governing perspectives on the value to the extracted from overseas publicity as
championed by Jacob, April 1951 saw the BBC make the first of a number of service
499 TNA, CAB134/102, CI(50)1 (11), 'Further Revision of the Three-Year Plan for the Overseas
Information Services', 11 January 1950.
500 TNA, CAB134/460, IS(51)1(2), 'Overseas Information Expenditure', 12 February 1951.
501 TNA, CAB128/19, CP(51)23(2), 'Overseas Information Services', 2 April 1951.
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reductionsP'" With Bevin as Foreign Secretary expansion, though improbable, was
worth pursuing, but with Morrison there was very little room for manoeuvre and Jacob
and Gaitskell remained at loggerheads as the financial will of the Treasury exercised its
control over the Grant-in-Aid. Would, though, a Conservative administration have
responded differently? Jacob and the BBC did not have to wait long to find out.
502 WAC, R2/48/6, BMA8, 'A BBC Calendar for 1951', undated; WAC, R2/48/2, BM41, 'Staff
Reductions in the External Services', Note by DOS, 30 March 1951.
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7. DROGHEDA
It soon became apparent that the same critical tension in relating value to expenditure
existed regardless of whether Clement Attlee or Winston Churchill occupied NO.10
Downing Street. In February 1951 R.A. Butler had argued, in response to the
announcement that the External Services budqet was to be cut again, that' this arm of
broadcasting is one of the most vital that we can use in our general defence
arrangements' .503 Likewise, there was derision in the press over this latest funding
decision with the Daily Mail noting, 'The "Voice of America" booms, the Voice of Stalin
roars, the Voice of Britain must whisper,.504 Nine months later, however, the
Conservatives also found themselves looking for a mechanism that would unlock the
problem of funding in the context of vastly swelling defence expenditure as a result of
the Korean War and a consequent desperate need to exercise control over the public
purse.
To this effect, the new Conservative government established a small Ministerial
Committee to 'examine the requirement for Overseas Information Services for the
coming year' under the Lord President of the Council, Lord Salisbury. In truth, the
committee had been given the task of cutting £500,000 from the overall budget which
was done by squeezing even further the resources of the British Council and the
Central Office of tntormatlon.?" Nevertheless, the decision of the government in early
1952 to freeze the overseas broadcasting budget for the coming financial year at
£4,750,000 resulted, according to Gerard Mansell who would take charge at Bush
House in the 1970s, in 'the most serious blood-letting the External Services were ever
to know'.506 This was no understatement. The long-term malnutrition of the External
503 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vo1.484, co1.1269, 21 February 1951.
504 Mansell, Let Truth Be Told, p.223.
505 WAC, R1/88/1, G13 'Report by the Director of Overseas Services', 6 February 1952.
506 Mansell, Let Truth Be Told, p.224.
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Services now threatened, as a result of successive budgetary settlements, to threaten
the survival of the whole organisation. In addition, the combined pressures of rising
costs and static finances were added to by the expense of counter-jamming operations
which became a further drain on funding. 507
As a result of the reduction in the External Services' budget for 1951/52 the General
Overseas Service in English was reduced from 24 to 21 hours a day with services in
Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America cut nearly in half and the BBC's office in
Bogota closed. There were also reductions in daily broadcast times in the Afrikaans,
French, Dutch, German and Yugoslav services, which services in Greek for Cyprus
were dropped attoqether.''" One year on, it was necessary to make further cuts in the
Portuguese and Spanish services to Latin America along with the closure of the four
remaining BBC offices there. The majority of breakfast and lunchtime broadcasts to
Western Europe were eliminated with services to Belgium discontinued completely. In
addition, the Arabic Listener ceased publication - a decision the government would
come to rue four years later - and nearly all capital expenditure, including that
desperately needed to update ageing transmitter stock, was deferred. Finally, and most
dispiritingly, 130 posts were abohshed.?" As Jacob informed the BBC Board of
Governors in February 1952, 'there is a real danger of our becoming inaudible in
various parts of the world unless we take steps to regain our position.t'"?
Deeply frustrated by the course of government inaction, Jacob had agitated for an
independent enquiry to help resolve this unsatisfactory state of affairs. Concerned at
507 Services in Finnish began to be jammed in January 1952, Czech in February 1952,
Hungarian in March 1952, Bulgarian and Roumanian in April 1952 and Albanian in May 19~2.
WAC R20/53, 'Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information
Services', 27 July 1953, p.73. .
508 Annual Report and Accounts of the British Broadcasting Corporation for the year 1951-52,
Cmd. 8660 (London: HMSO, September 1952), p.47.
509 Ibid., pp.47-8.
510 WAC, R1/88/1, G13, 6 February 1952.
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losing political control and the financial implications of such a move, the government
had resisted. However, the increased cost of jamming and the impact on domestic
opinion of the External Services swingeing cuts forced a change of approach in
Whitehall. In the face of increasing public and parliamentary criticism the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, announced to the House
of Commons on 2 April 1952 the government's decision to set up an interdepartmental
Committee of officials:
'Each successive year the Overseas Information Services have been subjected
to the over-riding requirements of finance ... It is high time, in my view, that an
enquiry was made into the political aspects of this field. We have, therefore,
already taken steps to invite the departments concerned, together with the
British Broadcasting Corporation and the British Council, to consider the whole
range of our overseas information services from the political and strategic
aspects' .511
This committee, chaired by Jack Nicholls of the Foreign Office who had taken over
from Warner as Assistant Under-Secretary superintending information services was,
perhaps surprisingly, not designed to find a solution. Rather it was a way of buying time
and a means to generate a consensus of opinion with which to mount an assault on
Treasury intransigence. It was to this effect that the committee reported on 14 JUly:
'We believe we have established the necessity for, and the advantages of,
efficient overseas information work ... We are clearly not qualified to express
any opinion on the proper distribution of the national resources; we must
therefore confine ourselves to saying that in our view the international situation,
the Communist ideological onslaught on the free world, the need to right the
balance of payments and the necessity of maintaining Commonwealth
relationships, all demand an intensification of overseas information work and a
511 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vo1.498, Co1.1716, 2 April 1952.
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measure of continuity in its financing, in order to permit operations to be so
planned as to produce their full cumulative effect.,512
Two weeks later Nutting announced in the Commons, in response to a question put by
the Labour MP Ernest Davies, the government's decision to establish 'a small expert
advisory committee of independent people outside the Government service' to make
recommendations on the long term policy of overseas information servlces.F" The
stage was now set for just the type of enquiry the BBC hoped would bring an end to the
suffocating inertia of the previous years.
Under the chairmanship of the House of Lords' Deputy Speaker (Lord Chairman of
Committees) and former Director-General of the wartime Ministry of Economic Warfare,
the Earl of Drogheda, the committee began its work in October 1952 having been
asked
'To assess the value, actual and potential, of the overseas information work of
the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office, Board of
Trade and Central Office of Information; the External Services of the British
Broadcasting Corporation; and the work of the British Council; to advise upon
the relative importance of different methods and services in different areas and
circumstances and to make recommendations for future policy.?"
In order to do this, the Drogheda Committee set about establishing general principles
that should guide its analysis of the various parts of the government's overseas
information services. For example, it was thought that 'The aim of the Information
Services must always be to achieve in the long run some definite political or
512 WAC R20/53, 'Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services', 27 July 1953, p.5.
513 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vo1.504, cols.1486-8, 30 July 1952.
514 WAC R20/53, 'Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services', 27 July 1953, p.3. Other members of the committee were: J.L. Heyworth,
Victor Feather, Mary Stocks, J.W. Platt, Donald McLachlan and Gervas Huxley. Sir Robert
Bruce Lockhart had also been originally appointed but retired in November 2952 due to ill
health.
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commercial result'. Equally, it was considered that 'Information Services should be
directed at the influential few and through them at the many'.515 With regard to the
BBC's External Services the Committee thought that the value of overseas
broadcasting would be further determined by three additional considerations. First, the
extent to which listeners in reception countries had access to alternative and reliable
sources of news. Secondly, whether people in another country look to the West for
'encouragement and guidance' and, finally, where local broadcasting systems relied on
the External Services to supply programming for output and where the BBC 'performs
an essential role as the centre if a broadcasting network which brings the voice of
Britain to countries which naturally look to London for news,.516
During the course of its deliberations, the BBC put a great deal of effort in furnishing
the Committee with ample information supporting its argument in favour of increased
financing. As J.B. Clark, who had replaced Jacob as the Director of External
Broadcasting following the latter's appointment as Director-General, remarked both in
December 1952 and the following February the 'atmosphere has been markedly
receptive to expressions of anxiety at the limitation of BBC activities' and both
'collectively and severally all the members of the Committee seem well disposed to the
BBC External Services,.517 Consequently, it was felt that the Corporation 'has had a fair
and full hearing at its various sessions with the Committee'. However, on the eve of the
Committee presenting its Report to the government, concerns at the BBC started to
emerge about 'a somewhat dangerous and unwelcome inclination to contemplate the
curtailment of services to Western Europe,.518
515 Ibid., p.6.
516 Ibid., p.9.
517 WAC R1/89/2, G32 'Report by the Director of External Broadcasting', 25 February 1953;
WAC, R1/88/6, G110 'Report by the Director of External Broadcasting', 3 December 1952
518 WAC R1/89/3, G64 'Report by the Director of External Services', 31 May 1953.
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The Report of the Drogheda Committee, which would never be published in full, was
presented to the government on 27 July 1953, a year on from the report of the
committee of officials.F'" Both the BBC and the Foreign Office had hoped 'to use the
weapon of the Independent Inquiry as a means of persuading the Treasury to make
increased grants to cover rising costs for the maintenance of the existing services' .520
However, as the Report's recommendations revealed, such a clear strategy was no
longer applicable. With respect to the BBC, the Drogheda Report recommended the
return of the General Overseas Service to a round-the-clock service. Broadcasts over
the Iron Curtain should be maintained and effective counter-jamming measures
continued. Services to the Middle East in Arabic should be extended with those for the
Far East further strengthened. The Latin American Service should be restored to
previous levels and programmes to North America and the Colonies maintained at
present levels. It was on the issue of Europe, as the BBC had feared, that the
Committee had less palatable news. While it was recommended that services in
English, German, Austrian, Finnish, Spanish, Turkish, Yugoslav and Greek should be
kept, because of their political importance, it was proposed that others in French, Italian
Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Portuguese and Swedish should be eltminated.?"
The Report presented a genuine dilemma for the BBC. The Corporation had presented
a robust case and felt that it had had a fair hearing. On the one hand, it paid tribute to
the BBC's 'high reputation as a news source, to its penetrative power though the Iron
Curtain, its influence in the Middle East, the value of the General Overseas Service and
the importance of the Far Eastern and Latin American Services.'522 In addition, by
519 The BBC was given sight of the original report. However, it was nearly another year before a
'Summary' of the report, heavily redacted, was published: Summary of the Report of the
Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Services, Cmd.9138 (London:
HMSO, April 1954).
520 WAC, R1/88/6, G110. 3 December 1952.
521 WAC R20/53, 'Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services', 27 July 1953, p.3.
522 WAC, R1/89/4, G89 'Report by the Director of External Broadcasting', undated.
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recommending an annual spend of £500,000 over five to ten years on capital
investment to improve ageing technical stock, the Committee was clear in its support of
the long term future of overseas broadcasting. However, on the other hand, services to
Western Europe had been evaluated, the Corporation felt, on the basis of 'irrelevant
principles ... made to apply to broadcasting as if they were native to it' .523
In its defence of broadcasting to Western Europe the BBC's argued strongly against
the fifth principle laid down by Drogheda - that information services shall be directed at
the influential few and through them at the many. This, it felt, was more suited to the
choice of student for a British Council course or the activity of a British Information
Officer amongst contacts in a foreign capital. Meanwhile, it utterly failed to appreciate
or take advantage of 'the greatest development in the propaganda field in the past
century'. Namely, that 'Wireless has given to governments for the first time direct
means of access to audiences overseas, which enables them to influence foreign
governments by and through direct contact with the masses'. In the case of France, it
was as if the British government possessed in its own right a daily newspaper with a
circulation equivalent to The Daily Telegraph. As such, the BBC argued, 'any
information service which is in daily touch with five million people is itself in a position
"to make policy or mould public opinion"'. To disrupt the global flow of the External
Service's for tactical purposes, they said, would have a deep impact on the hard
earned reputation of the BBC abroad as listeners had become well aware of the
political considerations pertaining to overseas broadcasting: 'Audiences are quite clear
as to the motives for treating them in this opportunistic manner, and the BBC would in
the shortest period acquire a new reputation'J'"
523 Ibid., G94 'Comments on the Report of the Drogheda Committee', 29 September 1953.
524 Ibid.
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This dilemma was mirrored in Whitehall were a virtual impasse had been reached
between the Treasury and overseas departments. The Report had recommended the
removal of the information services financial "ceiling" and proposed a substantial
increase in overall funding. In addition to the increase in capital expenditure for the
BBC it was proposed that annual revenue should also see an uplift of £485,000 to
compensate for the erosion caused by under-funding in previous years. These were
measures that the Treasury, under current fiscal pressures, did not feel it could nor
should accede to and as Prime Ministerial thoughts turned to the challenges, and
associated costs, of Britain's thermo-nuclear future role at the top table of international
diplomacy, the necessary political direction was lacking to enforce a resolution.
Accordingly, a White Paper based on the Drogheda Report was not published until
April 1954, and then without a commitment from government to implement any of its
recommendations. 525
In November the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden eventually conceded that the
government 'have accepted the broad principles set out in the Drogheda Report', but
would not commit to a schedule of lrnplernentation.t" It was another month before it
became clear that the government really did not intend to act on the Report any time
soon. In a debate in the House of Lords the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord
Reading, noted the decision 'not to abolish for the next year any of the Western
European Services' .527 While this was a welcome reprieve for the External Services it
also indicated that Bush House would not benefit from any of the increases in
expenditure and expansion recommended by Drogheda. It also made plain that the
strategic reorganisation of overseas broadcasting was to be postponed at least until
1956 - an unfortunate legacy as the Corporation would duly find out.
525 Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services, Cmd.9138 (London: HMSO, April 1954).
526 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vo1.532, cols.847-8, 8 November 1954.
527 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, vo1.190, co1.306, 8 December 1954.
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The equivocal nature of these public announcements could scarcely conceal the
genuine conflict of opinion amongst ministers. In the meantime, Whitehall's continued
indecision meant that Bush House, unable to make plans for the future, was once
again forced to prepare for further cuts as the annual horse-trade between it the,
Foreign Office and the Treasury returned to its normal attritional pattern. As J.B. Clark
noted of the latest round of budgetary negotiations in November 1954, 'the
recommendations of the Drogheda Committee, which on balance called for
considerable expansion of the External Services, has so far had no application to the
BBC. On the contrary, we are now going slightly into reverse,.528 Nevertheless, while on
the surface inertia seemed to rule, there was a subtle change occurring in official
attitudes on King Charles Street that although not fully appreciated at the time would, in
the course of the next year or two, come to be hugely significant in Whitehall's attitude
towards overseas broadcasting.
In negotiations with other departments the Foreign Office had consistently supported
the BBC's argument 'to maintain the status quo in relation to the overall scope of the
External Services'. This was the line it had pursued at meetings of the Treasury
Working Party on broadcasting services at the end of the 1954.529 However, debates
within the department revealed the emergence of a far more pragmatic flexibility
concerning the range of services broadcast overseas by the BBC. Prior to the
publication of the White Paper and with government discussions, both within the
Cabinet and in Ministerial Committee, stuck in departmental deadlock the Foreign
Office was forced to reconsider its position. As a result, the BBC was informed that
while the Foreign Office,
528 WAC, R1/90/5, G113 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting'.
529 Ibid.
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'would not have taken the initiative in suggesting the elimination of services to
the free countries of Europe, they feel that the position is one in which they may
have to accept this unwelcome proposal in order to save the many good things
elsewhere in the Committee's Report. The alternative ...might lead to a virtual
disregard of the entire Report. ,530
The practical acceptance by government at the end of 1954 of the latter course
appeared to have made such a compromise unnecessary, but this only masked the
beginnings of a very real conceptual change of attitude in the Foreign Office that linked,
at this point, ever worsening departmental budgetary constraints with the SSC's
insistence on the global remit of its long-term broadcast mission regardless of the more
immediate diplomatic, political and economic imperatives facing the government.
While, as Clark noted, Drogheda 'has not allayed the recurrent budget troubles which it
was really called into existence to cure,'?" it had planted the seeds of future discord at
a subterranean level that would ultimately question the entire basis of overseas
broadcasting by the SSC.
530 WAC, R1/90/1, G21 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting'.
531 Ibid.
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IV. THE FORGE
The general muddle over broadcasting was appalling and we found '" that we never knew from
day to day where we stood. We can only regard it now as a bad dream and hope that people
have woken up and will act in the future in a rather more sensible manner.
- Sir Ian Jacob, BBC Director-General, April 1957532
On the eve of what would be a most traumatic and momentous year for both the British
government and the Corporation, the BBC Governors hosted a dinner on 8 December
1955 for the Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, at Broadcasting House. With the
Director-General, Sir Ian Jacob, and senior overseas staff also in attendance,
conversation focused on the challenges facing the External Services.533 It was
suggested that the recent Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva heralded a
'revived hardening of the cold war' and that the Russian refusal to agree to closer
cultural relations increased more than ever 'the value of broadcasting as a means of
communication which, despite the jamming, remains almost the only one open to the
West' .534 It was clear, however, that what really exercised the minds of BBC
management were the domestic challenges facing overseas broadcasting and the
future of relations with the British government.
The shadow of the Drogheda Committee continued to hang over any consideration of
the strategic purpose and scope of the External Services. Although the BBG claimed
that its continued non-implementation should mean that its Report be considered
532 Sir Ian Jacob Papers, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge, JACB 2/4, Sir Ian Jacob to
Ralph Poston, 26 April 1957.
533 Also present were: J.B. Clark, Director of External Broadcasting; Tangye Lean, Assistant
Director of External Broadcasting; James Monahan, Controller European Services; Hugh
Carleton Greene, Controller Overseas Services.
534 TNA, F0953/1640, PB1011/6, 'Governors' Dinner to Foreign Secretary', memorandum by
Director of External Broadcasting, 8 December 1955.
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'obsolete in detail', the Corporation could not escape from the threat it represented to
re-make the External Services as an organisation excessively predisposed to servicing
the most immediate foreign policy and trade requirements of the British government.
Anxieties were compounded by the fact, pointed out to Macmillan, that in the last eight
years 'overall costs have risen in this country by about 50%, whereas the grants for
revenue expenditure on the External Services have risen by only about 20%', As a
consequence the British overseas broadcasting operation had become an
impoverished enterprise when compared to its American and Russian counterparts:
'our Services have been curtailed or eliminated in order to make ends meet, during the
very period when the cold war has been raging'. 535 However, while the BBC was
seeking a fiscal stimulus to enhance its remit, the Foreign Office was beginning to
argue for a more selective assessment of the value of broadcasts.
On 20 February 1956 Paul Grey of the Foreign Office's Information Policy Department
attended a meeting chaired by Anthony Nutting at which the Minister of State
emphasised, in light of the government's commitment to reduce public spending by
£100 million, 'the need for fresh thinking and for concentrating our resources on
essentials'. Grey was asked whether he was 'satisfied that no reallocation could be
made in our own overseas information vote to meet the special threat of Soviet
propaqanda'Pf" Was there, Nutting wondered, 'any rearrangement which could be
made in the information services... in particular, the BBC transmissions to Europe,?537
This was just the opportunity that many Foreign Office officials had been waiting for to
reopen, under ministerial cover, the debate on overseas broadcasting that had been
stuck in a state of inertia since the Drogheda Committee reported in 1954.
535 Ibid.
536 TNA, F0953/1641 , PB1011/17, 'BBG External Services', memorandum by Paul Grey, 10
April 1956.
53'! TNA, F0953/1646, PB1012/6, 'BBG External Services', Grey to Stewart, 20 February 1956.
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While protective of the overall information services budget - 'I am sure that we cannot
make further significant savings in our general information and cultural effort without
destroying our basic propaganda machine' - Grey offered to look again at 'the question
of the SSC'. It was not just the 'value for cost of our broadcasts to Russia' that Grey felt
needed review. He argued that a wholesale study should be employed to 'show how
much would be saved by cutting out broadcasts to various countries or groups of
countries'. Grey had seized the initiative and with the support of his colleagues began
sweeping aside official nervousness at addressing the perceived inadequacies of SSC
services abroad.r" From now on, they would only be considered essential where it was
possible for a positive contribution to be made to government publicity objectives and
anti-communist work in particular. As in 1948, the broadcast environment was
changing. The Corporation, Grey argued, was 'holding on to what is largely a fetish' by
believing it had an unassailable right to a global broadcast remit,539
8. THE SOVIET UNION
Cultural Rapprochement
The decision to embark on a cost-benefit analysis of the SSC External Services was as
much a response to the inconclusive outcome of the Drogheda Committee as it was a
reaction to the perceived requirements of overseas broadcasting in the current political
and diplomatic climate. The added impetus in the spring of 1956 was the determination
of officials to reinforce the SSC's programmes to Russia and by extension to maximise
the dividend realised from broadcasting to Central and Eastern Europe.
538 TNA, F0953/1641, PB1011/17, 'BBG External Services', 10 April 1956; F.0953/1646,
PB1012/6, 'BBG External Services', 20 February 1956. Grey noted that previously 'We have, of
course discussed the BBG services frequently and decided so far that we should leave well
,
alone". Ibid.
539 TNA, F0953/1641, PB1011/17, 'BBG External Services', 10 April 1956.
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The duopolistic leadership of Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev suggested a new
direction in the management of Soviet affairs.540 The continuing process of de-
Stalinisation implied a marginal loosening of central control over life in Russia while the
rapprochement in May 1955 with Yugoslavia had given currency to the idea of 'national
roads to socialism' within the Soviet orbit. In the same month the signing of the
Austrian State Treaty, the Geneva Conference in July and, later in 1955, trips to
Afghanistan and India were evidence of a re-engagement by the Soviet leadership with
the world beyond the Iron Curtain.P" There remained, however, continuing trends that
pointed towards a more orthodox interpretation of Soviet objectives and methods and
generated a deep scepticism in British official circles towards these events at the
beginning of 1956. Not the least of these was the emergence of a Soviet thermo-
nuclear capability, increased Russian penetration of the Middle East and North Africa,
the signing of the Warsaw Pact and the continued propaganda attack on the West in
general and British 'imperialism' in particular.P" In the face of this evidence, and
underlined by the brusque and uncooperative manner in which Molotov had brought
the second Geneva conference to a close, the Foreign Office considered that even
greater effort should be put into meeting the 'special threat of Soviet propaqandaP"
Naturally, the BBC was intended to be a central player in this renewed counter-
offensive, but there existed at the heart of the relationship between Whitehall and Bush
540 Khrushchev had been First Secretary of the Central Committee since September 1953 with
Bulganin taking up the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) in February
1955.
541 The Austrian State Treaty, signed on 15 May 1955 by the occupying powers (Britain, Russia,
France and America), allowed for the establishment of an independent Austrian Government on
27 July 1955. Allied troops withdrew on 25 October 1955. The July 1955 Geneva Summit
Conference between the leaders of Britain, France, Russia and America met to discuss German
reunification, disarmament, European security and enhanced economic and cultural relations.
542 The Soviet's detonated an enhanced fission devise in August 1953. The deal to supply
Soviet arms to Egypt was negotiated in September 1955. The Warsaw Pact was signed on 14
May 1955 by the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and
Romania - the German Democratic Republic joined the following year.
543 TNA, F0953/1641 , PB1011/17, 'BBC External Services', 10 April 1956.
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House a long term difficulty in the handling of Russian output. The accommodation
reached between the two in the years following the 1948 Cabinet decision on foreign
publicity policy had, by the mid-1950s, begun to splinter and significant divergences of
opinion on the tone used in broadcasts to Russia had contributed to an increasingly
dysfunctional relationship between officials and broadcasters in this respect. Indeed,
The BBC's Russian programmes had been 'the subject of discussion between the
department and the BBC for the past three years in an attempt to improve them', but
without, from the Foreign Office's perspective, success.?" In particular, it was felt that
'in their anxiety to appeal to the Soviet intelligentsia and to create a mental and
emotional bridge across the Iron Curtain, the Russian Service have tended to blur their
presentation of the British case by trying to be too concillatory'P"
Several years' worth of experience of transmitting over the Iron Curtain had produced
two distinct doctrines of how best to maximise the effectiveness of broadcasts in
Russian. For the Foreign Office, the BBC's programmes were excessively 'dry and dull'
and therefore lacked the necessary edge to be an effective form of propaganda that
would open the ears of listeners to the world outside and expose the inequities and
hypocrisies of Soviet communist rule as seen from the West.546 For example, there was
concern that recent 'talks on the Rembrandt exhibition in Amsterdam, one on the
Schumann centenary and another on the merits of the Tunisian Prime Minister would
seem, given our relatively short broadcasting hours, to be only justifiable if there were a
drastic dearth of interesting rnatertal'.?" The BBC, as Ian Jacob pointed out, had
developed a rather different approach. 'The art of broadcasting successfully to foreign
audiences,' he explained in a paper for the Foreign Office, 'lies in estimating how best
544 TNA, F0953/1643, PB1011/54, 'Criticisms of the External Services of the British
Broadcasting Corporation', memorandum by Cosmo Stewart, 20 September 1956.
545 Ibid., Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956.
546 Ibid., 'Criticisms of the External Services', 20 September 1956.
547 Ibid., PB1011/54, Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956.
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to secure their friendly interest'P" This echoed the personal style of the Russian
Service Programme Organiser, Anatol Goldberg, and although Russian output did not
eschew critical commentary - indeed it had become a fact of cold war broadcasting life
- the BBC sought to couch it within an empathetic framework rather than a more
aggressive and potentially alienating one.
What made this difference of emphasis particularly difficult was that it centred on an
issue of editorial tone - a textural dispute. This fact was, of course, well understood by
both sides and helps explain why, after three years of debate, the Foreign Office felt
that it had failed to realise the desired changes in output. Actual editorial control, as
opposed to instructions concerning where and when to broadcast, was the emblem of
the External Services' independence from the British government. It was also, the BBC
maintained, the preserve of the broadcast specialist, not the realm of the policy analyst
and a strict interpretation of the BBC's Charter would confirm this constitutional and
practical position. And yet, it was also understood that the BBC, under the rubric of the
national interest, had a duty to protect and present Britain's interests overseas. To do
this successfully required negotiation with the Foreign Office over the strategic direction
of broadcasts abroad. This had been the case in 1948 in terms of the external threat
that communism posed Britain, and now in 1956 another such reorientation was on the
cards.
Rather than continuing to push for a gradual editorial overhaul, by the spring of 1956
the Foreign Office was planning a radical shake-up of the External Services. What
remained to be seen was whether common ground could be found between Whitehall
and the BBC on the direction to be taken. However, before this process had a chance
548 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/13, 'The External Services of the SSG', by Sir Ian Jacob, 31 May
1956.
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to gain purchase it was overtaken by a hugely significant development: the cessation of
the jamming of BBC programmes in Russian.
The trigger for this was the arrival in Britain of Khrushchev and Bulganin. On the 18
April 1956, the first day of their visit, the BBC noticed 'that a very substantial proportion
of the jammers located in the USSR were no longer attacking these particular
broadcasts'. Amongst the western radios transmitting in Russian - America, Canada,
Italy, Turkey, Spain, France, Israel and the Vatican - only the BBC was given this
reprieve.549 There was an obvious and immediate political and diplomatic dividend for
the Soviet leaders in having the jamming suspended both at home and overseas. On
the one hand it demonstrated an intention for cultural cooperation with the UK at the
start of an historic visit, while on the other, it allowed the BBC's Russian audience to
glimpse their leaders on the international stage as reported independently and freely by
the world's press through the BBC. It is also important to recognise that there were
other, more rooted, reasons for the cessation.
Central amongst these was the desire within the Soviet leadership to promote their
vision of peaceful co-existence as the future for cold war relations. And a high profile
way of demonstrating this was to shut down some of the jamming operation. In this
context, it was ironic that the persistent thread of British government criticism of BBC
broadcasts to Russia - that output was too mild - may have been a compelling
facilitating reason on the Soviet side in support of cessation. The fact that the Russian
Service was not denunciatory in character, that it was in essence a news service,
would certainly have made it far less offensive on political, ideological and theological
grounds to Soviet Communist Party sensibilities than certain other western
broadcasters. Not surprisingly, however, BBC broadcasts to the satellites, which
549 WAC R1/92/3, G45 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', 25 May 1956. BBC
broadcasts to Finland, Turkey, Persia, Israel and to Greece were also affected positively by this
reduction in jamming. Jamming stations in the Satellites, however, continued to operate.
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maintained a much sharper attack on Soviet domination and with which the Foreign
Office were much more satisfied, continued to be jammed.550
There were also significant logistical reasons for a curtailment of jamming activity. The
BBC and the Foreign Office were very aware of the cost they (along with the
Americans and others) were placing on the Soviet Union in terms of financial
expenditure and material resources (including personnel), in maintaining such a major
jamming enterprise. And as the dimensions of the radio race between East and West
expanded, the reduction of this burden may have been a consideration for the
Russians in deciding if and when a reduction in the jamming operation could be made.
A perhaps less well known, though highly influential, contributing factor to this break in
jamming was the continued development of cooperative relations between BBC and
Soviet broadcasters and a series of discussions that took place between their
representatives in 1955 and 1956. In October 1955 a Russian delegation of
broadcasters had visited the UK to discuss mutual areas of interest - technical,
engineering, management and output - and the scope for future cooperative
development with the BBC. High on the agenda, from the British perspective, was the
continued jamming of BBC broadcasts. During this visit the leader of the delegation,
Topuriya, the Deputy Minister of Communications (the Soviet department responsible
for the technical execution of the directive to jam BBC broadcasts), implied that there
was room for manoeuvre on the topic. The UK response was not to accept this informal
invitation so as to avoid giving the impression of a 'concessionary attitude,.551
Nevertheless, it was clear that, whatever the Soviet motivation, a shift was occurring in
550 Programmes to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria.' Alb~nia and the East
Zone of Germany were still attacked by local jammers although the RUSSian high-power, long-
range jammers that supplemented these had been withdrawn. WAC, R1/92/3, G45, 25 May
1956.
551 WAC, R1/92/2, G27 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', March 1956; TNA,
F0953/1640, PB1011/6, 'Governor's Dinner', 8 December 1956.
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its attitude towards jamming. The visit to London in February 1956 of Mikhailov, the
Soviet Minister of Culture (responsible for Soviet Radio), may also have provided
another opportunity for official discussion of the culture of jamming and its future
direction.552
While the cessation of jamming was certainly not predicted by the BBC, the significant
change that did take place was perhaps not quite the complete surprise that it might
otherwise have appeared. The Director of External Broadcasting, J. B. Clark, when
explaining the circumstances to the BBC Governors clearly felt that the reduction in
jamming was a consequence of the combined effect of 'Russian detente' and
negotiations conducted by himself with the Soviet authorities 'in London and
Moscow' .553 It was, nonetheless, a hugely significant development and marks the
beginning of what might be described as a unique period of 'radio detente' between the
BBC and Soviet Radio.
In the spring of 1956 the course of radio diplomacy between BBC and Soviet
broadcasters in many respects mirrored that of relations between Britain and Russia.
Under the leadership of Khrushchev and Bulganin it was apparent that a significant
change in the style of Soviet engagement with the rest of the world was taking place.
But there were major doubts, highlighted by the 'imperialist' criticisms levelled at Britain
during the Russian leaders' Asian tour, about whether this represented a change of
substance. Nonetheless, the possibility of lessening cold war tensions provided a
compelling reason to explore with an open, though sceptical, mind the parameters and
dynamics of the emerging detente. It was in this spirit that the Foreign Office had
agreed to a return visit to Russia by a BBC delegation that would be 'prepared to insist
552 WAC, R1/92/2, G27, March 1956.
553 WAC, R1/92/6, G73 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', 18 September 1956.
181
on answers to awkward questions', particularly on issues related to jamming. 554
Accordingly, eleven days after the Russian leaders arrived in Britain a BBC party of
seven, led by the Director of External Broadcasting J.B. Clark with the Russian
Programme Organiser Anatol Goldberg acting as interpreter, arrived in Moscow.?"
Top of the visitors' agenda on their twelve day tour (which included visits to Leningrad
and Kiev) was the question of programme exchanges between the BBC and Soviet
Radio. These had been taking place for some time albeit on a rather uneven basis but
there was now a desire, also strongly supported by the Foreign Office, to develop the
potential for television programme exchanges in addition to extending the trade in radio
exchanges. During negotiations the BBC delegation were at pains to stress at every
available opportunity 'the fact that the continuance of jamming which was so directly in
conflict with the purposes and potentialities of broadcasting bedevilled the whole
prospect of cooperationP"
The visit also provided a first rate opportunity to look for evidence of jamming
operations - 'mysterious sausage type aerials are visible on a number of buildings' -
and to judge the reach and audibility of BBC broadcasts to Russia with the portable
medium and shortwave receiver they had brought with them. Neither was easy and
Clark noted that it was not possible 'within the limits of tact, to take the receiver in a car
some 20 or 30 kilometres out of Moscow to attempt reception of the Russian Service
and to confirm that the jammers are only effective in the main centres of population'.
Nevertheless, they were able to conclude that the western areas of the Soviet Union
provided good shortwave reception from most parts of the world. The greatest surprise,
554 WAC, R2/9/1, Board of Management meeting, 'USSR: Visit by BBC Officials', 12 March
1956; R1/24, Board of Governors meeting, 'Director-General's Report', 15 March 1956.
555 The other members of the Delegation were: R.T.S. Wynn, Chief Engineer; Frank Gillard,
Chief Assistant to Director of Sound Broadcasting; A.E. Barker, Deputy Editor, News; Leonard
Miall, Head of Talks, Television; S.N. Watson, Head of Television Section, Designs Department.
556 WAC, R1/92/3, G 48 'Report on Visit to the USSR, April/May 1956', undated, p.5.
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though, and of quite some importance to the ongoing expansion of English by Radio
output in broadcasts to Russia was the discovery that the English-language General
Overseas Service 'was received excellently' even when radiated form the Tebrau
transmitter in Singapore which was not directed for reception in Moscow.?"
Although discussions between the SSC and their Russian counterparts produced no
tangible concessions in the official Soviet argument in favour of jamming (that it was a
necessary means of protecting Soviet citizens against hostile propaganda) there was
detected in discussions with the Head of Soviet Radio, Puzin, 'a mood in which
negotiation might be possible' and a 'wish on the part of the Soviet Government to
make a first step towards some abatement of this major irritant'.558 As Jacob pointed
out to the Governors in the summer of 1956, 'Various aspects of future liaison are
based on the assumption that that [the recent reduction in jamming] will continueP"
Clark, however, sounded a note of caution about the long term implications of this
apparent break-through in his report on the trip of the SSC delegation:
The elaborate and obviously carefully engineered jamming installations ... and
the importance clearly attached to the control of listening inherent in the act of
jamming, yields no indication that the Soviet authorities are likely to dismantle
or abandon the means of jamming, whatever bilateral or multilateral
arrangements they may make. It would be wishful thinking to imagine that, in
the context of their present more cooperative attitude in broadcasting as in
other fields, they contemplate depriving themselves of the jamming weapon - at
least for many years to come.560
This sober, though entirely accurate, assessment was a useful reminder of the
geopolitical context within which these discussions were taking place.
55? Ibid., p.36.
558 Ibid., pp.2 & 5.
559 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
560 WAC, R1/92/3, G 48, undated, p.3.
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It was, nonetheless, a very successful visit and the source of a real improvement in
relations between the two broadcasters with an agreement, in principle, reached 'on
the basis of collaboration which will cover the exchange of programmes on an entirely
satisfactory basis and liaison in other matters of mutual interest' .561 The trip had also
been very useful in terms of gaining an assessment of the potential of the BBC's
audience in the Soviet Union - a field that had lacked illumination for some time. Out of
a total of 35 million licensed receiving installations, ten million wireless sets were
produced by the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry.562 Therefore, the need to
maintain a domestic broadcasting service across the vast distances of the Soviet Union
provided wireless receivers with a short-wave range capable of picking up BBC
broadcasts in Russian. The Soviet authorities were, in effect, manufacturing wireless
Trojan horses which gave the BBC access to an audience of millions deep behind the
Iron Curtain which were otherwise untouchable from the outside. Both Bush House and
the Foreign Office were quick to identify the 'immediate and striking
opportunities now presented by the lessening of jamming of BBC broadcasts' to
penetrate Russian minds as never before.563
Indicators of Change
The 'unparalleled opportunity', as IPD's Paul Grey described it, to address Russian
listeners unimpeded now gave greater impetus and direction to the Foreign Office's
561 WAC R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
562 WAC: R1/92/3, G 48, undated, p.2. The majority of installations (25 million) were served by
wire networks and consequently under censorship.
563 TNA, F0953/1640, 'The External Services of the SSC', 31 May 1956; F0953/1643,
PS1011/54, Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956. Soviet Radio had been ~nxious to .complete a
formal agreement covering liaison between the two organisations, but this was resisted ,by the
SSC delegation and subsequently a letter from Clark to Puzin was accepted as the basis of
agreement. WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
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editorial re-engagement with the BBC External Services' output, and broadcasts to
Russia in particular.r'" It also provided the BBC with a chance, mindful of official views
on King Charles Street and keen to retrieve the initiative, to re-engineer its
programming over the Iron Curtain in line with the new listening conditions. In a very
important memorandum for the Foreign Office in May 1956 the Director-General, Ian
Jacob, evinced the latest BBC thinking on Russian audience requirements. The
listener, he wrote, 'will be in receptive mood, and avid for knowledge and stimulation. In
place of the bare presentation of facts and argument which is all that has been possible
in the face of the jamming, a more elaborate programme will be necessary in order to
follow up and develop our advantage'. New series of talks would be commissioned 'to
correct the distortions and gaps in knowledge'. English by Radio would be introduced
and the 'music, entertainment and the ordinary sounds of this country will need to be
put across for the first time,.565 What Jacob was talking about amounted to an
educational agenda to engage the people of Russia with a more composite
programme, indicative of wider social trends within British society, than had been
possible before.
The Foreign Office, too, was focused on re-educating a Russian audience that had
been 'cut off from information about the West for so long'. However, their educational
zeal was punctuated by more pressing political concerns than that of the BBG.
Increasing the range of output to give a genuine picture of life in Britain, they argued,
'did not mean to imply that we should abjure all criticism of Soviet policy ... Indeed
projection of Britain and criticism of Soviet behaviour must often go hand in hand; the
one will not be effective without the other,.566 As such, while BBG plans for the
broadening of Russian Service programme content were considered by the Foreign
Office to be 'plainly on the right lines', there was a strong belief that the Corporation
564 TNA, F0953/1643, PS1011/54, Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956.
565 TNA, F0953/1640, PS 011/13, 'The External Services of the SSG', 31 May 1956.
566 TNA, F0953/1643, PS1011/54, Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956.
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was simply not making the most of the opportunity the cessation of jamming presented.
As Cosmo Stewart, the head of IPD, put it in an internal briefing note, there was an
'intellectual softness' at the heart of the BBC's operation that prevented the British point
of view from being presented more forcefully. Broadcasts were characterised by 'too
much hedging, ambiguity and oversubtlety?"
A good, if rather curious, case in point had been the arrest in the summer of 1956 of
the Russian discuss-thrower, Nina Ponomareva, for stealing hats from C & A Modes in
Oxford Street while in London with the Soviet athletics team for the White City Games.
The ensuing crisis - the Soviet team's withdrawal from Games, Ms Ponomareva's
initial failure to attend her bail hearing and six week confinement at the Soviet Embassy
until she was finally permitted to go to court - was fully reported, often through eye-
witness accounts, as was her conviction and non-custodial sentence of a payment of
three guineas. The Director of External Services, J.B. Clark, noted at the time that
comment in the BBC's Russian broadcasts confined itself to a calm exposition
of the facts, explaining the independence from political interference of the legal
processes that had been set in motion, coupled with regret that political
prejudice had again been injected into a field which had been pleasantly free
from it in recent months.568
This treatment of the case exemplified the nature of the Foreign Office's criticism of the
present balance in Russian output. On the one hand, the opportunity taken to explain
the principles and operations of the British legal system, particularly when contrasted
with the Soviet judiciary, was well realised. On the other, the Foreign Office believed
there had been a failure to 'firmly condemn Russian nonsense': 'We fully recognise that
there is scope for subtlety in penetrating Russian minds, but the prime purpose must
567 Ibid.; 'Criticism of the External Service', 20 September 1956.
568 WAC, R1/92/6, G 73, 18 September 1956.
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surely be to state our views unambiguously, and this means that if the Russians
behave badly at our expense we should not shrink from telling them so plainly,.569
Where the SSC had shown regret over the course of Soviet actions the Foreign Office
wanted condemnation.
The debate over broadcasts to Russia stood in contrast to that concerning services to
the Soviet satellite states which the Foreign Office considered far more satisfactory.
The reason for this was the convergence of respective appreciations of the interests,
needs and tolerances of the listening audience. Since 1948/49 when the editorial policy
towards the satellites was first fixed in its cold war mode,Soviet domination over the
internal affairs of these territories had provided a central and rich theme which the
SSC, after careful negotiation with Whitehall, was willing to exploit. As Jacob noted of
overseas listeners in the summer of 1956, 'It may in some instances be best to enlist
their support against the regime in which they live, as in Germany during the war, or in
the Russian satellites'. This was a strategy that made sense in broadcasting terms
because there already existed a cleavage between the people of Central and Eastern
Europe and their Moscow-sponsored communist leaderships. Consequently,
programmes that highlighted, in their coverage of current events and world affairs, the
nature of Russian oppression had a ready audience and a chance of gaining purchase.
Although not liberationist, these broadcasts did seek to extend the emotional and
political distance between the people and their leaders. As a result, the theme of Soviet
imperialism, in contrast to national or regional self-determination, was seen in Bush
House as a fruitful and worthwhile target in a way that just did not translate to the
Russian context where history and culture were against it. For Jacob nothing was to be
gained by 'alienating the listener or his nation as a whole'. 570 The fear at the SSC was
569 TNA, F0953/1643, PS1011/54, Grey to Lean, 21 September 1956.
570 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/13, 'The External Services of the SSG', 31 May 1956.
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that to follow a highly critical and denunciatory policy in its broadcasts to Russia would
run the risk of doing just that.
Aggressive broadcasting which challenged the listener's loyalty to their homeland
weakened the broadcast authority of the SSC, whereas attacks on the Soviet system in
the satellites where there was growing hostility towards Russian domination made the
central control exercised by Moscow a weakness that could be legitimately targeted.
This convergence of purpose on Central and Eastern Europe reflected a consensus, in
this sphere at least, of what it meant to broadcast in the national interest. It was based
on a calculation that took into account UK attitudes (and in the absence of a strong
popular voice on Iron Curtain issues, this meant government opinion) as well as the
cultural, political and emotional needs of audiences whose national identity was made
subservient to Soviet regional aims and who lacked an independent media.
As Jacob pointed out in the summer of 1956, the value derived from this approach
rested on the application of a consistent editorial strategy over a long period of tirne.?"
Strong support for this view was evident in a contemporary Radio Free Europe (RFE)
report on listening in Poland which had concluded that the SSC's popularity, which
exceeded that of RFE, Radio Madrid and Voice of America (VOA), was predicated on
'its reliability and tradition dating back to the days of the German occupation, which
accounts for the listeners' attachment to the SSC,.572 Accordingly, when Jacob laid out
for the Foreign Office the editorial strategy for broadcasting over the Iron Curtain he
was able to point to six major themes that had formed the basis of critical attacks on
the Soviet regime 'during the past decade':
571 Ibid.
572 WAC, R1/92/3, G45, 25 May 1956. This report was based on 127 refugee interviews. The
SSC had access to the RFE report under a reciprocal information sharing arrangement with the
Americans.
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1) The rigid insistence on the doctrine of Marx and Lenin (in its Stalinist
version) coupled with total control of the press and suppression of criticism
2) The arbitrary powers of the state police
3) The detention of prisoners after faked trials or without trial
4) The forced labour camps and the exploitation of ordinary labour by
Stakhanovite campaigns
5) The collectivisation of agriculture
6) The refusal or effective discouragement of travel facilities outwards from
Russia or inwards to Russia 573
In reflective mood, Jacob wondered whether it was 'a coincidence that the work of a
decade on these themes by the SSC has been followed by major admissions and
modifications under each of these headings, with a resultant loosening of the whole
regime'. Leaving his Whitehall readers to contemplate the consequences of this claim,
his comments bring into focus a highly important conclusion being drawn in the West in
the early summer of 1956: that the Soviet Union was experiencing highly significant
problems in managing internal dissatisfaction within its satellite system. In this context,
did the SSC have a role to play in amplifying the pressures being felt in Moscow?
Jacob seemed to think so:
'While the future will establish how much the cracks spreading across the
Communist facade have been due to broadcasting from without. .....The cracks
which have appeared must now be prised further open and prevented from
closing again. The Soviet domination of Eastern Europe must be further
weakened and its recovery prevented.f'"
573 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/13, 'The External Services of the SSG', 31 May 1956.
574 Ibid.
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By 1956 the Soviet Union had been coming to terms with the political and doctrinal
legacy of Stalin's death for nearly three years. The competition for the Soviet
leadership - involving, principally, Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev - had mirrored
the unsettled direction of Russia's ongoing ideological strategy and its practical
application. By extension, the nature of Russian control over the satellites became
inherently bound up in the vicissitudes of the leadership race. At the Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 a future vision
did emerge out of a dramatic critique of the past that was to have a seismic impact on
relations between Russia and her satellites and provide an organising theme around
which broadcasts over the Iron Curtain were thereafter framed. In a closed session on
the last day of the Congress the ascendant Khrushchev delivered a long and wide
ranging speech that at its heart sought to cut the Soviet leadership free of the previous
twenty years of Stalinist rule. Khrushchev's purpose, in what was a carefully calculated,
but none the less daring, speech was to effect a decapitation of the old order and
revitalise the governing communist tradition, with himself at its head.
In what must have been a shocking and unsettling break from normal practice for
delegates, Khrushchev came to bury Stalin, not to praise him. And this he did with a
penetrating piece of character assassination that, on the one hand, acknowledqed
officially for the first time what many had privately known or suspected about the terror
of previous decades while, on the other, consigning this problematic past to the history
books along with its chief architect in what was a calculated act of flagellation to effect
political renewal. Stalin, he argued, had violated principles of collective decision-
making and fostered the 'cult of personality' as an adjunct to power. What was now
required was a return to 'Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy' which would
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be 'characterised by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism' - something that
had been conspicuous by its absence under Stalin.575
This was a step into the unknown for Khrushchev and other senior officials. The notion
of criticising the state, self-criticism indeed, had been absent from Soviet life for a
generation and sat incongruously with the idea of an infallible and historically
determined system which had become an inherent part of the projection of Soviet
identity both at home and overseas. It was a message that needed careful
dissemination if the Soviet leadership was to control the course and consequences of
the debate it had started. Developments over the next few months, however, led the
SSC to conclude that Khrushchev had opened the floodgates and could not now easily
stem the liberalising sentiment flowing through some of the satellite states. As the
Hungarian Section Programme Organiser, Ferenc Rentoul, succinctly put it in a
General News Talk for the European Services at the end of June: 'Like the sorcerer's
apprentice who had released forces he could not later control, the Communist regimes
of Central and Eastern Europe are in difflculties'r'"
Khrushchev's speech was intended to lay the foundations of a new beginning within the
Soviet Union, but its destabilising potential had clearly been a concern for Khrushchev
and the management of its dissemination reflected this. Although an official publication
of the speech did not appear until 1989, on 5 March 1956 the Soviet Presidium ordered
that the speech should be read at all Communist Party meetings in Russia. The speech
was to receive different treatment in the satellites. While copies were dispatched to
communist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe there was no accompanying
instruction - or desire at that initial stage - for its contents to form the basis of a public
debate. For such a strategy to be successful, however, required complete control over
575 T.H. Rigby (ed.), The Stalin Dictatorship: Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Other
Documents, (Victoria: Sydney University Press, 1968), pp.23-91.
576 WAC, E40/151/1, Rumblings in Hungary, General News Talk by F G Rentoul, 30 June 1956.
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all means of communication within the Soviet orbit - something that ten years of
beaming radio programmes over the Iron Curtain by western broadcasters suggested
was impossible.
Far from being passive observers of the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet
Union the BBC and other broadcasters, in particular Radio Free Europe and the Voice
of America, put a great deal of effort into influencing the way in which these shifts were
interpreted by satellite audiences. As Clark noted, 'Khrushchev's admission that the
Stalin regime had been a tyrant-ridden nightmare was persistently underlined in
comments in the days and weeks that followed'."? This critique was considerably
enhanced when the text of Khrushchev's speech was leaked by the CIA (who had
obtained a copy in April from Israeli Intelligence) to the New York Times and published
on 2 June.578 Now it was possible to broadcast 'extensive extracts...to those countries
without a free press'. Consequently, publication of the speech dominated output of the
BBC, RFE and VOA. As Clark pointed out for the BBC Governors, despite the lack of
publication within the Soviet Union, 'there is no doubt that everyone who listened to the
BBC broadcasts over this period was able to get a clear understanding of what is
certainly one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of Communism' .579
577 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
578 Johanna Granville '''Caught with jam on our Fingers": Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian
revolution of 1956', Diplomatic History, 29(5), 2005, p.820.
579 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting: June to August 1956',18
September 1956.
192
9. HUNGARY
Prelude to a Revolution
June 1956 would prove to be a turning point for Central Europe and for Soviet
hegemony. Not because of the publication in the West of Khrushchev's 'secret speech',
though its vigorous dissemination (particularly in the broadcasts of RFE, VOA and the
BBC) certainly had a part to play. Rather, events that month came to represent a
breaking point in the code of obedience that nearly ten years of Soviet inspired state
terror had forced on the people of the satellites and which led to the exposure of the
practical limits of the new direction outlined by Khrushchev just a few months earlier.
There was no clearer, dramatic or more emblematic example of this than what
happened in Hungary through the summer of 1956 as the country and its people found
themselves on the crest of a revolutionary wave.
The political turbulence experienced in Moscow in the three years after the death of
Stalin was transmitted with full force to Budapest. In June 1953 the leader of the
Hungarian Workers' Party, Matyas Rakosi, who had ruled Hungary with an iron fist for
the pervious six years was dismissed by a Moscow leadership eager to rein-in, in light
of the East German uprising and disturbances in Czechoslovakia, the Stalinist
tendencies of communist leaders like him. In the face of a bleak economic landscape
and spiralling living standards his replacement, the veteran communist and Deputy
Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, introduced a 'New Course' of economic, social and political
reforms in addition to the abolition of internment camps and an amnesty for many
political prisonersP" Politics in Hungary seemed to have regained a semblance of self-
determination within the broader Soviet system. The political wind in Moscow, however,
580 Brian Cartledge, The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary, (Tiverton: Timewell Press, 2006),
p.457.
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was never still and by the beginning of 1955 Khrushchev was preparing a new direction
of his own to suit his political ends. Summoned to Moscow in January 1955 it was now
Nagy's turn to be denounced by the Soviet Presidium for rightist deviationism. The
charge of industrial and agricultural mismanagement and consequent social dislocation
echoed Rakosi's dismissal a year and a half earlier. Similarly, Nagy and his policies, as
Bryan Cartledge has noted, 'became the victims of the power struggle within the
Kremlin'.581 The result was a return to stricter controls over satellite affairs from
Moscow and, after the replacement of Malenkov as Prime Minister with Bulganin, the
return of Rakosi in Hungary.
By contrast, BBC broadcasts to Hungary throughout this period of ongoing transition
were remarkably consistent and relations between Bush House and the Foreign Office
extremely cooperative. When, in 1955, IRD suggested 'laying particular stress at the
present time on what the removal - and even the decrease - of Russian influence
might mean', the amenable head of the BBC's Central European Service, Gregory
Macdonald, was in 'full agreement' and thought the idea, which had come from the
British Legation in Budapest, 'entirely in line with our tradition of broadcasting to
Hungary' .582
In particular, Macdonald thought that pursuing 'the theme of comparison with West
Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia may be the most vivid and the most rewarding'. The
Hungarian Programme Organiser, Ferenc Rentoul duly made a trip to Yugoslavia in
July 1955 'to make contacts and get reactions from Hungarians' for the very purpose of
obtaining 'points of compartsonP" Meanwhile, despite the limited transmission time
available, room was found for a series of talks on life in Austria by Karl Brusak after the
581 Ibid., p.459.
582 TNA, F01110/781, PR1021/121, Note by Storey, 9 June 1955; Ibid., Macdonald to Overton,
22 June 1955; Ibid., Cope, Budapest, to Mason, 2 June 1955.
583 Ibid., Macdonald to Overton, 22 June 1955.
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signing of the State Treaty and another on Yugoslavia by the head of Bush House's
Central Research Unit (CRU), Walter Kolarz. Brusak's work closely echoed the
Legation's suggestion 'to contrast the general scene in Austria and in Hungary to show
how the two countries so closely associated in the past, and with such similar
backgrounds, have gone different ways because of Communism'. Likewise, Kolarz's
scripts emphasised, as had been proposed, 'how a country can become more
prosperous, happier and freer when it throws off Moscow's domination and is able to
enter into normal relations with the outside world.'584 In fact, Kolarz had been provided
with 'special knowledge' via the Foreign Office for the purpose of producing these
talks.585 As the Legation later pointed out, both sets of programmes 'are quite
excellently done and will, I am sure justify the considerable amount of work which has
gone into their preparation'. 586
While Bush House showed, by implication, what the satellites had lost through Soviet
domination, by the end of 1955 officials in Budapest and London were keen to stress
that 'the Western Powers have forever in the forefront of their minds the sad plight of
the peoples behind the Curtain, and are determined to use all possible peaceful means
to secure their deliverance'.587 The idea of peaceful liberation was also a strong theme
in American broadcasting to the region and had been a key element of President
Eisenhower's 1955 Christmas message to Eastern Europe broadcast by Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe when he told listeners that it was 'a major goal of US
foreign policy,.588 However, as Gary Rawnsley rightly points out, there was an important
and marked contrast between the methods used by the British and American
broadcasters to get this message across. While the BBC implied and emphasised, the
584 Ibid., Cope, Budapest, to Mason, 2 June 1955.
585 Ibid., Macdonald to Overton, 22 June 1955.
586 Ibid., PR1021/181, Grady to Storey, 18 November 1955.
587 Ibid.
588 Quoted in Gary Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: the BBC and VOA in
international politics, 1956-64, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p.83.
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American broadcasters, as Rawnsley notes, 'actually told the east Europeans the
objectives of their propaqanda?" The consequences of this distinction would become
very important the following year.
Equally significant, after a 'year of possible hopes successfully dashed' in Central
Europe, was the decision by IRD at the start of 1956 to emphasise in its publicity to
Hungary the course of internal developments there and in Poland and to focus, in
particular, on evidence of dissenslon.F" Earlier proposals had been directed at giVing
people in the satellites a perspective from which they could re-examine their own
experience of Soviet control in light of the knowledge gained about Western ideals and
practice. This continued, but the Foreign Office now wanted overseas publicity,
including the SSC, to shine a critical, and perhaps destabilising, light on a system of
governance that was starting to appear increasingly fragile.
The limited reforms experienced in Hungary under the leadership of Nagy had
fundamentally altered the country's cultural landscape, revitalising intellectual debate.
The confidence the intelligentsia had gained under Nagy, allowed it to tentatively
question the direction Hungary was now taking. In September 1955 an edition of the
Writers' Association's journal, Irodalmi Ujsag, was recalled and its editor sacked for an
implied criticism of the Minister if Culture.?" In response the Writers' Association sent a
protesting memorandum in November to the Central Committee signed by a large
number of writers, composers, journalists and pertormersF" The response of the
Hungarian authorities was uncompromising, issuing a counter 'literary resolution' of its
own and pressurising the signatories to the original memorandum to renounce the
589 Ibid., p.84.
590 TNA, F0111 0/781, PR1021/181, Grady to Storey, 18 November 1955; F0371/122422,
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592 Cartledge put the figure at 59 signatories. The Open Source Archive of the Central European
University in Budapest puts the figure at 63: http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/textl28-5-
150.shtml, accessed 15 June 2007.
196
document. Those who did not were expelled from the Party, as was Nagy the following
spring. Despite the limitations imposed on criticism from within, there was little the
Hungarian leadership could do about the beaming-in of criticism from without. By
Christmas 1955, Bush House was reporting the 'revolt of the literary men' thanks to the
valuable local information provided by the British Legation in Budapest.F" Quite a
number of programmes by the Hungarian Section were devoted to the 'Writers' Revolt'
with particular prominence given to Laszlo Szabo, a Hungarian poet working at Bush
House who was considered to have a substantial audience amongst Hungarians, a
good example of how Bush House attempted to promote the intellectual bond between
the External Services and audiences behind the Iron Curtain.594
With the benefit of hindsight, Macdonald noted in a minute for the Hungarian Section in
July 1956 that
'the most important single development. ..... is the way in which criticism of
Stalinism developed into a full-scale attack on Rakosi personally, coupled with
the welcome readiness of party members at all levels to criticise rationally
rather than dogmatically not only the misdeeds and mistakes of the past nine
years but the present situation,.595
By the spring of 1956 Rakosi had become perilously out of step not only with the rising
tide of popular opinion in Hungary, but increasingly with his political masters in
Moscow. His Canute-like attempts to stem the flow of discourse in Hungary
increasingly reeked of desperatism.
The threat to Rakosi was as much from within the Party as it was from without. It was
not communism per se that was the focus of criticism, rather communism with a Soviet
593 TNA, F01110/781, PR1021/181, Macdonald to Grady, 23 December 1955.
594 WAC, R1/92/2, G56 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', March 1956.
595 WAC, E35/50/1, 'Hungary: Before Rakosi's Fall', H.C.Eur.S. to Hungarian P.O., 19 July
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face. Now Party and non-Party members alike agitated for a Hungarian brand of
communism: Tito had proved the viability of national roads to socialism and his
rapprochement with Khrushchev gave the appearance of official sanction. As Cartledge
has noted, the 'constituency of dissent' in Hungary already had its martyr, Imre Nagy,
and by the summer of 1956 it had found its forum - a debating club created a year
earlier by the communist youth organisation, DISZ, known as the Petofi Circle.596 It was
named after Hungary's national poet, Sandor Petofi, who fought in the 1849 War of
Independence against the Habsburg Empire and who died, symbolically, at the hands
of Russian troops.
Other organs of dissent also clamoured for change, such as the resurgent Writers'
Association and its journal, but it was the Petofi Circle that finally tipped the balance.
On 27 June the Petofi Circle met to debate information services and the press, but
rather than the usual crowd of two or three hundred, five or six thousand attended
forcing a move to a larger venue and the use of loudspeakers for those who still could
not get in the meeting. This in itself signified a mass awakening and as the relay of
speeches pressed the case for cultural and political freedoms ever more vehemently so
the temperature of the meeting rose. Rakosi and the ruling cabal became the focus of
attack and Nagy, whose very mention received a standing ovation, the antidote. By the
time the meeting came to an end in the early hours of the following morning those who
had attended and the wider community of interests they represented had breached an
important psychological barrier that until then had prevented such angry, outspoken
and public criticism of the state.?"
While the Petofi meeting had been a watershed for Hungary, developments in Poland
later that day would catch the world's attention and give a clear signal that Central
596 Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.461.
597 Ibid., p.464; Peter Unwin, 1956: Power Defied, (Norwich: Michael Russell, 2006), p.112.
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Europe was in turmoil. As in Hungary, the intelligentsia of Poland had become
increasingly vocal in its criticism of the political, economic and cultural restrictions on
life in the country and the influence of Moscow.598 But, it was workers at the Cegielski
engineering works in Poznan, the largest industrial plant in Poland who, on 28 June,
dramatically shook the foundations of Polish society. A dispute originally over tax
allowances culminated in a demonstration about wider economic and political
conditions as protesters carrying banners calling for 'Bread and Freedom' marched on
the city centre.599 They demanded talks with the Polish leadership, but when no
response came the crowd turned violent, attacking, amongst other symbols of state
repression, a radio jamming station''" Over the course of the next two days of riots 53
people were killed, according to official figures, and around 300 injured in clashes with
Polish army units and security forces."?'
In Hungary, Rakosi was already aware of the potential impact of overseas
broadcasters on the domestic life of Hungary and had complained just days before the
Petofi Circle meeting that if it wasn't for the Voice of America Hungarians would not
have heard the full text of Khrushchev's secret speech.602 He would hardly have been
surprised, then, when in the days following the meeting the BBC provided an almost
daily commentary on these events (and those taking place in Poland) in its broadcasts
over the Iron Curtain. With what appears to have been a remarkable level of detail
about the proceedings of the Petofi meetings - who spoke and to what effect - the
Hungarian Programme Organiser, Ferenc Rentoul, developed a scripted thesis on the
rise of national communism in Central Europe and its undermining of traditional Soviet
598 R.F. Leslie (ed.), The History of Poland since 1863, (Cambridge: CUP, 1980), pp.346-7.
599 Ibid., p.349.
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controls. There was even a 'reconstruction in a dramatic form of one of the stormiest
meetings of the Petofi Club', based on authentic material,.603
In talks entitled, for example, 'Rumblings in Hungary' and 'Communist Conflict in
Hungary' listeners were left in no doubt that something truly momentous was afoot.
And if they were unsure what interpretation to give to these developments, then the
BBC's analysis was clear. There were three important conclusions to be drawn,
Rentoul suggested in 'More Hungarian Alarms' on 3 July:
'The first is that the rebellious writers, authors, journalists and so on are
themselves Communists. It is they who were demanding a New Revolution and
who were saying that the liberation is to begin in real earnest now. The second
conclusion is that there is undoubtedly strong and by now undisguised
opposition to Rakosi continuing as the First Secretary of the Party. He more
than any man is a symbol, inside Hungary as well as outside, it now appears, of
the Stalin era. And the third conclusion is that no matter from where this
demand for more freedom and a real Liberation may have come, no matter by
whom it has been voiced, it has undoubtedly found a wide and enthusiastic
appeal among the masses. And after Poznan perhaps the Communist
themselves realise that they cannot indefinitely ignore the masses with
impunity.'604
Rentoul was right. In Poland, control of official media presented very few problems, but
the riots had started at the end of the annual International Trade Fair in Poznan when
the town was filled with overseas businessmen who observed the violence. They, in
turn, became stringers for news agencies around the world.605 In addition, the BBC's
603 WAC, R1/92/6, G 73 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting, 18 September 1956.
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own Gregory Macdonald had been in Poland just ten days earlier on the first visit
beyond the Iron Curtain by a member of the European Services since 1948.606 So it
was with a renewed sensibility towards conditions in the country that the BBC now
beamed-in news of the crisis in Poznan that the Polish authorities were so desperately
seeking to censor domestically. To this extent, in both Hungary and in Poland, the BBC
and the other western broadcasters who carried similar news were establishing a
challenge, albeit within a limited, though highly motivated, listenership, to the official
rendition of events. Whether this had an influence over the course of these events is
very hard, if not impossible, to determine, but it demonstrates the way in which Bush
House, by the summer of 1956, had begun to participate in the politics of Central
Europe. At the very least, these broadcasts were uncomfortable reminders of the
freedoms exercised elsewhere in the world.
In a radio broadcast to the people of Poland on the evening of the zs" June Premier
Cyrankiewicz had blamed foreign agents for the violence in Poznan, but within a few
days the leadership of the Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR), the official Party in
Poland, began to talk in terms of the legitimate complaints of the workers and the
responsibilities of the state towards thern.?" This important development marked the
start of a divergence in the paths taken by Poland and Hungary in response to
domestic pressures as well as those emanating from Moscow. Poland embarked on a
reform programme that sought to alleviate the kind of economic and industrial tensions
that had been at the root of the Poznan demonstrations. The subsequent trials of those
accused of taking part in the riots, recordings of which were broadcast by Radio
Polskie every evening, were considered by staff at the BBC to demonstrate 'the
determination of the Poles, the defence lawyers amongst them - to give the truth to the
606 WAC, R1/92/6, G 73, 18 September 1956.
607 Leslie, History of Poland, pp.350-1.
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world'.608 This also appeared to be the case when the Polish Central Committee's
Seventh Plenum committed itself to democratization and successfully rebuffed the
strong-arm attempts of a Soviet delegation, comprising of Bulganin and the Minister of
Defence Georgi Zhukov, to reassert direct Moscow control.
In contrast, in Hungary an embattled Rakosi was frantically marshalling the levers of
power for an all-out assault against his challengers at home. It was all too late,
however, and on 17 July the Russian Foreign Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, arrived in
Budapest and informed Rakosi of the latter's immediate resignation on health
grounds.609 His successor, chosen by Moscow, was Erno Gero - a Stalinist and former
Deputy Prime Minister under Rakosi who was representative of all that had gone
before and utterly incapable of managing the new tensions that were, at that time,
fracturing Hungarian society. As Cartledge notes, 'The choice of Gero made continued
unrest in Hungary inevitable: it could be argued, indeed, that the Hungarian Revolution
began with the news of his appointment' .610
Throughout this period of change Bush House, in line with its editorial precepts,
reported these developments and attempted to provide a context within which they
could be understood by listeners behind the Iron Curtain. As has been seen, these
emphasised - by being critical of press censorship, the repressive methods of the state
police, mass detentions and the use of show trials, the exploitation of labour and
national resources - the advantages to be gained from the removal of Moscow's
influence over political, economic and cultural life and the value of self-determination.
608 WAC R1/92/7, G91 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting, 27 November 1956. These
hour long Radio Polskie programmes in September 1956 led to an innovative development at
the BBC whereby the 'Polish transmissions were directly fed into Bush House [from BBC
Monitoring at Caversham], so that commentators were able to speak with close knowledge of
the atmosphere of the court'.
609 Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.464; Tony Judt, Postwar: a history of Europe since 1945,
~London: Heinemann, 2005), p.314.
10 Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.464.
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By the summer of 1956 this was fertile ground and an atmosphere of hope and
apprehension attended the task of broadcasting over the Iron Curtain: hope that
genuine freedoms could be won in Central and Eastern Europe; apprehension that
such demands might provoke an angry backlash from Moscow.
Broadcast Revolution
The course of events behind the Iron Curtain during 1956 was evidence of both the
shifting context in which Soviet affairs were being conducted and the growth of
indigenous aspirations within Central Europe, after ten years under the close control of
Moscow, for greater political, economic and cultural self-determination. Though distinct,
the interplay between the two was self-evident and considerable. At the start of the
year the new direction set out by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress
suggested the terms in which a revision of governing Soviet ethics could be
considered. However, the different roads to socialism subsequently taken by Hungary
and Poland and the civil disturbances they sparked produced a worrying set of
conditions for the leaderships in Budapest, Warsaw and Moscow that threatened to
destabilize Soviet hegemony in the region. It would be a mistake to assume, however,
as the pressure for reform in these countries increasingly came into conflict with state
authority that what was being observed was a conscious progression towards
revolution. When Hungarian students at both the Eotvos Lorand and Technical
universities sat down on 22 October 1956, the former to organise a rally the following
day in the centre of Budapest and the latter to pen a list of 16 demands for change in
Hungary, neither had any sense that a time of revolution was upon them nor, indeed,
that their decisions that day would provide the driving force behind it. 611
611 Students at the Technical University also planned a 'silent' demonstration for 23 October in
solidarity with recent events in Poland.
203
The Hungarian revolution, or uprising, was a compelling and resonant moment in
Magyar history, but beyond the domestic tragedy it brought into sharp focus some of
the harsh realities of cold war geopolitics: the nature and extent of Soviet repression
and the practical limits of the West's ability to act, despite its rhetoric. The emotionally-
charged narrative arc of the two-week uprising - a battle for freedoms seemingly won
against overwhelming odds and then brutally denied - along with over three thousand
dead provided a defining reference-point for people all over the world.612 In the West,
as the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has claimed, 'probably no other episode in zo"
Century history generated a more intense burst of feeling'.613
That the story of the Hungarian uprising was such an important moment in the
changing dynamics of the cold war and the international communist movement (and
was seen to be at the time) was in very large part due to the crucial role played by
radio during the crisis. Radio, both domestic and international, became the
cartographer of the revolution, broadcasting its confused and frantic beginnings before
mapping the path to its desperate and terrifying end. However, Radio Budapest, Radio
Moscow, the BBC, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe not only reported on
the uprising, but were, from the beginning, an integral part of it. Journalistic endeavour
was mixed with diplomatic and political functions in a unique blend that established, in
what is recognisably a modern context, a new relationship between the media and the
international events they report. From the start they held the world's attention and
focused it on Budapest and the radio revolution that followed fundamentally shaped the
contours of the Hungarian uprising.
612 Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.482; Granville, 'Jam on Our Fingers', p.825, fn.; Rawnsley,
Radio Diplomacy, p.93.
613 Eric Hobsbawm, 'Could it have been different?', London Review of Books, 28(22), 16
November 2006, p.3.
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Towards the end of July 1956 a Bush House memo circulated to the Assistant Head of
the Central European Service, George Tarjan, noted that 'if Gero fears that economic
conditions in Hungary may drive the workers to a Hungarian 'Poznan' rising, it can only
be said that his fears are justified in this respect'. 614 Despite the unpredictability of the
Hungarian uprising it was becoming clear to outside observers that the tensions
revealed over the previous year and most recently at the Petofi meetings had not been
extinguished by the game of musical chairs played by the Hungarian leadership at the
behest of Moscow. This was further underlined by the attendance of tens of thousands
at the reburial, after his posthumous rehabilitation, of Laszlo Rajk on 6 October in what
became another symbolic act of defiance against state authority.?" It was, however,
events in Poland that provided the spur for more emphatic demands for reform in
Hungary.
The rise of Wladyslaw Gomulka (who had been imprisoned after being denounced as a
reactionary and expelled from the Polish United Workers Party in 1949) to a position of
pre-eminence as First Secretary of the Central Committee and the democratization
programme now being pursued by the Party was emblematic of the different path that
Hungary could have taken. So too was the manner in which the Polish leadership
subsequently handled Russian demands to come to heal after Warsaw had dismissed
the Soviet Marshal Rokossowski as Poland's Minister of Defence. A delegation
consisting of Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Molotov flew into Warsaw on 19 October, the
first day of the Eighth Plenum of the Polish Party, in tandem with an advance of Soviet
troops and tanks towards the capital. As in July the Poles suspended their proceedings
and confronted the Soviet delegation. To nearly everyone's surprise Gomulka
convinced them that it was he and not the Russian armed forces that could best meet
and balance the needs of Warsaw and Moscow and from this unlikely position he
614 WAC, E35/50/1, 'Gero and the Hungarian Economy', unsigned memo, 23 July 1956.
615 Cartledge, Will to Survive, p.466.
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managed to turn extreme Soviet intimidation into a victory for his creed of national
communism. It was in response to these developments, which were reported in the
official Hungarian newspaper, Szabad Nep, and in the broadcasts of the official radio
station, Kossuth Radio, that the 'Polish October' became such a key motivating factor
behind the demonstrations in Budapest a few days later.?"
However, while the motivations behind the Hungarian uprising are relatively clear the
reasons for the escalation from student demonstration to full-blown revolution on 23
October 1956 were, at the time, far from being so. That morning Szabad Nep had
published a further list of Ten Demands, including the end of one-party rule, drawn up
by the Petofi Circle while Radio Kossuth announced the details of and pledged its
support for the student march that afternoon. Confusion reigned, however, when the
Ministry of Interior at first banned all meetings and demonstrations and then, with
Kossuth Radio as its mouthpiece, withdrew its own ban. Ban or no ban, the fact was
that by mid-afternoon several thousand had gathered in Petofi Square to embark on a
march that, by the time it reached Parliament Square a few hours later, was in excess
of 200,000 having been joined by workers whose shifts had ended. The limited aims
and discipline of the original cadre now gave way to calls for 'Russians go home' and
'Nagy to the qovernment'F"
By eight that evening protesters had split into two groups. One moved to Stalin's statue
while the other made its way to Sandor Brody Street which housed the offices of
Budapest (Kossuth) Radio. It was here that broadcasting took centre stage for the first,
but not the last, time and heralded in the moment of revolution. That the radio station
616 Kossuth radio was alternatively known as Hungarian Radio or Radio Budapest/Budapest
Radio; In a survey of 1,007 Hungarian refugees conducted in December 1956 by International
Research Associates Inc. on behalf of the Unites States Information Agency (USIA) 40 per cent
(the most popular choice) thought that the 'example of Poland' was the most important 'reason
why people in Hungary were willing to attempt an uprising'. WAC, E3/907/1, 'Hungary and the
1956 Uprising: Survey Among Hungarian Refugees in Austria', February 1957, p.31.
617 Cartledge, Will to Survive, pp.468-9.
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should have become the focus for demonstrators in the first place was indicative of
both of its central importance in Hungarian life and the symbol it had become of the
hated authority of the state. It was universally listened to and universally distrusted.
With force of numbers behind them, negotiations were under way between the
demonstrators and radio managers for the broadcasting of the Sixteen Points when
radio sets across Budapest crackled with the voice of Erno Gero, returned that day
from Prague. In what must go down as one of the most ill-conceived broadcasts of all
time, Gero fanned the flames of rebellion by accusing the demonstrators, thousands of
whom listened in disbelief outside the radio station, of counter-revolution and
provocation. The despised AVH secret police, a number of which had been posted to
the radio building, then attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas and in the
ensuing confusion the first shot of the Hungarian uprising was fired. Within hours
hundreds were dead and the first battle of Budapest was fully under way.
Also listening to Gero's broadcast that evening was E. Papp of the BBC's Monitoring
Service (BBCM) at Caversham in Berkshire. He was instantly alerted to the fact that
something very unusual was afoot when Gero announced that 'What is at stake now is
whether we want a Socialist or a bourgeois democracy'. As further news of an
emergency meeting of the Hungarian Central Committee was picked up along with the
first casualty figures 'the resources of the Monitoring Service were mobilized.' From
that moment on, Papp later recalled, 'the ears of the Monitoring Service were kept on
Radio Budapest day and night'.618 And while teleprinters in Whitehall and Washington
sang with the momentous news reported by BBCM, Bush House readied itself for the
most challenging broadcasting crisis it had faced in Europe since the Second World
War.
618 WAC, Programme as Broadcast, 'The BBC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
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Understanding the size and nature of its audience in Hungary at the time was a great
challenge for the SSG. In 1946 a Hungarian survey of 1200 radio owners in Budapest
found that over 90 per cent listened to the BBG in Hungarian. Since then, evidence had
been largely anecdotal, based on Legation reports and dissident stories of listening.
Jamming further increased the tentative nature of any assessment, but the scraps of
evidence that did emerge suggested that the western radios maintained a significant
profile in the region. For example, a Polish survey carried out before the Poznan riots
found that 80 per cent of listeners tuned to western broadcasters.t" while a Radio Free
Europe report on listening in Hungary in May 1956 noted that 'there is considerable
evidence that the BBG outranks all other western stations in prestige and authority with
the better educated sector of the audience,.62o
The great escape and mass exodus of over 200,000 Hungarians during and after the
uprising - about two per cent of the entire population - therefore provided an
unparalleled opportunity to examine listening habits behind the Iron Curtain.'?' What
emerged was a powerful, if imprecise, appreciation of the remarkable extent to which
the western radios appeared to have penetrated, despite jamming, the domestic
media-mix and the lives of listeners.622The BBG estimated that the number of wireless
sets in Hungary had tripled since the start of the 1950s to a figure of around one and a
619 WAC, E3/898/1, draft report on 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957.
620 WAC, R1/92/3, G45 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting, 25 May 1956. The report
was based on 238 interviews.
621 Judt, Postwar, p.318; Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.482.
622 There were five main contemporaneous studies on the influence of the media: 1007
Hungarians were interviewed in Austria by the New York firm, International Research
Associates Inc., for the United States Information Agency (USIA) in December 1956; Radio
Free Europe also conducted a large questionnaire survey amongst refugees; 400 Hungarians
were interviewed by an Austrian market research company at the end of 1956 which conducted
a further study of 315 refugees for RFE in January and February 1957; 220 questionnaires were
filled in for the BBC by Hungarian refugees in Britain. In all about 3,000 Hungarians were
canvassed. WAC, E3/898/1, 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957; WAC, E3/907/1,
'Hungary and the 1956 Uprising: Survey Among Hungarian Refugees in Austria', USIA, 15
February 1957.
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half million.623 Of these, it was believed that between three quarters and four fifths
could pick up the West on shortwave. The avowed scale of listening to the West was
an even greater surprise with listening figures of between 83 and 97 per cent.624
Amongst the Western broadcasters Radio Free Europe (RFE) was clearly the most
popular and 96 per cent of those who tuned to foreign broadcasts said in the largest,
United States Information Agency (USIA), survey that they had listened to RFE in the
last year. The Voice of America (VOA) and the BBC scored 82 and 67 per cent
respecnvely.?" Other broadcasters such as Radio Vatican, Radio Paris, Radio Madrid,
RIAS (Radio in the American Sector - Berlin) and the American Forces Network also
had sizeable audiences in Hungary. Significantly, the results of the surveys reflected
the scale of big three's output with RFE broadcasting direct from Munich (and with the
most powerful signal) about 19 hours a day, VOA around five hours and the BBC just
two hours a day.626
Within Hungary foreign broadcasts compared very favourably with regime media,
especially when it came to the single most important reason for listening: news. While
nearly half of those surveyed for the USIA said they received their news from regime
623 WAC, E3/898/1, 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957. The number of 'wired' wireless
sets fed by cable under the control of the authorities (as was the content) was thought to be half
a million by 1956/7.
624 Ibid. "The lowest figure for listening to western broadcasts came from the 200 plus BBC
administered questionnaires. It was 83% of the sample. The highest figure was 97% amongst
the group of 315 Hungarian refugees interrogated for RFE in early 1957. Percentages in the
three other main groups that provided information ranged from 90% to 96%."
625 WAC, E3/907/1, 'Hungary and the 1956 Uprising', 15 February 1957. When asked how often
they listened to foreign radio stations 67 per cent said that they listened to the BBC 'frequently'
- 100 per cent of the BBC's audience in this group. The equivalent figures for VOA and RFE
were, respectively, 67 and 81 percent - a reduction in their overall audience share.
626 WAC, E3/898/1, 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957. While the USIA was primarily
concerned with VOA broadcasting and not that of RFE it is possible to detect a national bias in
the responses given by those canvassed in relation to who they perceived to be asking the
questions. For example, in terms of the comparative popularity of the western broadcasters the
BBC noted that those who filled in the Corporation's questionnaires "must have felt a bias
towards British broadcasting just as those in Austria showed that they were favourably disposed
to Radio Vienna. On the BBC questionnaires the order was BBC first with 76%, RFE next with
73% and VOA third with 65%."
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radio and 38 per cent from regime press, only four per cent felt they could rely on what
they were being told. By contrast, 86 per cent stated that they also received their news
from foreign radio and a startling four fifths said they relied on this source most for
news of what was happening inside Hungary before the uprislnq.?" The collective
impact of these foreign broadcasters in Hungary and the evidence of cross-listening led
Bush House to conclude that 'broadcasting to Hungary has been essentially a
combined operation by a range of western broadcasters who share the audience and
also dilute no doubt the jamming attempts of the communists' .628 The BBC, meanwhile,
was considered the most reliable of the broadcasters with 91 per cent believing its
news broadcasts to have most credibility.629 Therefore, despite its relatively short
broadcasting schedule, Bush House had built up an enviable reputation amongst
listeners in Hungary leading even RFE to note that 'among many more critical
members of the audience in Hungary, news is accepted as true only if confirmed by the
BBC,.630
The Hungarian Section, led by Ferenc Rentoul and containing such influential
broadcasters as Laszlo Veress and George Urban, organised itself into a round-the-
clock production centre. As Rentoul recalled,
'we split ourselves into small teams. While a group of two or three people was
listening to the latest reports coming out of Budapest Radio and taking hasty
notes, others were getting bulletins on the air, translating news from English
into Hungarian, compiling reviews from the latest newspaper articles on the
627 WAC, E3/907/1, 'Hungary and the 1956 Uprising, 15 February 1957. 84 per cent also said
that they relied on foreign radio most for news of what was happening outside Hungary.
628 WAC, E3/898/1, 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957.
629 WAC, E3/907/1, 'Hungary and the 1956 Uprising, 15 February 1957. VOA scored 85 per
cent in terms of reliability and RFE, 69 per cent. Six out of ten of the Hungarian refugees
interviewed in Austria in January and February 1957 considered the SSC the most objective
broadcaster. Next on the list came RFE and VOA with 16 and 14 per cent, respectively. See
WAC, E3/898/1, 'Listening in Hungary', 27 November 1957.
630 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.69.
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Hungarian events and writing comments on the impact and significance of what
was happening in Hungary at that particular moment."?'
While the riots and subsequent political changes in Poland had received full coverage
in the European Services this was done within the framework of existing programmes.
By contrast, the revolution in Hungary 'very soon dominated all the broadcast output,
and for a period transmissions in nearly all the languages were wholly concerned with
reporting and interpreting its developments'. As the recognised specialists, the
Hungarian Section not only had to manage its own programmes, including an extra
quarter hour transmission in the evening from 24 October, but also provide daily
bulletins and comments for the rest of the European Services, the General Overseas
Service and the BBC's domestic Home Service.632 At the height of the crisis Rentoul
appeared nightly on the Corporation's flagship current affairs television programme,
Highlight, to explain, as the programme's producer and future Director-General of the
BBC, Alasdair Milne, put it, 'what he thought was going on in Hungary,.633 In this
respect the Hungarian Section took on the role of interpreters of the Hungarian
revolution for the BBC both in terms of its internal consumption and editorialising, and
as the source of analysis for external broadcast.
Radio Budapest was not only at the centre of the start of the uprising, but was the
principal source of news on its development and to assist the Hungarian Section its
output was fed directly into Bush House - an innovation taken from recent experience
covering Poland.634 George Tarjan recalled listening to these broadcasts in the early
hours of 24 October and hearing 'untrained voices making sporadic, hasty
announcements on the wavelength ...we knew then that the Communist Government
had lost control of the situation despite seemingly confident statements about people
631 WAC, PasB, 'The BBC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
632 WAC, R1/92/7, G91 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting, 27 November 1956.
633 Highlight was the predecessor of the Tonight programme; Alasdair Milne, DG: The Memoirs
of a British Broadcaster, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), p.12.
634 WAC, R1/92/7, G91, 27 November 1956.
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laying down their arms,.635 With this live feed staff could 'interpret minor developments'
such as 'delays of incidental music' and the 'fluctuations in the fortunes of the
Government and revolutionaries were apparent from the announcements made,.636
Tarjan also considered it essential to balance editorial assessments in London with a
visceral feel for what was actually happening: 'we felt that only by listening ourselves to
Radio Budapest could we get near enough to the atmosphere in the Hungarian capital
to gauge what events really meant'P"
This in-house analysis enhanced the vital flow of information provided by BBCM which,
with its resources and depth of coverage, was an essential adjunct to the work done in
Bush House. As a Corporation pamphlet published earlier in the year on 'The BBC and
its External Services' had pointed out, the Monitoring Service provided 'a continuous
picture of reactions to the shifting international scene' and no-where was this more
important in October 1956 than in listening to and deciphering the broadcasts of Radio
Budapest.f" There remained, however, one other less visible, but nonetheless
essential, internal resource within Bush House for understanding events in Budapest.
This was the Central Research Unit (CRU), the External Services' institutional memory-
bank headed by the mercurial Walter Kolarz. Filed in CRU was a history of communism
in Hungary with information on 'the names and careers of every insignificant Under-
Secretary and most of the Communist Party functionaries, dating back to 1945'. This
reference library, as Rentoul recalled, was Bush House's 'self-contained information
bureau through all these years and it paid rich dividends when the slow-moving events
of the Cold War years suddenly burst into a full national revolution,.639
635 WAC, PasS, 'The SSC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957
636 WAC, R1/9217, G91, 27 November 1956.
637 WAC, PasS, 'The SSC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
638 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/16 'The SSC and its External Services'.
639 WAC, PasS 'The SSC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
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Though well served by its own machinery during the uprising the BBC's Hungarian
output would have suffered greatly but for the assistance it received from the Foreign
Office and, by extension, the British Legation in Budapest. The constant stream of
reports (with many carrying the special 'Aside' label intended for BBG consumption)
from the Minister at the Legation, Leslie Fry, gave the BBC invaluable on-the-ground
assessments from which to paint a radio picture of the revolution.
Meanwhile, IRD's Peter Foster had met with Macdonald and Kolarz just five days
before the student demonstration in Budapest to discuss the reinstitution of regular
meetings between them which had latterly fallen into desuetude. An agreement was
reached for these influential members of Bush House staff (or their deputies George
Tarjan and Hugh Lunghi) to attend every Friday, the Foreign Office's daily morning
discussions on the day's news and the possible treatment of it 'attended by the Heads
of the Soviet and East European Desks, Miss Storey, Miss Korentchevsky and Miss
Harris'. This, it was felt, would be 'an opportunity for a weekly round-up and to discuss
any current or medium-term projects on which exchange of views might be useful'. In
particular, and underlining the often unacknowledged importance of GRU, Foster
hoped that 'we may be able to co-ordinate our own output a little more closely with Mr
Kolarz's excellent projects and thus save possible duplication of effort' .640
A virtuous triangle of information flows rapidly developed between the Budapest
Legation, the Foreign Office and Bush House. Telegrams from Fry reporting almost
hourly on the course of events were, depending on the sensitivity of their contents,
copied to Bush House and, in a break with normal strict BBG protocols concerning
Foreign Office telegrams, were distributed amongst senior members of the Hungarian
Section for editorial assessment. In addition regular telephone contact was maintained
between the Foreign Office and Bush House for clarification of issues or when
640 TNA, F0111 0/873, PR10111/133, Memorandum by Foster, 19 October 1956.
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particular information needed to be passed on especially quickly. This was the case, for
example, when Penney Storey called on the afternoon of the 25 October to explain that
'some 2,000 people of all kinds and conditions have just congregated outside H.M.
Legation carrying the Hungarian colours and singing the National Anthem.?" Although
this was not broadcast by the BBC and was used for context instead, other information
provided by Storey was included in programmes such as the news that 'Hungarian
tricolours without Communist emblem now flying on many public and other buildings
throughout the city' .642
The unique nature of this cooperative endeavour, while impressive, did not prevent
familiar editorial tensions from coming to the fore. Prompted by Fry's analysis of
programmes, two key concerns about the BBC's news output emerged. The ubiquity of
Budapest Radio was an acknowledged problem for the External Services in
deciphering the accuracy of events. In a telegram dated 25 October, Fry thought it
'most disturbing to the Hungarian people that the BBC should still be quoting virtually
nothing but Budapest Radio' especially when its official claims, such as that the
resistance of revolutionaries was almost over, were 'far from the truth, as of course are
practically all the other news bulletins from this city'.643 In response, Macdonald noted
that the 'absence of open sources apart from Budapest Radio (and Vienna Agencies)'
meant that
'we had no option but to use the normal procedure of reporting Hungarian news
from the one public source available - this was also the source of most of the
agency material - at the same time making it clear in every story, even in every
paragraph, what the source of the various statements was'.
641 WAC, E40/154/1, 'Telephone message from Miss Storey - 6.45pm approx.', 25 October
1957.
642 Ibid. Other information also communicated by Storey on 25 October from Fry's despatch was
the prophetic analysis that the uprising appeared "to have come as close to controlling
Budapest as is ever likely".
643 WAC, E40/154/2, Telegram No.429, Fry, Budapest, to Foreign Office, 25 October, 2.37pm.
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It was true, he admitted, that 'pinning of everything to Budapest Radio meant,' as Fry
had observed, 'that unwelcome Communist jargon sometimes crept in'.644
Fry also felt the BBC should use more of the information he provided and believed that
'we should not hesitate to take this magnificent opportunity to discredit the fraudulent
regime which is maintaining itself so precariously here by force of Russian arms.,645
Macdonald, however, stuck to the established line that 'Foreign Office telegrams of this
sort could not be used as open sources for news stories because there was the
cumulative danger over a long period of sources being identified' .646 Accordingly, the
telegrams were used as confirmation of statements made by other agencies and as
background information. Meanwhile Fry, at the epicentre of a defining moment in
European history, clearly felt that the BBC, in such an instance, should conform to the
diplomatic interests he was giving expression to. On 26 October he suggested that the
arrival of 'three prominent British journalists in Budapest,' all of whom might be able to
get their despatches back to London via Vienna, was sufficient cover to use Legation
intelilqence.?" What eventually broke this impasse was the highly significant decision
by the Foreign Office to give 'permission for the use of telegrams from Budapest as
news'. It was not long though, as the Head of Central European Services had feared,
before 'the source became a matter of public knowledge'. Nevertheless, Macdonald
was quite right in concluding, despite these tensions, that the BBC was 'magnificently
served by Budapest throughout the period' .648
The machinery of interpretation generated significant practical problems of its own, but
a challenge of equal magnitude facing the BBC was arriving at a consensual
agreement on the Corporation's own editorial interpretation of events. In light of the
644 WAC E2/812/1, Macdonald to Foster, 16 November 1956.
645 WAC, E40/154/2, Telegram No.442, Fry, Budapest, to Foreign Office, 26 October 1956.
646 WAC E2/812/1, Macdonald to Foster, 16 November 1956.
647 WAC, E40/154/2, Telegram No.442, 26 October 1956.
648 WAC E2/812/1, Macdonald to Foster, 16 November 1956.
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paucity and dubious nature of the open sources available, staff in Bush House had to
decide what the news was going to be and where its emphasis would lie. This was a
problem that the European Services, in reporting on Soviet and satellite affairs, had
had to grapple with on a daily basis for the last decade. What made this different was
that the daily news of events in Hungary had international appeal and international
implications. A BBG programme about its own coverage of the Hungarian uprising,
broadcast on the Home Service on 23 January 1957, stated this editorial requirement
in its most basic form: 'the main task of the commentators in the Hungarian Service
was to put events into perspective for their listeners who were perhaps too near to
them fully to understand what was happening' .649 What, though, was the BBG's attitude
towards these events?
Earlier in October 1956 the Foreign Office had internally restated its belief that satellite
governments were 'unrepresentative regimes imposed by force from outside' and that
UK policy towards them should be 'to do nothing which would encourage or strengthen
the puppet governments of East Europe or which can be interpreted as approval of
them' .650 Bearing in mind that this accorded with long-standing BBG attitudes, the first
question for staff in the Hungarian Section on the morning of 24 October was how to
interpret Gero's overnight decision to replace Andras Hegedus with Imre Nagy, the
titular head of the reform movement, as Prime Minister. Nine years later Tarjan recalled
that Nagy had been recognised as a genuine alternative and was given the benefit of
the doubt throughout those turbulent days.?" While this may have been the case by the
end of the uprising, attitudes to Nagy and the changing Hungarian leadership within the
Hungarian Section were far more equivocal than Tarjan suggests in those first
moments of revolution.
649 WAC, PasS, 'The SSC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
650 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.85.
651 WAC, E2/812/1, 'The SSC and the Hungarian Uprising', Macdonald to DXS, 6 July 1965.
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Matters were greatly confused with the announcement by Budapest Radio at 0800
GMT on 24 October that as a result of the 'dastardly armed attack of the counter-
revolutionary gangs during the night' the Hungarian government had 'applied for help in
accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Treaty to the Soviet formations stationed in
Hungary. The Soviet formations, in compliance with the Government's request, are
taking part in the restoration of order,.652 Then later that morning Nagy, inadvisably also
using the terms 'counter-revolutionary' made a plea to the workers for calm: 'Defend
the factories and machines. This is your own treasure. He who destroys or loots harms
the entire nation. Order, calm, discipline - these are now the slogans; they come
before everything else ... ,653 Despite another broadcast later that day in which he
announced a programme of reforms and the start of negotiations over the withdrawal of
Soviet troops, the strong impression was given that Nagy now represented the old
regime and had himself issued the invitation for Soviet military assistance.
Laszlo Veress, who often found himself in opposition to Tarjan (whom he considered
as having strong communist sympathies), immediately denounced the new government
and held Nagy 'ultimately responsible' for the arrival of Soviet troopsP" The attendant
uncertainty about how to characterise Nagy within Bush House informed the BBC's
early coverage of the uprising and it is fortunate that these initial misgivings did not set
the tone of future output as was the case, for example, in the programmes of Radio
Free Europe. As it later transpired it was Gero and not Nagy who issued the invitation
to the Russians, first through the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, and
then on the phone with Khrushchev himself. Equally, there was no indication at the
time that Nagy was being held under guard, a virtual prisoner, in the HWP
652 WAC, E40/154/1, untitled memo dated 24 October 1956.
653 Cartledge, Will to Survive, pA70.
654 Laura-Louise Veress (Dalma Takacs, ed.), Clear the Line: Hungary's Struggle to Leave the
Axis During the Second World War, (Prospera Publications, 1995), p.350; Rawnsley, Radio
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headquarters and his speeches, which were broadcast on BUdapest Radio, written by
others. It was three days before he managed to escape.P"
The evolution of the External Service's analysis of Hungarian news mirrored in some
respects the changing nature of the revolution as it moved through its different phases.
The confusion surrounding its beginnings had given way to a sense that something
irrevocable was taking place. On the evening of the 24 October the BBC's Maurice
Latey described how the people of both Hungary and Poland must now 'either have
better things ...or be held down with Soviet tanks,.656 A day later, after the arrival in
Budapest of the Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan along with Mikhail Suslov
and the massacre of Hungarian civilians by the AVH in Parliament Square, Gero was
replaced by Janos Kadar. On 26 October, with Nagy established in the Parliament
buildings under his own authority and negotiating with the Russians, a new phase
emerged in which the aspirations of Hungarian nationalism began to take shape.
Evidence of this materialised the following day when Budapest Radio announced a
new government including, for the first time since 1948, non-communists such as
Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs. 28 October brought the most remarkable news when
Nagy, again on Budapest Radio, announced a general ceasefire and the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Budapest. The seemingly impossible had happened, but a sceptical
world waited for Moscow's response. In a broadcast that the Director of the CIA, Alan
Dulles described as 'one of the most significant to come out of the Soviet Union since
the end of World War Two', Radio Moscow announced on the evening of 30 October,
'the Soviet Government has given orders to its military command to withdraw
the Soviet army units from Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary
by the Hungarian government. At the same time, the Soviet government is
ready to enter into corresponding negotiations with the government of the
655 Cartledge, Will to Survive, p.470.
656 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.91.
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Hungarian People's Republic and other participant of the Warsaw Treaty on the
question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hunqary.'?"
It was a remarkable broadcast and one that must have had monitors at Caversham and
in Bush House listening in near disbelief, but there were surprises yet to come that
evening. Budapest Radio, which for so long had been the mouthpiece of repressive
and authoritarian government and which had adapted its tone to the varying shades of
authority over the previous few days, now transformed itself into the voice of a new
Hungary. 'We are opening a new chapter,' it announced, 'in the history of the
Hungarian Radio at this hour':
'For long years past, the radio was an instrument of lies. It merely carried out
orders. It lied during the night and at daytime, it lied on all wavelengths We
who are facing the microphone now, are new men. In future you will hear new
voices over the old wavelengths. As the old saying has it, we shall tell "the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".'
They wished, 'to let the Hungarian nation's voice be heard throughout our homeland
and the world', and in its subsequent broadcasts to Central Europe and around the
world the BBC made sure that happened.f"
By the time of this broadcast, however, the Hungarian revolution was already entering
its final, terminal, phase. The Russian government had come under pressure from the
Chinese to halt the pace of reform in Hungary and even Tito had begun to show
concern at the extent to which Nagy appeared to embrace radical reforms such as a
multi-party electoral system. Events in Budapest also contributed when on the
afternoon of 30 October a detachment of security police were discovered hiding out at
the HWP building in Republic Square. Hopelessly outnumbered, in the confusion that
657 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.95; Cartledge, Will to Survive, p.474.
658 WAC, E40/233/1, Message broadcast by Budapest Radio on behalf of the Revolutionary
Committee of Radio Budapest, 30 October 1956.
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followed they were slaughtered. Images and reports of this became the focus for eager
journalists who had entered Budapest in a lull between the fighting. In the Soviet
Presidium the following day Khrushchev, who now knew of the Anglo-French
intervention in Egypt and who until then appeared not to have made up his mind about
Hungary, finally did so arguing that 'we should take the initiative in restoring order in
Hungary. If we depart ... the imperialists will interpret it as weakness on our part,.659
On 1 November, amid reports that Soviet troops were surrounding Budapest and not
retreating, Nagy met with Andropov and demanded that they been withdrawn. He also
threatened to remove Hungary from the Warsaw Treaty and declare the country's
neutrality. In keeping with previous decisions, Nagy's style of diplomacy reflected the
limited choices available to him. The lack of room for manoeuvre at the start of his
Premiership had left Nagy little option but to toe the Party line. Freed from this he was
then a hostage to the pace of revolution set by the people of Budapest and Hungary
and had to follow their lead. The imminence and unavoidability of Soviet repression
now forced him to take the mantle of revolutionary leader for which his name has
subsequently become synonymous.
Once again radio was at the heart of the defence of Hungary. Budapest Radio became
a diplomatic vehicle speaking directly to Moscow, Washington and the United Nations,
with the BBG consciously appealing on its behalf when it reported the station's output.
On 2 November Hungary unilaterally dissolved its ties with the Warsaw Treaty and
declared its neutrality. It looked to the West and to the United Nations for support while
demanding from Moscow further negotiations on the removal of troops from sovereign
Hungarian territory. Speaking in all manner of different tones Budapest Radio
attempted to motivate its domestic audience and appeal for help from the West while
659 Granville, 'Jam on our Fingers', p.833; Peter Hennessy, Having it so Good: Britain in the
Fifties, (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p.443.
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keeping the Russian bear at bay. Aware of this balancing act and wishing to help, the
BBC organised its editorial policy accordingly. One talk, by Anatol Goldberg in his
Notes by Our Observer series, broadcast on 3 November across Europe and in
Russian, was a good example of how Bush House sought to reflect these diplomatic
sensitivities in its programmes. While on the one hand it re-emphasised Nagy's appeal
for the UN 'to uphold the Hungarian Government's decision to leave the Warsaw Pact
and occupy a position of neutrality in the international arena', Goldberg was also at
pains to ease Soviet fears of an independent Hungary: 'Every serious politician and
observer in the West realises that this is the best solution for Hungary, and that no one
is out to entice her into some other camp. The Soviet Union should be pleased with
Hungary's neutrality as far as Soviet frontier security is concerned' .660
Nevertheless, the Soviet troop build-up continued and a sense of inevitability pervaded
the evening of 3 November. For the BBC, however, there was at least one pleasant
surprise left. That day a message from Radio Budapest was delivered to the British
Legation to be forwarded to the BBC for inclusion in the BBC Hungarian Service. It
said:
'We express our appreciation of the London Radio Station, BBC, for the
objective information given to the world about or people's struggle. We were
particularly pleased to note that there was no incitement to extremism and that
the tone of the broadcasts expressed solidarity in our joy over victories and in
our sorrow in weeping for our dead.,661
This message was rebroadcast in all languages by the BBC, as was the Corporation's
carefully pitched reply:
'The BBC in its transmissions to Hungary and to the world during these historic
days has tried to represent faithfully the admiration and sympathy of the whole
660 WAC, E12/713/1, Notes by Our Observer by Anatol Goldberg, 3 November 1956.
661 WAC, R1/92/7, G 91,27 November 1956.
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British people for the suffering, the victories and the courage of the Hungarian
nation. In the knowledge that Hungarians have written a glorious chapter in the
history of Europe, we hope that the result will be for the Hungarian people
peace based on justice and moderation, and we rejoice that the Free Hungarian
Radio [Budapest Radio], in the midst of the struggle, accepted and declared to
the world the supremacy of truth.'662
Such solidarity of the spoken word was, however, no match for the firepower of the
Soviet army once mobilised. At 0419 GMT on 4 November the BBC Monitoring Service
picked up the voice of Imre Nagy: 'In the early hours of this morning Soviet troops
launched an attack against our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the
lawful democratic Hungarian Government. Our troops are fighting. The Government is
in its place. I am informing the people of the country and world public opinion of this,.663
This was Nagy's last speech and was rebroadcast by the BBC across Europe and
beyond in English and vernacular output. Radio had been there at the start of the
revolution and now it broadcast its last breath. In beaming the story of the uprising into
homes around the world it had engaged a global audience in the personal and political
lives of those behind the Iron Curtain and engendered a visceral sense of the
geopolitics of the cold war. The fact remained that the Hungarian fight for freedom had
been crushed. Maurice Latey, in a commentary broadcast later that day answered the
question that must have hung in the minds of many: 'And now must we stand by
impotent and guilty watching the destruction of the Hungarian nation which won that
victory? I think the feeling must be one of shame at this.'664
662 Ibid.
663 WAC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1956.
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Aftermath
Nagy's final broadcast was followed by a number of increasingly frantic
announcements by Free Hungarian Radio. Just before 0500 GMT the Defence
Minister, Pal Maleter, and the Chief of the General Staff, Istvan Kovacs - both of whom
were being held captive by the Russians - were ordered to return to their posts. Ten
minutes later, Nagy's message of 3 November to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Dag Hammerskjold, was repeated in Hungarian, English and French. After
another hour, in Hungarian and Russian, a desperate plea was made to the advancing
Soviet troops: 'Attention! Attention! Important announcement! The Hungarian
Government appeals to the officers and men of the Soviet Army not to shoot. Let us
avoid bloodshed. The Russians are our friends and will remain our friends'. Then, at
0710 on 4 November 1956, after a further appeal for help by the Association of
Hungarian Writers followed by music, the radio signal was discontinued and Free
Hungarian Radio fell silent for the last time.665
At 1000 BBCM caught a fragment of speech on the Budapest Radio wavelength which
said that 'Counter-revolutionary elements have found their way back into the
movement. .. ,666 The re-emergence of the term counter-revolutionary chimed with
earlier broadcasts that had overlapped with the demise of Free Hungarian Radio. At
dawn and on a Soviet wavelength Ferenc Munnich, who with Kadar had absconded to
Moscow a few days earlier, was heard broadcasting from Szolnok, a town east of
Budapest and field HQ of the Soviet Military Command. Here he announced the
establishment of the new Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government to be
led by Janos Kadar as Prime Minister. An hour later, Kadar broadcast details of his
political programme, explaining why it had been necessary to ask the Soviet Army
665 WAC, BBC Monitoring, Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, 4 November 1956.
666 Ibid.
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Command to 'smash the sinister forces of reaction' .667 As he did so the BBC Hungarian
Section broadcast that Budapest Radio was 'now believed to be in Soviet hands' and
later quoted Kadar's justification for Soviet tnterventlon.?" At 2100 Budapest Radio
returned to the airwaves and after five minutes of music from an emergency
programme put out by Moscow Radio, Kadar's appeal was rebroadcast to the nation.?"
Budapest Radio was once again the mouthpiece of the Soviet-backed Hungarian
authorities and the return to normal service was followed by the kind of archetypal
revisionist statement that Hungarians had got so used to over the previous nine years:
'Imre Nagy's Government, which had opened the way for the reactionary and
counter-revolutionary forces, has collapsed and ceased to exist. We can see
now what cruel and terrible treatment has been meted out to the working class,
to the revolutionaries and to the peaceful population by the sinister forces of
reaction ...The revolutionary Government of the people's Hungary calls on every
worker, peasant, intellectual and young person - on every patriot - to support
the Government with all their might.'
Immediately afterwards, although it hardly needed underlining, an order by the
Commander of Soviet Troops was read out on air in which it was noted, with ominous
certainty, that 'the complete liquidation of the counter-revolutionaries is under way,.670
The death and subsequent rebirth of Hungarian (Budapest) Radio reflected the shifting
balance of power in the country and the people of Hungary now had to come to terms
with the aftermath of a failed revolution. Meanwhile, Bush House saw it as fundamental
that 'the voice of the BBC will continue to provide a link with the outside world'. 671
Despite more recent assessments of Janos Kadar as a political realist, at the time the
667 Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.481.
668 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.97.
669 WAC, BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1956.
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BBC immediately dismissed him as the leader of a puppet regime and a symbol of the
old Soviet-backed order in Hungary.672
As the prospect of influencing the course of events in Hungary ebbed away, Fry's
communiques from the British Legation, as well as the BBC's Hungarian output, sought
to emphasis that while unable to resist Soviet might, the indomitable revolutionary will
of Hungarians survived and was very much in evidence. As Martin Esslin noted in a
broadcast on 13 November, the people of Hungary 'may have been repressed by an
unprecedented weight of armour,' but their 'spirit remains unbrokenF" Two days
earlier the BBC's Diplomatic Correspondent, Tom Barman, had opined that 'while the
events in Hungary may well be a Russian victory, they are a defeat for Communism' .674
Another equally popular means of maintaining the bond with listeners, while at the
same time pillorying their leaders, was the judicious application of satire. Fry was quick
to report the emergence of numerous spoof notices circulating Budapest that revealed
the dark humour of Hungary after the revolution. 'Wanted,' announced one, 'A
Hungarian Prime Minister. Qualifications, a criminal record and Russian nationality.
Character and backbone unnecessary.' Another asked, 'Why are the Russians not
leaving? Because there is no one to wave them goodbye' .675 One more warned
Hungarians that 'ten million counter-revolutionaries are at large in the country' while
another described Russian tanks as 'Kadar taxis' .676 The value of these was
immediately realised in Bush House where the Assistant Director of External
Broadcasting, Tangye Lean, was prompted to ask of Macdonald whether it was
672 Ibid.; For a more recent assessment of Kadar's motivations see, for example, Charles Gati,
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675 WAC, E40/154/2, Telegram No.738, Fry to Foreign Office, 16 November 1956.
676 WAC, E2/812/1, 'Hungarian Jokes', memorandum from ADXB to C.Eur.S., 16 November
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possible to 'keep these in play throughout our output, e.g. by keeping them in front of
the eyes of commentators on Hungary' as they were 'the kind of thing that sticks deeply
in the mind.'?"
The connection with the Legation in Budapest was also an essential feature in telling
the story about how young Hungarians (mainly men), suspected of involvement in the
uprising, were being deported en masse to Russia in closed railway carriages. Very
soon after the return of Soviet troops to Budapest Fry and his staff began receiving
reports of groups of up to 400 at a time being collected for transport out of the country
along with harrowing news of their treatrnent.?" The coverage of this story by the
External Services, perhaps unsurprisingly, provoked a strong reaction in official media
behind the Iron Curtain, most especially on East German Radio which announced that
the BBC had admitted to making the stories up 'on special instructions of the British
Secret Service'. As Macdonald noted after learning of this East German broadcast, not
only had the deportations been witnessed with escapees already arriving in Vienna and
telling their stories, but Budapest Radio, 'in a spasm of truthfulness' had actually
reported these rnovernents.?"
An issue of major significance which the BBC and other western broadcasters were
eager to lay heavy emphasis on was the publication in June 1957 of the United
Nations' report by its Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. Convened at the
behest of the UN General Assembly on 10 January 1957 representatives from
Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay had been charged with providing 'the
fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other
677 WAC, E2/812/1, 'Hungarian Jokes', 16 November 1956.
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means, in the internal affairs of Hungary'.680 In contrast to the Soviet thesis that the
uprising had been provoked by western imperialists and carried out by counter-
revolutionaries, the UN Report was clear in its assertion that it was 'a spontaneous
national uprising' which was 'led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many
of whom were Communists or former Communists'. It painted a picture of life in
Hungary that was devoid of human rights and free speech: where the government was
'maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH or political police' and
supported by 'a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole of
Hungarian society'; and where the power of Moscow over the country meant 'an alien
influence existed in all walks of life,.681 Just as damning was the Report's final
conclusion that, 'A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of
another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country
must, by the Soviet's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international
concern' .682 Such censure and the accompanying criticisms of the system of
governance in Hungary and Moscow's part in it was rich material for the SSC to get its
broadcasting teeth into.
Although published on 20 June, the Russian press was slow to respond with Pravda
taking two days before dismissing the UN Report as provocative nonsense designed to
distract from Soviet disarmament proposats.f" The decision of the Soviet authorities to
publicly comment on the report at all must, in some part, have been in response to the
near blanket coverage given to its publication by the SSC and other western
broadcasters. For 24 hours from noon on 20 June the SSC European Services (in
English and the vernacular) were instructed to 'devote the maximum possible time to
680 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General
Assembly Official Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement NO.18 (A/3592), 1957, p.10.
681 Ibid., p.244.
682 Ibid., p.247.
683 TNA, F0371/128680, NH101101422 'Soviet press comment on the United Nations report on
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the UN Committee's report' in news output adding that 'comments, talks and press
reviews will be used entirely for the purpose of quoting from, explaining and
commenting upon the report'. In addition, 'services to Iron Curtain countries will devote
their entire transmission periods to this subject until Saturday [22 June], with the
primary task of making as much as possible of the text of the report known to the
audience which will not receive it through its own radio and press services.' Thereafter,
it was intended that the Report would provide programme material, 'particularly for the
services to countries behind the Iron Curtain, for many months to come,.684
Not only did coverage of the Report afford the opportunity to refute Soviet criticisms of
BBC output, such as the UN Committee's conviction that Hungarians had indeed been
deported, but more importantly it provided a much wider platform on which Bush House
could attack Soviet repression in the satellitesP" Khrushchev's secret speech at the
start of 1956 and the nature of its subsequent 'outing' had, as the then Controller of
Overseas Services, Hugh Carleton Greene, later pointed out, 'shaken faith in Stalin
much more effectively than we ever could' .686 The ensuing disruption in Hungarian and
Polish society had further emphasised the discord between local ambitions and those
of Moscow. The Polish October and the Hungarian uprising had shown both the
acceptable limits of national roads to socialism and, ultimately, the extreme prejudice
with which the Russian leaders were prepared to protect Soviet hegemony. Now, the
UN Report provided the BBC with a ready-made script, based on the nearest thing to
an international consensus, with which to admonish the management of intra-Soviet
relations and highlight human rights abuses behind the Iron Curtain.
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The Hungarian uprising had arguably shown the western radios at their most potent.
Audience research, despite obvious inadequacies, supported the conclusion that
foreign broadcasters had achieved a remarkable listenership and influence behind the
Iron Curtain. Even jamming, the spectre of communist authority in the 'private sphere of
the secret listener' and the audible reminder of state surveillance, as the Hungarian
historian and political scientist, Istvan Rev, has characterised it, failed to put off the
determined llstener.?" And yet it was questions over the extent and use of that
influence which provoked the most severe and serious criticisms of the western
broadcasters and which generated the biggest crisis of confidence in international
broadcasting since the end of the Second World War.
The principal allegations were that the output of the western radios had incited
Hungarian listeners to a point of revolution and, once underway, had encouraged their
continued resistance against Soviet forces. The radios were also criticised for
undermining Imre Nagy and therefore weakening his position as a credible leader able
to manage the crisis in the eyes of Moscow, and for being the source of much of the
virulent anti-Soviet sentiment expressed in Hungary. Above all, however, it was alleged
that these broadcasters had raised unreasonable expectations that the West would
intervene, diplomatically and militarily, to help the Hungarians in their struggle for
freedom. The combined indictment was that the radios had instigated, encouraged and
prolonged the uprising and as a consequence, were partly responsible for the deaths of
many the Hungarians (as well as Soviet troops) who fell in pursuit of an unrealisable
objective.
From the perspective of the NATO allies, the balance of power in continental Europe
and the fear of escalating a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union made the idea
687 Istvan Rev, 'Just Noise?', paper presented at the Conference on Cold War Broadcasting
Impact, Stanford University, 15 October 2004.
229
of intervention in Hungarian affairs appear absurd. President Eisenhower later summed
up the geopolitical realities of the time when he described Hungary 'as inaccessible as
Tibet'.688 Yet, amongst the largest group of Hungarian refugees interviewed after the
uprising there was an almost unanimous expectation that the West would provide aid
during the revolutton.f" In fact, half of all those surveyed thought that the 'American
broadcasts gave the impression that the US was willing to fight if necessary to save
Hungary' .690 If so, this was a highly damaging failure not just for American international
radio, but for the collective western broadcast effort, and a highly exploitable one for
Soviet propaganda.
Radio Free Europe, as opposed to the Voice of America or the SSC, became the
primary focus of criticism. This was echoed by the United Nations whose report on
Hungary concluded that 'It would appear that certain broadcasts by Radio Free Europe
helped to create an impression that support might be forthcoming for the
Hunqarians'i''" Despite having concerns about output both the Council of Europe and
the West German Government cleared RFE of serious wrongdoing, particularly on the
charge of incitement.f" Meanwhile, the 'Special Mission to Europe on US Policy
Toward the Satellite Nations', a subcommittee of the United States Foreign Affairs
Committee, also avoided direct criticism but highlighted the distinction between
publicity and propaganda on the one hand and policy on the other: 'We must not talk
more strongly than we are prepared to act,' was the committee's conclusion.F" Hidden
from the political sensibilities and diplomatic requirements of the public debate, internal
688 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.81.
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reviews at RFE presented a rather different and more disturbing picture of the Munich
station's output.
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), then the principal funder of RFE's
operations, concluded that 'Radio Free Europe neither incited the Hungarian people to
revolution nor promised outside military intervention' .694 However, its Director, Allen
Dulles, in a more candid assessment for the American President on 20 November
1956, explained that 'RFE broadcasts went somewhat beyond specific guidelines in
identifying itself with Hungarian patriot aims, and in offering certain tactical advice,.695
Meanwhile, Sam Walker, the Director of the Free Europe Press (a sister organisation to
RFE), concluded at the beginning of December that the output of the Voice of Free
Hungary (VFH), the broadcast name of RFE's Hungarian Desk, was emotional in tone,
poor in content and lacking in programme technique.F" Similarly, an internal RFE
'Program Department Report' judged that while discipline was maintained at the Polish
Desk it was 'slack' in the Hungarian section?"
Perhaps the most critical report of RFE's activities was written by its own Policy Advisor
in Munich, William Griffith. He identified sixteen programmes in which there were
'distortions of policy', and four instances of 'genuine violations of policy'. According to
Griffith, the Hungarian programme editor, Gyula Borsanyi, under the pseudonym of
Colonel Bell, instructed listeners in partisan warfare and implied foreign assistance if
the fighting could be prolonged.698 On 30 October his colleague, Gyula Litterati,
instructed listeners on the use of Molotov cocktails in anti-tank warfare, while the day
694 Johnson, 'Setting the Record Straight', p.13.
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before Katlin Hunyadi explained that Americans and Hungarians in Cleveland, Ohio,
were volunteering to go to Hungary to fight the Russian.P" Griffith concluded that
broadcasts were 'overexcited', contained 'too much rhetoric, too much emotionalism,'
lacked 'humility and subtlety' and had a 'distinct emigre tone,.700
It was an RFE broadcast on the 4 November that Griffith believed had provoked
specific expectations of assistance from the West. In a programme entitled Short World
Press Review, Zoltan Thury quoted a report from the London Observer, written before
that morning's military activity, by its Washington Correspondent. It suggested that if
the Hungarians could hold out for another three or four days (until the US elections
were over) 'the pressure upon the government of the United States to send military
help to the freedom fighters will become irresistible.' Thury, combining a potent mixture
of speculation and aspiration, continued: 'The reports from London, Paris, the United
States and other Western reports show that the world's reaction to the Hungarian
events surpasses every imagination. In the Western capitals a practical manifestation
of Western sympathy is expected at any hour."?' Predictably, such practical
manifestations never appeared - they never would have - but for those who had
listened to these encouraging broadcasts during the uprising such sobering realities
were not avowed.
There remains, however, another, highly revealing, review of RFE's output that until
now has received little if no coverage in the literature on cold war broadcasting.
Although not concerned with the Hungarian uprising this confidential report, written in
January 1956, is remarkable for two reasons. First, in its analysis on the objectivity of
RFE broadcasts the report prefigures many of the problems experienced during the
uprising. Secondly, the review was conducted by the SSC's Head of Central European
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Services, Gregory Macdonald, and as such reflects many of the governing principles of
broadcasting to Central Europe inherent in SSC practice. Commissioned by the
Director of the Munich station, Richard Condon, and his deputy, Allan Michie, this was
Macdonald's fourth in a series of reviews undertaken since the American broadcaster
started operating in 1951. Although carried out with the knowledge of IRD, such was
the sensitivity of the report that Macdonald was careful to warn IRD that 'I have been
very cagey about it in Bush House, so will you please treat it as confidential'."?
Macdonald began his analysis with two basic assumptions: that 'News is the foundation
of radio operation upon which programmes are built' and on which 'the credibility of the
station depends'; and that a 'distinction must be preserved between News and
Comment - between the reporting of facts and developments on the one hand and the
analysis or interpretation of facts which must always have an element of persuasion or
polemic'. Despite being impressed by the 'energy' and 'idealism' of staff in Munich
Macdonald detected profound problems in the running of RFE and concluded that
broadcasts had, in fact, 'too marked a tendency in them to be persuasive or polemical'
- a verdict that chimed with attitudes in Whitehall. 703
Unlike the SSC, which prepared its news and most of its other programme material
centrally for retranslation at the language Section level, RFE's Central News Desk was
'confined to intake and supply for the Regional News Desks, with a minimum of
editorial control'. Macdonald found little evidence of 'any mechanism to ensure that the
various News Desks really do interpret the same news in the same way'. Individual
producers set the editorial tone according to individual agendas. It was a dangerously
702 TNA, F01110/853, PR134/5, 'Report on Visit to Radio Free Europe, Munich' by Gregory
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permissive system. This lack of common output standards across RFE led Macdonald
to note that 'Under a system where the raw material flows through almost unprocessed
to five different editorial centres there are bound to be daily examples of the
misapprehension or omission of important stories, and of the inclusion of stories not
fully verified' .704
Just as important was Macdonald's analysis of the cultural differences between RFE
and the SSC which, he suggested, stemmed from the American Revolution (War of
Independence) nearly two centuries earlier. 'The American mind,' he argued, 'politically
and historically, is "dedicated to a proposition", so that news can be discussed in terms
of trends and linked with future vindication'. Conversely, the English and by extension
the SSC, 'do not believe in "causes" (except in wartime) or in absolute principles, but
wait for the vindication of truth out of conflict and contradiction'. To emphasise his
point, Macdonald turned to RFE's Special Guidance Notice No.20 'On Objective Truth'
which exemplified this peculiar dialectic: 'We believe that only the truth can win us
credibility with our listeners. We have faith in our cause. We believe it must triumph in
the end.' With this kind of conditioning it is perhaps not surprising that Macdonald
identified a 'tendency in RFE to regard News as a trend towards the future, so that
stories indicate (sometimes predict) what is about to happen rather than what has
happened' .705
Fifty years later an echo of Macdonald's argument could be heard in remarks made by
Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, in a BBC Radio 4 documentary that
probed the meaning of the 'national interest'. America, Kissinger argued, 'has a
difficulty, historically, in defining a concept of the national interest because it prefers to
cast its politics in terms of a universal mission and with an aggressive assertion that it
704 TNA, F0111 0/853, PR 134/5, 'Report on Visit to Radio Free Europe, February 1956.
705 Ibid.
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does not reflect any so-called selfish mterests?" Similarly, at the start of 1956
Macdonald perceived in RFE an editorial outlook that sought to condition the truth in
terms of the political, historical and emotional convictions of both the institution and its
broadcasters which was very different from his understanding of the BBC tradition
where 'News is what has happened, set if necessary against a background of past
happenings so that proportion is acnleved?"
As part of the western broadcast effort, the BSC was somewhat associated with the
criticisms levelled at RFE, particularly those coming from behind the Iron Curtain. For
example, on 18 December 1956 the Hungarian press criticised a BBC broadcast a
couple of days earlier for inciting strikes while the following March a note from the
Kadar regime alleged that the BBC was 'conducting a campaign of incitement against
the Government of the Hungarian People's democracy which could only be compared
with the activities of Radio Free Europe' .708 However, while RFE had become the new
benchmark of disreputable international broadcasting, the BBC remained relatively
unscathed in terms of its conduct during the uprising. Contemporary anecdotal
evidence suggested that the BBC's reputation had been significantly enhanced rather
than diminished. At the Council of Europe in January 1957 General Bela Kiraly, the
military commander of revolutionary forces in Budapest told the Assistant Head of the
BBC's Central European Service, George Tarjan, that 'if there was one radio that
enjoyed respect and authority during the revolution it was the BBC'. At the same
session, the exiled Hungarian Revolutionary Council 'found a lot to criticise in Radio
Free Europe's output', but 'came to the conclusion that the best broadcasts to Hungary
706 Henry Kissinger speaking in 'Lying Abroad', broadcast on BBC Radio Four, 13 June 2007,
2045-2100 SST.
707 TNA, F0111 0/853, PR 134/5, 'Report on Visit to Radio Free Europe, February 1956.
708 WAC, E40/154/2, Telegram No.1049, Fry to Foreign Office, 20 December 1956; E12/713/1,
'Kadar Note Hits at SSC', Daily Telegraph, 9 March 1957.
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were provided by the BBC'. Even Bill Griffith admitted to Tarjan that the BBC 'proved to
be the best in the situation' .r09
BBC broadcasts had sought to be realistic in terms of the likelihood of outside
assistance. In a broadcast on 26 October 1956 Maurice Latey stated clearly that
listeners should not expect intervention from the west 'because that would mean
war we here on the sidelines cannot encourage one man to shed his blood since
we ourselves can take no part'."? Paul Grey at the Foreign Office subsequently praised
the BBC for 'following a cautious policy in its broadcasts to the satellites'.711
Nevertheless, there is no doubt with whom the sympathies of the BBC lay. While
attitudes in Bush House towards Nagy and his various and hastily arranged
administrations was equivocal and, in some instances, openly hostile, the fight of the
Hungarian people for freedom against their Soviet-backed oppressors was a common
theme in output that went right the way back to the imposition of a one-party system in
Hungary. The uprising only magnified the importance and pertinence of this message.
Looking back after nearly a decade Tarjan provided a more candid assessment of the
BBC's performance when he noted how struck he was 'by the emotional content of
what we wrote and said at the time' .712 This recognition of the degree to which staff and
the Hungarian Section as a whole were engaged in the events unfolding on the other
side of the Iron Curtain enables a more balanced assessment of the BBC's conduct
during the uprising which does not equate objectivity of reporting with neutrality in
reporting. At both a corporate and individual level a set of values hostile to the Soviet
Union that were shaped by the course of the cold war, British government attitudes and
the experiences of the BBC's broadcasters, were projected from Bush House and no
709 WAC, E2/812/1, 'Visit to Strasbourg, Council of Europe, January 1957' memorandum by
Assistant head of Central European Service.
710 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.92.
711 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.71.
712 WAC, E40/154/2, Macdonald to DXB, 6 July 1965.
236
less so during the Hungarian uprising. As Tarjan succinctly put it in January 1957, 'It
was our job to follow the uprising not to lead it, but at the same time it was not for us to
set limits to the aims of the Hungarian uprising, and certainly not to underbid them from
London in their fight for freedom and national independence' .113
713 WAC, PasS 'The SSC and the Hungarian Revolution', 23 January 1957.
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10. SUEZ
Convergence
The Hungarian uprising was a defining moment not only in the management of intra-
Soviet affairs, but in wider perceptions of the brutal nature of Moscow's control over its
satellite interests. In representing this story the BBC found itself intimately involved in
the development of the uprising as an interpreter of events for Hungarian consumption
as well as being instrumental in creating a collective 'radio narrative' of the revolution
that attempted to comprehend the direction and meaning of events. In Britain, as
across many parts of the world, a visceral appreciation of the cold war took hold of the
public mind as never before. Yet in those dramatic months of October and November
1956 the world's attention was also preoccupied with the step-change from crisis to war
that was taking place in the Middle East.
The virtually unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union's repressive intervention in
Central Europe contrasted starkly with the acute divisions of opinion both within British
society and the wider international community concerning the United Kingdom's policy
towards Egypt following that country's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956. In
reflecting this state of affairs in its domestic and overseas broadcasts the BBC
consequently found itself in direct confrontation with the British government over what
was considered appropriate to broadcast from the perspective of the national interest.
The result, in broadcasting terms, was the defining postwar argument between the
government and the BBC that shaped future relations between the two. When the
Director-General, Sir Ian Jacob, was summoned to the Foreign Office on the eve of
military engagement on the Suez Canal it appeared to be an argument the BBC was
about to lose.
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At that meeting on 25 October 1956 with the Foreign Office Minister of State, Anthony
Nutting, Jacob, accompanied by Tangye Lean, was informed that the government 'had
been giving thought over a long time to the external services, which in recent months
had not, in their view, given value for money spent on them'. On the basis of a Cabinet
discussion the previous day it was intended that £1 million, around 20 per cent of the
money spent on broadcasting overseas, would be cut from the External Services
budget. As a result, Nutting told Jacob, the majority of services to Western Europe
would be abolished along with some for Africa and India. If this did not provide the
required savings further cuts in services to Latin America and economies in the
General Overseas Services would be considered.?" Meanwhile, in order to 'advise the
BBC on the content and direction of the oversea programmes' and thereby enforce a
measure of governmental editorial control, a Foreign Office liaison officer with a desk in
Bush House would be imposed on the broadcaster.?" Furious at the sudden
presentation of these proposals without prior consultation, Jacob argued forcefully that
these measures 'would have the effect of destroying a large and integral part of the
Corporation's organisation built up to carry out work on behalf of the Government'.
Nevertheless, as Jacob was forced to concede, the government had the right 'to
terminate prescription of services' and at this moment of crisis, also appeared to have
the necessary appetite to do it.716
So, at the start of what was possibly the most significant fortnight in international
relations since the Second World War - with Britain, Israel and France colluding in a
Parisian suburb to engineer a war against Egypt while blood was being spilt on the
streets of Budapest - senior management at the BBC suddenly had to come to terms
with a first order challenge to its editorial independence and, just as significantly, to the
714 TNA, F0953/1644, PB1011/60/G, 'BBC's External Services', Cosmo Stewart, 26 October
1956.
715 TNA, CAB128/30 Part 2, CM(56)73rd Conclusions, 'Oversea Broadcasting', 24 October 1956.
716 TNA. F0953/1644, PB1011/60/G, 'BBC's External Services', 26 October 1956.
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very purpose and future of its overseas services. To really appreciate the scale and
nature of the argument between the BBC and the government at that time, it is
necessary to understand not just the proximate, but also the underlying causes that
brought it about. In this respect, the Suez crisis was the spark that lit a pyre of
governing resentments under Bush House that had been long under construction.
In one respect, the best way to comprehend the fundamental conditioning forces that
brought Nutting and Jacob together, just four days before Israeli paratroopers landed
east of the Mitla Pass717 and six days before the British and French bombardment of
Egypt beqan.?" is to revisit the long unresolved issue of the strategic distribution of
broadcast services overseas. Anyone overhearing the tense and bad-tempered
exchange between the Director-General and the Minister of State that day would have
been struck by the similarities between Nutting's proposals and the recommendations
of the Drogheda Committee which, until then, had not been implemented.
In February 1956, Nutting was envisaging a re-calibration of overseas broadcasting
when he met officials to discuss recent developments in relations with the Soviet
Union. No doubt with the recent Cabinet decision to cap all overall expenditure on
overseas publicity for 1956/7 at £11.8 million in mind, he asserted that now was the
time for 'fresh thinking and for concentrating our resources on essentials' .719 In
particular, he wondered 'whether there was any rearrangement which could be made in
the information services' and Paul Grey, who had responsibility for them, offered to
'look once more into the question of the BBC' which, at £5.14 million represented
nearly 44 per cent of the overall spend.720 As Peter Partner has put it, 'this request
717 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East, (London: I B Taurus, 2003),
~R-3~7-50.
lbid., pp.380-85.
719 TNA, F0953/1646, PB1012/3, Hillis, to Stewart, Foreign Office, 30 January 1956; TNA,
F0953/1646, PB1012/6, 'BBG External Services', Paul Grey, 20 February 1956.
720 TNA, PRO, FO 953/1641, PB1011/17, 'BBG External Services', 20 February 1956.
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seems to have released a small landslide in Foreign Office thinking about the SSC,.721
The subsequent paper by Grey on the 'SSC External Services', completed in April with
the drafting assistance of the head of IPD, Cosmo Stewart, began a paper trail that led
directly to Nutting's meeting with Jacob on 25 October.
Grey argued that in light of the growing need to counter Soviet and other subversive
activities, 'it is questionable whether the SSC contribute greatly either to publicity
overseas or to our anti-communist work,' except in 'broadcasts to the iron curtain'.
Although admitting the importance of increasing the amplification, especially on
medium wave, of the SSC's output as a means of maximising its impact, Grey was now
contemplating radical surgery on whole groups of vernacular services. In this respect,
the primary focus was Europe where he believed that the 'conditions under which the
SSC acquired its influence... during the war no longer exist this side of the curtain'. Sy
way of contrast, the areas of contemporary strategic interest where direct sound
broadcasting remained effective were considered to be the Middle and Far East and
Central and Eastern Europe. 722
These conclusions were a kind of super-charged Drogheda, imbued with all the latent
angst of the previous two years' frustrations, and promised an estimated reduction of
188 hours from the overall weekly transmission time of 554 hours. Such a major cut, it
was argued, might then be able to produce 'a consequent significant saving in
maintenance and operation'. To effect this Grey proposed: the abolition of the language
services to countries in Europe outside the iron curtain; reorganisation of the German
Service with East Germany as the principal target; retention and possible increase of
English by Radio to Europe; the abolition of the Latin-American Services; retention and
possible extension to Middle Eastern, South-East Asian, and Far Eastern Services;
721 Peter Partner, Arab Voices: The BBC Arabic Service, 19380-1988, (London: BBC, 1988),
~.96.
22 TNA, FO 953/1641, PB1011/17, 'BBC External Services', 20 February 1956.
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greater expenditure on sound and television transcriptions and exchanges. There
remained, however, the tricky question of public reaction to these proposals. On this
point Grey thought the abolition of a large part of the overseas services 'would cause a
certain storm in Parliament and the Press'. Nevertheless, if the government 'based
their view on the Drogheda Report and announced at the same time that they would
provide money for activities in other direction' the period of criticism might be
'shortlived?" Ivone Kirtpatrick agreed, noting that 'the protests will be loud and
angry'.724 So too did Nutting, who added, with political astuteness, that 'I have always
wanted this kind of redeployment. But it can only be sold in Parliament if it is a
redeployment.?" Accordingly, 'expansion' was to be the watchword, particularly in
relation to the Middle Eastern, South East Asian and Far Eastern Services.
The subsequent Cabinet paper and debate on 5 July 1956 resulted in the
establishment of a Committee on Overseas Broadcasting (GEN 542) to 'examine the
scale and distribution of expenditure on oversea broadcasting' .726 Its chairman was the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Dodds-Parker - an
ex-SOE hand with a well-developed appreciation of the darker arts of overseas
publicity. Only two months earlier, he had indicated his personal feelings about the
BBC in response to the Corporation's film of Khrushchev and Bulqanin's visit to the UK
in April. In a letter to Paul Grey he fumed at this 'disgraceful occurrence', continuing
that 'Many people, far beyond the confines of the Tory Party, believe that there are
sinister, extreme left, influences in the BBC who since the war have slanted news, etc,
against HM Government's long term interests' .727
723 Ibid.,
724 Ibid. Note by Ivone Kirpatrick, 11 April 1956.
725 Ibid. Note by Anthony Nutting, 11 April 1956.
726 TNA, CAB130/119, GEN 542/6 (Final), 'Interim Report', August 1956.
727 TNA, F0953/1640, PB1011/12, Douglas Dodds-Parker to Grey, 24 May 1956
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It was not until 11 July that the BBC was consulted on Whitehall plans for the
redevelopment of the External Services. In a conversation with Jacob, Selwyn Lloyd
acknowledged the 'mutual lack of confidence between Government circles and the
British Broadcasting Corporation' and the need for a 'frank discussion' on overseas
broadcasting. Jacob's pithy response was to argue that 'the BBC since the war had
been faced with an annual financial freeze. The orange was now just about dry.' Lloyd
for his part countered by suggesting 'that the BBC was too respectable' and should be
prepared to be more 'aggressive' .728 If this meeting had been designed to build bridges,
it seems to have created just as many anxieties as it sought to resolve.
Six days before GEN 542 submitted an Interim Report to the Prime Minister, very much
on the lines of Grey's April paper, Colonel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal and
everything changed. The report had proposed the abolition of the French, Italian,
Portuguese, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian and Dutch services with further
consideration given to those in Spanish, Finnish and Greek, and a reduction in the
scale of the General Overseas Service. The intellectual journey to this point had, on the
morning of 26 July, more to do with the unresolved outcome of the Drogheda
recommendations than anything else. When news came through that evening of the
dramatic turn of events in Egypt all previous business between the BBC and the
government immediately came to be seen through this new and threatening prism.
This is the point at which the strategic reassessment of the overseas services of the
BBC became fused with the problem of Britain's evaporating influence in the Middle
East and the government's desperate attempt to rectify this by all means possible. The
result was to assign to the mission of the External Services' reorganisation, amongst
many Whitehall officials and their political leaders, a zeal for punitive reform that owed
728 TNA, F0953/1641, PB1011/20, 'Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State
and Sir Ian Jacob about overseas broadcasting', 11 July 1956.
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far more to the inability of Britain to retain a credible purchase in the Middle East in an
emerging age of Arab nationalism than it did to a well-thought out and implementable
programme for change in overseas information policy and the BBC's place within that
framework.
Broadcasting to the Middle East
Although the atmospherics of the relationship between Bush House and Whitehall in
1956 were heavily charged with the effects of long-term discord over the distribution
and funding of overseas services, it was already apparent by the start of the year that
developments in the Middle East were to be a major preoccupation for the government
and broadcaster alike in the months ahead. As the Director of External Broadcasting,
J.B. Clark, noted in the spring of 1956, when surveying the 'Political Scene' for the BBC
Board of Governors, 'the focus of international political interest has not been on
Europe but on the Middle and Far East'.729 Meanwhile, British concerns over its
ebbing influence in the region, augmented by the course of events since the Second
World War and punctuated by the Egyptian military coup in 1952 and subsequent
seizure of power by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, cultivated deep-rooted political and
military anxieties about the threat this posed to Britain's key strategic interest in the
region - the Suez Canal. Notwithstanding the October 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty,
which extended the international status of the Canal Zone to 1961, as the last British
troops left the Canal in 1956 senior ministers were acutely aware of the 'vicious circle',
as a Defence Committee paper put it, 'in which a reduction in our ability to influence
events leads to a loss of prestige... [that] ... in turn creates both the incentive and the
opportunity for countries hostile to us to take action harmful to our interests.'730
729 WAC, R1/92/2, G27 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', March 1956.
730 TNA, CAB131/17, DC(56)17 'United Kingdom Requirements in the Middle East', 3 July 1956.
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Radio and particularly international broadcasting had not only followed the shifts in the
postwar struggle for influence in the Middle East, but had also been an essential
adjunct to regional political and diplomatic ambitions. As with broadcasting through the
Iron Curtain, radio in the Middle East was a means of communicating competing
regional visions with an unparalleled immediacy that made it a key component in the
escalating diplomatic battle for control in the area. In this regard, Egypt's well
developed domestic and international broadcasting operation represented by far the
most significant and potentially damaging threat to British interests. Launched on 4 July
1953 to promote Arab nationalism and attack its opponents, the Voice of the Arabs
(VOTA) was the Arabic language service for the Middle East from Cairo Radio.731 It
soon commanded the attention of the British government as the emblem of a 'virulent
and highly effective Egyptian propaganda campaign against the Western powers, and
particularly the United Kingdom' .732
By the beginning of 1956, Egyptian broadcast services had a reach that covered the
whole of the Middle East, North, Central and Eastern Africa and were audible in
Western Africa. As the Joint Intelligence Committee prophetically noted of the Egyptian
government in July 1956, just days before Nasser used this formidable network to
announce to the world the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, 'Cairo Radio is probably
the most effective single propaganda medium at its disposal' .733
British authorities, meanwhile, were developing several strategies to enhance the
prominence and credibility of United Kingdom policy in this increasingly competitive
propaganda war. The British radio station in Aden and, more significantly, the Sharq-al-
731 Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and persuasion during the Suez
crisis, (London: LB. Taurus, 1996), pp.4-5.
732 TNA, CAB131/17, DC(56)17, 3 July 1956. . .
733 TNA, CAB158/25, JIC(56)78 'The Activities of Cairo Radio and their Impact on the Territories
Towards which they are Directed', Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 23 July 1956.
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Adna Arabic-language station broadcasting from Cyprus - a nominally commercially
music-based operation which was, in fact, controlled by the British government - were
highly valuable resources for transmitting Whitehall's point of view. In addition, plans
were also in train for the establishment of 'a chain of low-powered VHF stations in the
Persian Gulf, including Kuwait, which would complement the material produced at a
'proposed covertly controlled Arab Production Centre of transcnpts'{" These in turn
would be supported by a build up of clandestine, or "black", broadcasting stations
capable of beaming propaganda into the region, primarily from facilities in Cyrpus.?"
However, the formative nature of these plans undermined the British government's
range of communication tools in the Middle East. This was also true of Radio Baghdad,
the centre-piece of the Pact's communication strategy, which was still not operational
by the time of the Suez crisis. As a consequence, Whitehall found itself primarily reliant
on the BBC's services to the Middle East, in Arabic and English, as the most effective
means of presenting the British case to an Arabic audience.
Any analysis of the BBC Arabic Service in the run up to the Suez crisis would be hard
pushed to find any great cleavages between broadcast output and British policy. Within
the 28 hours of programmes broadcast a week in Arabic ample opportunity was found
to reflect government policy and British concerns.?" Programmes such as Mirror of the
West, Topic of Today, British Thought and the British Way of Life and the popular
audience correspondence-based Political Questions and Answers, allowed the Arabic
Service to transmit comparative, expositional and projection of Britain material in some
detail. As J.B. Clark noted of developments in the Arab world, including Jordan's
734 TNA, CAB 130/119, Committee on Overseas Broadcasting, GEN 542/6(Final) 'Interim
Report', 1 August 1956. For the disagreement between the Foreign Office and the Colonial
Office over these plans see, James Vaughan, The Failure ofAmerican and British Propaganda
in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds, (Basingstoke: Palwave, 2005),
p.202; TNA, CAB130/119, Committee on Overseas Broadcasting, GEN 542/15 Meeting,
'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 12 July 1956.
735 Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds, p.204.
736 TNA, F0953/1631, P1041, Stewart to Lodge, 8 May 1956. In addition, seven hours of
Persian programmes were broadcast and three and a half hours in Hebrew.
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decision not to join the Baghdad Pact and the sudden dismissal of the British General
Glubb as head of the Jordanian military, the Arab Legion, 'Listeners to the Arabic
Service were left in no doubt of the British reaction to these events' .737
A prime example of this was the BBC/British government response to Nasser's
decision in October 1955 to accept the Soviet Union's offer of arms, under cover from
the Czech authorities. There was an undoubted synergy between Whitehall's response
to the arms deal and the threat of Soviet penetration and Bush House's by now well
established cold war rhetoric. Such was the closeness of the fit that IRD regularly sent
BBC talks scripts such as 'Communist Economic Offensive in Egypt' by Alfred
Zauberman and 'The Colonialism of Anti-Colonialists', 'Khrushchev the Colonialist' and
'The USSR and Islam' all by Walter Kolarz, to the Regional Information Office in Beirut
to be translated and transcribed for dissemination in the Middle East.738
The Soviet arms deal provided the opportunity to attack both Soviet regional intentions
as well as General Nasser personally for having invited this threat to Arab
independence. Accordingly, all overseas services, according to Clark, 'continued to
hammer away at the theme of "Soviet Imperialism'" into the summer of 1956 as a
response to both this development and the persistent Soviet 'diatribes' against the
western colonial powers and Britain in particular.f" The BBC was also at pains to
emphasise the positive achievements of the British Commonwealth, drawing
comparisons between 'the Russian record of oppression and the British record of
737 WAC, R1/92/3, G45 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', 25 May 1956.
738 TNA, F0953/1632, P1041/50 'Copies of Weekly Letters sent by RIO, Beirut to Posts in the
Middle East: Lists of articles translated into Arabic by RIO Beirut'; TNA, FO 953/1630, P1041/17
'Copies of Weekly Letters sent by RIO, Beirut to Posts in the Middle East: Lists of articles
translated into Arabic by RIO Beirut'; TNA, F0953/1629, P1041/2 'Copies of Weekly Letters
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739 WAC, R1/92/3, G45, 25 May 1956.
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education for independence' .740 For example, the BBC's Eastern Services produced a
series of talks by Sir Ivor Jennings for the Arabic Service 'on the development of self-
government in British Colonies and Dependencies' which was echoed in talks by
Patrick Gordon Walker in the Pakistan Service comparing this with the fate of the
Central Asian republics in Soviet Russia.I"
Whitehall's 'Sovietisation' of the Middle Eastern propaganda war certainly had its
advantages - one line of attack for two strategic threats - and easily fitted into tried and
tested cold war publicity strategies. However, the argot of anti-communist rhetoric,
Rawnsley persuasively argues, was a rather ineffective vehicle for projecting British
influence in the Middle East.742 The need for closer attention to be paid in Whitehall to
Britain's specific publicity requirements in the Middle East was reflected in the April
1956 decision to give the Head of IRD, Jack Rennie, 'a special brief to counter
Egyptian propaganda'. On the surface this might have indicated more of the same from
the head of a department that, since 1948, had been concerned with anti-communist
publicity. But, as a Foreign Office note from May makes clear, IRD had been 'given a
new charter to include anti-subversive work in general in the field of propaganda and
publicity, and, as an immediate objective, this work in the Middle East will, in IRD, take
priority over anti-Communism'. 743 This suggests that while warnings about the dangers
of Soviet influence would remain an important part of British publicity to the Middle East
(as it did in the output of the BBC), prior to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Whitehall was experiencing a process of recalibration as to the most effective and
expedient means of influencing opinion and future developments in the region.
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A very important factor in understanding British publicity to the Middle East in 1956 was
the threat posed by the hostile propaganda emanating from Cairo Radio. As the
Foreign Office Minister of State, Anthony Nutting, recalled in print a decade later, when
its programmes 'boomed forth from the "Voice of the Arabs" radio transmitter in Cairo,
the British Government desperately tried to tighten its grip upon those countries where
its writ still ran'.744 The fear of Egyptian radio's regional influence only enhanced the
importance of BBC services to the region with the Whitehall Committee on Overseas
Broadcasting describing Britain as being 'engaged on what amounted to a "radio
war'" .745 Meanwhile, the JIC wryly commented that 'the Egyptians have been natural
experts in the publicity business since the days of the Pharaohs'T" As a consequence,
BBC services began to be re-armed for battle with an extra half-hour broadcasting time
in the evening from 5 August, while plans were advanced for an Arabic transcription
service (to supply radio stations in the Arab world) and the beaming in, at the Colonial
Office's request, of Arabic, Hindu and Urdu services to East Africa.?" Nonetheless,
these belated attempts to improve the reach of the BBC in the Middle East concealed a
history of parsimonious resourcing that reached back to before the Second World War.
In his May 1956 paper on the 'External Services of the BBC', an attempt to pre-empt
current government thinking on broadcasting, Ian Jacob noted that 'For a generation
successive British governments have shown reluctance to finance propaganda
services in Arabic corresponding to the size of the problem and the virulence of our
competitors'. The most damaging cost of this prevarication, he argued, was that the
'BBC's case for a medium wave relay has been shelved for nearly twenty years on
grounds of economy'. In a media environment that had become dominated by listening
on medium-wave, something embraced and enhanced by Cairo Radio, BBC Arabic
744 Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez, (London: Constable, 1967), p.10.
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and other regional services on short-wave simply did not have the reach and audibility
to compete on equal terms. To continue in this way was surely a false economy. What
he advocated was the installation of a medium-wave transmitter on Cyprus at a capital
cost of £250,000.748
Tangye Lean, however, could see 'no prospect of our being able to carry out the
extension of the Arabic Service' and the fiscal landscape within which such plans would
be considered seemed to augur ill for future developrnent.?" Despite the
recommendation of the Drogheda Committee that Arabic services should be expanded,
in 1954 the Treasury vetoed Foreign Office proposals to do just that and although
broadly sympathetic to the needs of broadcasting in the Middle East the Exchequer
continued to refuse to increase funding of the External Services to this end.750 Indeed,
by June 1956, and with the Treasury looking for an overall saving of £100 million from
the public purse the Chancellor, Harold Macmillan, proposed to the Cabinet the
slashing of expenditure on the External Services by £1 million.751
The political tide, however, was turning. At a meeting with the Treasury's Sir Alexander
Johnston on 18 June Paul Grey believed that there was now a genuine appreciation
'that it was in the national interest that such schemes as we had or could devise for the
Middle East should not be hampered by financial difficulties and, secondly, that we
should not be asked to finance them out of savings on this year's information vote,.752
This loosening of the purse strings reflected the outcome of a review, ordered by the
Prime Minister, into British broadcasting in the Middle East in May 1956. Of the four
748 TNA, F0953/1640, PB1011/13, 'The External Services of the BBC' by Sir Ian Jacob, 31 May
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projects recommended, the first was for the BBC Arabic Service to be broadcast on
mediurn-wave.I'" Whitehall soon followed suit and on 25 July the powerful Policy
Review Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, invited the Foreign Secretary to
arrange for a medium-wave relay station to get underway in the Middle East.754
On the eve of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal there existed two critical debates in
Whitehall over the External Services of the BBC. One that brought to a head years of
unresolved tensions about the funding and distribution of the overseas broadcasting
effort and the other which brought into sharp focus the political and diplomatic
preoccupations of the time. In addition, this collision of forces took place in a fiscal
environment that offered no easy public expenditure solutions despite the apparent
consensus on a medium-wave transmitter. The unifying theme between the two
debates was the sense that BBC services to both Western Europe and the Middle East
had become ineffective. Despite BBC protestations that the sheer volume of listeners
in, for example, France made it a valuable service, it is clear from Drogheda onwards
that Whitehall considered them ineffective because they did contribute to the
government's overseas publicity objectives or, more specifically, its anti-communist
activities.?" By contrast services to the Middle East were ineffective, not because the
job they did was undervalued, but because they didn't have the reach an impact
necessary to maximise the usefulness to government. As the Committee on Overseas
Broadcasting, GEN 542, pointed out on 12 July 1956, the objectives of overseas
broadcasting were not the same around the world: 'the emphasis in Europe was on
culture, but in the Middle East we were engaged on what amounted to a propaganda
753 Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds, p.202. The other three projects were: VHF broadcasting
facilities for the Arabian Peninsula; the strengthening of Radio Baghdad; clandestine
broadcasting facilities.
754 TNA, AIR8/2062, Brook to C.A.S., 6 June 1956; TNA, CAB 130/119, Committee on
Overseas Broadcasting, GEN 542/2nd Meeting, 'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 25 July 1956.
755 The BBC claimed that there were 1 million listeners to the service. TNA, CAB 130/119,
Committee on Overseas Broadcasting, GEN 542/1 st Meeting, 'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 12
July 1956; TNA, F0953/1641 , PB1011/17. 'BBC External Services', 10 April 1956.
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war,.756 With the Treasury unwilling to provide the financial resources to fund both it
was an obvious political decision as to which would survive. In this way the fate of the
overall distribution of the SSC's External Services became fused with the course of
events in the Middle East.
Controlling Tendency
The growing conviction within government that something should be done about the
SBC's External Services found expression in an appetite for asserting greater
centralised direction over output. It was highly significant, therefore, especially in terms
of the magnifying effect of what was to happen the following day, that on 25 July the
Policy Review Committee invited the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd 'to consider by
what means the Government could best secure a larger measure of control over the
context of broadcasts to the Middle East and Far East'.757 This instruction would
subsequently reverberate around Whitehall during the summer of 1956 gathering
momentum as the government's policy and position in the Middle East became ever
more fraught.
A blueprint for reorganisation that could be pressed into service had already been
established by Paul Grey in his April paper on the 'BBC External Services' and was
now advanced in the debates and Interim Report of GEN 542, Douglas Dodds-Parker's
Committee on Overseas Broadcasting. Meeting just hours after the Policy Review
Committee it was suggested that the 'possibilities were either to arrange with the BBC
that its broadcasts should be used as an instrument of Government policy, or to make
use of a different organisation and reduce Government expenditure on BBC overseas
756 TNA, CAB130/119, GEN 542/15t Meeting, 'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 12 July 1956.
757 Ibid., GEN 542/2nd Meeting, 'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 25 July 1956.
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broadcasts'. With no ready alternative available for such a move this was perhaps an
example of rhetoric exceeding realism, but it was nonetheless an indication of the
extent to which the mainstream political debate in government was by now willing to
contemplate radical solutions with respect to the BBC. Practical considerations were
brought to bear, however, and it was pointed out that 'to use overseas broadcasting as
a means of disseminating what would be known to be United Kingdom propaganda
was open to serious objections, which might outweigh the advantages of abandoning a
wholly impartial approach' .758 This view was echoed by Grey who felt that 'it would be
strongly resisted by the BBC as destroying their present independence and thereby
damaging their reputation abroad; and H.M.G. themselves might find that there would
be disagreeable consequences, including responsibility, both in Parliament and abroad,
for every word broadcast'. 759
Substantial obstacles to government seizure of control over overseas broadcasting
also existed in the 1946 Broadcasting Policy White Paper which stated the intention
'that the Corporation should remain independent in the preparation of programmes for
overseas audiences'. Nevertheless, the government retained the right to provide
guidance and various liaison arrangements had been devised over the years to satisfy
this impulse. For example, there was daily contact between the heads of the BBC
language services and the regional desks of the Foreign Office, while special
information was passed through the BBC's Diplomatic Correspondent. 'Aside' and
quidance telegrams specifically for Bush House consumption were sent by British
Missions abroad in addition to telegrams on the Foreign Office and Whitehall
distribution (below "SECRET" grading) which were circulated to selected External
Services personnel. Specifically to assist broadcasting over the Iron Curtain the
Foreign Office maintained 'a special desk which gives the BBC virtually an hour to hour
758 Ibid.
759 TNA, F0953/1643, PS1011/44, 'The SSC External Services', 26 July 1956.
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service of information and comment'. In the climate of July 1956, it was now being
argued that these means of influence were inadequate for the job the government
wanted done. However, to effect such radical change would, as Grey cautiously noted,
require rewriting the Licence and Agreement if not the SSC's Charter itself.76o Such a
public act would be hard to defend.
The External Services constitutional framework did allow the government of the day to
prescribe which countries the SSC should broadcast to, in which languages and for
how long. Accordingly, while GEN 542's Interim Report, which was delivered to the
Prime Minister on 2 August 1956, assumed 'that the SSC continues to be the agent
used by the Government for general external broadcasting' it argued strongly that the
Corporation's overseas output was 'quite out of balance with political requirements' and
proposed a radical reorganisation to suit government needs. In advocating this, it was
on much stronger ground. The basis of its argument was that broadcasting to Western
Europe accounted for about one third of the total cost of the External Services while
'expenditure on services to the Middle East and the Far East combined is less that one-
tenth,' with not much more than that spent on services over the Iron Curtain.?" It was
little wonder, then, that the Committee concluded that in the case of Western Europe
'Direct broadcasting is, in our view, now a relatively uneconomic means of making our
influence felt' .762
760 Ibid.
761 TNA, CAB 130/119, Committee on Overseas Broadcasting, GEN 542/6(Final) 'Interim
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Ian Jacob, meanwhile, maintained that an increase in funding, not a cost-cutting
reorganisation, was the only viable route to build up a global service with sufficient
resources to deliver genuine value for money for the British government. The perceived
inadequacies of overseas broadcasting were the product of historic under-resourcing
by government, not a reason for further diminishing it: 'For lack of a comparatively
insignificant fraction of national expenditure, a valuable aid to the British international
position and an institution of world-wide fame, is being eaten away year by year, with a
corresponding loss of sympathy and understanding throughout the world'.763
When Jacob met Kirkpatrick on 28 August 1956 to discuss government thinking on the
future of overseas broadcasting he was left in no doubt about the political reality of
what was proposed. Ministers, Kirkpatrick told him in what Asa Briggs describes as an
unpleasant, even threatening, interview, 'were increasingly dissatisfied with the BBC'
and that 'there were two powerful schools of thought, one of which was disposed to
favour governmental control in the overseas services and the other, the curtailment of
the £5 million grant in aid to the BBC and its expenditure in other propaganda
enterprises' .764 Kirkpatrick clearly felt his message had hit home, later noting that 'Sir
Ian Jacob looked stricken like a mother about to be deprived of her child,.765
This meeting was notable, however, for two other reasons. First, as a member ten
years earlier of the Official Committee on Government Information Services, which
helped form the postwar constitutional settlement of the External Services, Kirkpatrick
had left none of his colleagues in doubt as to his understanding of the future scope for
government action:
763 TNA F0953/1640 PB1011/13 'The External Services of the BBG', 31 May 1956.
764 Briggs, Competitio~, p.121; TNA, F0953/1643, PB1011/43/G, 'Record ofa meeting with Sir
Ian Jacob', Kirkpatrick to Rennie, 28 August 1956.
765 TNA, F0953/1643, PB1011/43/G, 'Record of a meeting with Sir Ian Jacob', Kirkpatrick to
Rennie, 28 August 1956.
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'It was not intended that the Government should accept any formal
responsibility for the conduct of the overseas services, but finance would be
provided on the basis of an approved programme, and the Government would
be fully entitled to bring pressure to bear on the SSC in order that the service
should accord with the aims of Government policy. The ultimate sanction would
be a financial one.'766
A decade on, and now Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, he was in a
position to give life to his conviction of what it meant to broadcast in the national
interest.
Secondly, and directly related to the modus operandi he identified in 1946, were the
terms in which he suggested these ministerial concerns. What the government wanted
was the ability to control, but not the negative and undermining publicity that would
inevitably be associated with an overt act of censure. It was for this reason that GEN
542 had effectively dismissed the idea of the government taking responsibility for
overseas broadcasting as unworkable. Kirkpatrick knew this, but his purpose was to
threaten Jacob with fundamental change, 'to bring pressure to bear' on the SSC, as
would later be the case with Nutting. This was political warfare of a domestic sort and
as an old hand Kirkpatrick seemed to relish this opportunity to engage in a new radio
war.
Ironically, at the point when Suez became an all-consuming crisis in Whitehall, 26 July
1956, relations between the SSC and the government could not have been, almost
literally, any closer. That evening Jacob attended a dinner hosted by the Prime Minister
at No.1 0 Downing Street marking the official end of the state visit of King Faisal of Iraq
766 TNA, CAB134/306, GIS(46)4Ih Meeting, 28 February 1946.
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and his Prime Minister, Nuri Said.767 Amongst others in attendance were the Foreign
Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd and the Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell. As news
arrived during the evening of Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company the
BBC, the government and HM's Opposition found themselves united by the shock of
Nasser's audacious and highly successful propaganda coup. By the autumn, however,
relations between the three would be remarkable for their disunity and, in the case of
the BBC and government, their outright hostility. Similarly, during the summer of 1956
there was a general disintegration of consensus in British political and public life over
what should be done about Suez.
Eden's announcement in the House of Commons on 2 August, the eve of the summer
recess, that 'certain precautionary measures of a military nature' were underway
regarding the Suez Canal was immediately followed with a speech by Gaitskell
comparing Nasser's actions to those of Mussolini and Hitler in the years before the last
war.768 Consequently, it appeared that there would be little domestic political restriction
on the development of government plans in the weeks ahead, yet just a day later in a
private letter to Eden, Gaitskell made it clear that the Labour Party could only accept
'forceful resistance' by Britain under United Nations ausplces.?" This was the
beginning of a cleavage in approach that would become ever wider and ever more
public over time. Meanwhile, after the initial flash of public and press support in favour
of taking a firm line with Nasser, there were concerns in government that it might all too
quickly evaporate, thereby undermining long-term planning.770
767 WAC, R34/1580/1, Suez Crisis: Historical I, DG's Desk Diary, 26 July 1956; Kyle, Suez,
p.134; David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.35; Tony
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768 Kyle, Suez, p.164.
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What the government needed was a sustained publicity campaign and there was
clearly an expectation that the BBC, both domestic and overseas, should acquiesce.
Meanwhile, the Corporation, conscious of the need to reflect 'the conflicting views
about British policy which had begun to be voiced after the House of Commons debate'
decided to replace Dancing by the Sea from Brighton on the Light Programme with a
Special Survey of the Suez Canal Crisis on the eve of the London Conference of
Maritime Nations.771 This 'round-up of opinion' lasted twenty-five minutes and
contained a short contribution from Major Salah Salem, editor of AI Shaab and former
Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, giving an Egyptian perspective on the Suez
crisis.772 Coming at the same time as the BBC's initial refusal to allow the visiting
Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, to broadcast in support of the
government's stance towards Egypt - an important part of Eden's domestic public
relations campaign - the giving-over of airtime, no matter how little, to Egyptian
representations at such a delicate moment confirmed in Eden and others around him
suspicions that the BBC was to be considered as an adversary to be robustly
managed, rather than a willing advocate.F" Were those responsible for this at the BBC,
wondered Eden, 'enemies or just soclausts'P?" On 17 August Jacob was summoned
back from holidaying at his Suffolk house and in a frosty interview with Eden informed
that if the BBC failed in its duty to 'educate' the country as to the 'seriousness of the
situation', a Foreign Office official would be posted to the BBC for 'liaison' purposes.?"
And as the Suez crisis worsened for the government in the coming weeks and months
ahead, political disgust with both the BBC's home and overseas services threatened to
771 WAC, R2/9/2, Board of Management meeting, 'Suez Canal Crisis', 13 August 1956; WAC,
R34/1580/1, programme note, 15 August 1956; The Conference was designed to pressure
Nasser to reverse his course. On 23 August 18 of the 22 nations present agreed to a system of
international control for the Suez Canal. See, Carlton, Suez Crisis, pp.41-5, 47-8.
772 WAC, R34/1580/1, programme note, 15 August 1956.
773 Sir Robert was eventually allowed to broadcast following the direct intervention of Eden who
telephoned his former Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, now
Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors, who in turn instructed Jacob to make the necessary
arrangements. For a good account of this episode see, Shaw, Propaganda and persuasion,
~.g114-116.
4 Briggs, Competition, 1995, p.87.
775 Shaw, Propaganda and persuasion, p.121.
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eclipse the work the Corporation was in fact doing, under challenging circumstances, to
support the government line abroad.
Great care had been taken in the External Services to ensure that the British
government's case was heard around the world, particularly in the Middle East, and
that the themes pursued in output reflected Whitehall's publicity strategies. Eden's
domestic television broadcast concerning the crisis on 8 August had been
simultaneously transmitted by the General Overseas Service and given in full on the
Arabic Service. Such was Bush House's desire to cement in the minds of listeners the
government's message that the Arabic translation of Selwyn Lloyd's ministerial
broadcast two days before the London Conference, started transmission even before
he had finished speaking in English.776 On the first day of the London Conference, 16
August, Guy Wint in Topic of Today on the Arabic Service argued that Nasser was
damaging regional development by 'scarring away those who are most anxious to
promote international cooperation'."? The Conference itself was very closely followed
by the BBC in all services with two commentators specially assigned to cover
proceedings for the Arabic Service, transmitting reports at very short notice from a
studio at Carlton House Terrace. Special importance was also attached to broadcasting
translations of important speeches in full, as was the case with statements by Lloyd
and the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 'as it was rightly anticipated
that only distorted versions of the speeches would be available to newspaper readers
in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world' .778
With such coverage Bush House was able to give voice to the public themes
expressed by politicians and statesmen as the crisis developed: Eden arguing that
Nasser 'is not a man who can be trusted to keep an agreement'; Lloyd describing
776 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
777 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p.43.
778 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
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Nasser as military dictator who 'maintains himself in power by methods so well known
to us from what happened in certain countries in the inter-war years'.779 In addition to
pursuing long term themes such as Nasser's pan-Arabic imperialist ambitions and the
dangers of communism in the Middle East through Egypt's links with the Soviet Union,
BBC Arabic output concentrated on such Foreign Office targets as the 'futility of
Nasser's economic plans' and the 'intricacies of the Canal organisation and the danger
of running it without experienced pllots'."" In this sense, the relationship with Whitehall
was close and even Douglas Dodds-Parker 'expressed appreciation of the vigorous
line which has been taken' by the BBC.781 Yet despite this obvious dovetailing of
government aims with External Services output the outstanding characteristic of the
relationship between the two was a growing sense of attrition.
Against the reality of the substantial effort being made by the BBC to accommodate
government attitudes in its programming, was a perception in Whitehall that the
broadcaster was failing to fulfil its duty to support national, i.e. government, overseas
policy. Nevertheless, there was one genuine point of friction about which there was no
ambiguity - the domestic disintegration of consensus over Suez. On the 12 of
September the return of Parliament heralded 'two difficult days,' as Eden put it, of
debate on Suez during which Gaitskell condemned the military preparations being
made and pushed the government to refer the matter to the United Nations.
Demonstrations in London that day also demanded 'No War Over Suez,.782 The
following day Ian Jacob sought the advice of the Board of Governors on this 'unusual
situation for the BBC,' where 'for the first time for many years there was a foreign policy
779 Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds, pp.212-3.
780 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956. For Whitehall's publicity and propaganda themes
during the Suez crisis see, for example: TNA, F0953/1633, P1041/75, Draft Directive on HMG's
Propaganda in the Middle East for information of the East African territories, undated; WAC,
R34/1580/1, 'I.C.E. Progress Report', undated; Ibid., I.C.E. briefing paper by Douglas Dodds-
Parker, 11 October 1956; Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds, p.214.
781 WAC, R1/92/6, G73, 18 September 1956.
782 Kyle, Suez, p.247; WAC, R34/1580/1, 12 September 1956.
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issue of great gravity on which there was a sharp division on party lines'. Their reply,
'that the BBC should do nothing to underline the existence of party division and disunity
at a time of crisis' was as political as it was unrealistlc.?"
For those actually making programmes such as Topic of Today and writing broadcast
reviews of the British press it was impossible to conceal, except by deliberate
censorship, the divisions evident within British society. Although output was tempered
by these political considerations the BBC as a journalistic organisation was simply
unable and unwilling to re-engineer itself for such tactical purposes. Consequently,
when the subject of 'Oversea Broadcasting' resurfaced at the Cabinet on 26
September the Prime Minister's continued dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
overseas services led Eden to order that 'the whole basis of existing arrangements
should be reviewed' .784 In doing so he gave executive authority to those in Whitehall
who sought to rewrite the postwar constitutional settlement for overseas broadcasting
and sanctioned the greatest challenge to the editorial independence of Bush House
that it has ever faced.
The first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Oversea Broadcasting, GEN 554, on
9 October and chaired by the Lord Privy Seal, R.A. Butler, took as its starting point the
question of 'whether the Government should have greater control than at present over
the content of overseas broadcasts by the BBC, even perhaps to the extent of
assuming full responsibility for the content and operation of overseas broadcasting
services?" Once again, the sheer impracticality of this objective under the current
783 WAC, R1/24, Board of Governors meeting, 'Suez Crisis: Request for Broadcast by Leader of
the Opposition', 13 September 1956.
784 TNA, CAB 128/30 Part 2, CM(56)67(8) 'Oversea Broadcasting', 26 September 1956.
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were: Alan Lennox-Boyd (Secretary of State for the Colonies), David Heathcoat-Amory (Minister
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Charles Hill (Postmaster-General), Anthony Nutting
(Minister of States for Foreign Affairs).
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constitution of the BBC was realised. As the Postmaster-General, Charles (later Lord)
Hill, pointed out, while it was incumbent upon the Corporation to consult and
collaborate with government department's 'the final content of those programmes was
dependent on the BBC's own interpretation of the national interest,.786 In the face of
such a genuine obstacle the general mood of the committee appeared far more
equivocal than might otherwise have been expected. Even Alan Lennox-Boyd, Colonial
Secretary and one of Bush House's more vocal critics that summer, felt that 'while the
BBC's External Services handling of topics was sometime inept ... it is necessary to
bear in mind the very large volume of programmes put out by the BBC in which the
British point of view was constantly kept from before overseas audiences' ?87 It was left
to Ivone Kirkpatrick, who had been specially invited to this first meeting, to succinctly
sum up the present difficulty: 'In short, there was no logical half way house between no
control over the BBC and total control' .788
If total control was out of the question, in terms of both the Corporation's continued
credibility and the government's liability for overseas broadcasting, another mechanism
was needed for exercising influence over Bush House. The policy purchase achieved
by the Foreign Office's analysis of the External Services organisational shortcomings
through the spring and summer of 1956 now bore fruit. Allying budgetary restrictions to
the kind of reform proposed by Grey and then GEN 542 provided a more realistic
negotiating position.789
At this point, Kirkpatrick made a decisive intervention. The 'best course', he suggested,
'might be for the Government to advise the BBC that, while they recognised it to
be inherent in the BBC's constitution that it could not undertake propaganda
786 Ibid.
787 Ibid.; Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd: A Biography, (London: I.B.Taurus, 1999), p.162.
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activities, the Government regarded the expenditure of some £5 millions a year
on oversea broadcasting out of a total expenditure of some £8 millions on
overseas information services as a whole as being disproportionate'.
Consequently, the government would in future 'no longer contemplate devoting so
large a proportion to the external services of the SSC as at present constituted'. This
approach would, he thought, 'administer a psychological shock to the SSC and might
bring the Corporation to consider more seriously than hitherto the problem of
reconciling its independence under the Charter with the need to conduct its external
services in the national interest' .790 With this, Kirkpatrick handed ministers the option to
threaten the External Services with extinction.
The government's constitutional right to prescribe the services it wanted the SSC to
broadcast overseas at a cost it set was, as Kirkpatrick had predicted, the soft
underbelly of the External Services' editorial independence. At its second meeting on
18 October, GEN554 agreed in principle to recommend to the Cabinet 'a saving of at
least £1 million in expenditure on existing SSC External Services, and that language
broadcasts to all European countries (other than the Soviet Union and its satellites),
Latin America, South Africa, India and Pakistan should be abolished to the extent
necessary to secure such a saving'. Nevertheless, 'subject to the creation of closer
liaison between the Foreign Office and the SSC, the Corporation should continue to be
the vehicle for overseas broadcasting' .791
The kind of 'closer liaison' the government had in mind, however, would be just as
unpalatable as the method used to apply it. The Suez crisis provided the excuse for
raising the issue of a liaison officer who would oversee 'the whole range of the external
services though he would, to begin with, devote special consideration to their
790 Ibid.
791 TNA, CAB130/120, GEN 554/2nd Meeting, 'Oversea Broadcasting Policy', 18 October 1956.
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presentation of the news on the Middle East'.792 Kirkpatrick likewise felt that in framing
its output in the national interest the 'Corporation would derive considerable help in this
direction from the appointment of a competent liaison officer from the Foreign Office,.793
Not since the dissolution of the Political Warfare Executive and the end of wartime
broadcasting measures had the government attempted to influence the BBC's editorial
line from within Bush House, but the Suez crisis provided both the cover and, for those
convinced of the all-consuming importance of toppling Nasser, the necessary conflict to
insist on a derogation of the constitutional safeguards designed to prevent official
control over overseas output.
With Jacob's visit to the Commonwealth Broadcaster's Conference in Australia
imminent it was decided that 'it would be useful if the Committee's provisional
conclusions could be disclosed to him before his departure'. Accordingly, on the same
day that Britain secretly signed a collusive pact with the French and Israeli's in the
Parisian suburb of Sevres to engineer a war in the Middle East to overthrow Nasser, 24
October 1956, the Cabinet gave authority for a meeting with Jacob to inform him of the
following:
(i) The Government grant of about £5 millions in respect of the BBC's
external services would be reduced by at least £1 million, mainly by the
elimination of the European language services.
(ii) This saving would be devoted, in part to an intensification of the BBC's
services to the Middle East and South East Asia.
(iii) Some part of the saving might also be used to increase the
effectiveness of our information services by other means over which the
Government would retain more direct control - for example, the
792 TNA, PRO, FO 953/1643, PS 1011/53, 'Foreign Office Liaison with the SSC Overseas
Services', memorandum by Paul Grey, 24 September 1956.
793 TNA, CAS130/120, GEN 554/151 Meeting, 9 October 1956.
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production of television material, for use wholly overseas, by the Central
Office of Information.
(iv) The Government would not seek to impose any direct control over the
BBC's external services, but they would require the appointment of a
Foreign Office liaison officer to advise the BBC on the content of the
overseas proqrammes.I'"
The result was that by the end of October 1956 both the government and Bush House
were on a collision course to meet their respective nemeses. For the government, this
took the obvious form of Colonel Nasser. For the External Services, however, it was
the far more surprising and, by this time, increasingly forlorn figure of Anthony Nutting.
Into the Firing Line
The day after approval was given to approach the BBC on the lines suggested by the
Cabinet Nutting, along with Dodds-Parker and Cosmo Stewart, met with Jacob and
Lean. Nutting proceeded to outline the government's demand that the BBC make a
saving of £1 million in the Grant-in-Aid of the External Services and, in pursuit of 'closer
and more formal liaison', agree to the appointment of a Foreign Service Liaison
Officer.795 At Jacob's request Dodds-Parker drafted a letter to the BBC containing the
provisions laid out by Nutting in order that 'the existing pattern of the external services
of the BBC might be redirected so as to be rendered more effective and to accord more
closely with the policy objectives abroad of the Government' .796 However, in the time
between the initial writing of this letter and its delivery to Broadcasting House the
following day there occurred what Briggs has described as a 'twist of fortune' that even
794 TNA, CAB128/30 Part 2, CM(56)73(4) 'Oversea Broadcasting', 24 October 1956.
795 TNA, F0953/1644, PB1011/60/G, 'BBC's External Services', 26 October 1956.
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now is hard to explain satisfactorlly.?" With Jacob due to fly out of the UK the afternoon
of Friday 26 October a subsequent meeting between Jacob accompanied by the BBC's
Chairman, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and the Lord Privy Seal, R.A. Butler, and Dodds-
Parker was hastily arranged for that morning. The letter was then revised by the
Cabinet Office official Burke Trend (who would later become Cabinet Secretary) along
the lines of this second meeting. When the letter arrived at the BBC a few hours later,
importantly still in a draft form, although it contained the original suggested cuts in
many of the language services and improvements in others to the Middle East and
South East Asia, the amount to be saved in the External Service budget had been
radically reduced by half to £500,000.798
The reason for this change is still not entirely clear. Was it the result of the ferocity of
Jacob's response to Nutting's proposals that weakened the resolve of Butler the
following day? Was it as the consequence of an intervention by the BBC's Chairman
who, as the wartime Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office had access to
Eden and other ministers and senior officials in Whitehall? Or was it just evidence of
the confused, uncertain and increasingly unhinged state of affairs in government at the
time? For BBC management and Governors there was little time to reflect on these
motivational nuances as critical judgments of strategy had to be devised posthaste.
The chosen solution, and perhaps the only realistic one available, was to stonewall.
The manner and timing of the government's proposals, the lack of prior consultation,
the apparent flexibility on the core budgetary objective and the sheer administrative,
797 Briggs, Competition, p.126.
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logistical and technical impracticality of implementing these changes without a
substantial period of preparation must have struck those involved at the BBC as highly
peculiar. It is hard to imagine it not being interpreted as a means to exert immediate
and short-term influence over output regardless of the genuine reorganisation these
proposals advocated. However, while Jacob's departure for Australia imposed a
deadline of sorts on the BBC's initial response it was also something that could, and
was, used to the Corporation's advantage. The letter had requested, probably in
response to Jacob's criticisms about the lack of consultation, an informal response
from the BBC 'so that we can take account of the Corporation's views'."?' The
opportunity this provided for delay was immediately taken up with Jacob's Secretary,
Miss Torry, calling the Foreign Office that evening to say that the BBC had 'no
comment' to make on the draft and 'supposed that the BBC would now be getting the
letter in final form,.8oo Accordingly, as Jacob flew across the Atlantic leaving executive
management responsibility for the Corporation with the newly installed Assistant
Director-General, Sir Norman Bottomley, the BBC called the government's bluff and set
about orchestrating a formal riposte to these proposats.'?' It was the beginnings of a
successful strategy. On hearing the news of the BBC's unofficial response, Dodds-
Paker, aware of the 'Cabinet hoops to be gone through' before any action against the
BBC could be taken, assumed 'that the next step will be the circulation of the draft to
the Overseas Broadcasting Committee,.802 Events, however, were about to take over
and Butler's committee would not meet again until 12 December by which time both the
BBC's and the government's negotiating positions would be radically altered.
799 Ibid.
800 TNA, F0953/1644, PS1011/61/G, 'Draft letter to SSC', note of a telephone conversation, 26
October 1956.
801 Previously, SSC Director of Administration.
802 Burke trend noted on 26 October that the final version of the letter could "be prepared only
after the Cabinet have taken a firm decision on policy". TNA, FO 953/1644, PS1011/61/G,
Trend to Rae, 26 October 1956; Ibid., note of a telephone conversation, 26 October 1956.
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On Monday 29 October the Board of Management, meeting without Jacob, 'agreed that
a letter in strong terms, on the lines sketched out by DXB [Director of External
Broadcasting, J.B. Clark], should be prepared for the Chairman's considerationP'"
However, as due process was being observed inside the BBC, the world outside was
about to be turned upside down. That afternoon Israeli paratroopers landed east of the
Mitla Pass in Egypt, 45 miles from the town of Suez, and the military phase of the crisis
began. The followinq day in accordance with the Sevres agreement Britain and France
issued ultimatums to both Egypt and Israel to 'halt all acts of war' and withdraw ten
miles from the Canal, with the extra stipulation for the Egyptians that they 'accept
temporary occupation of key positions on the Canal by the Anglo-French forces,.804
Following Egypt's expected failure to comply allied Anglo-French bombing of Egyptian
airfields began on 31 October and 5 days later British and French paratroopers land at
Port Said at the northern end of the Suez Canal.
While the means to exert greater control over the External Services had been the
motor behind government planning through the summer of 1956, these new
circumstances concentrated minds in Whitehall on the need for the BBC, home and
overseas, to broadcast with a sense of national duty under wartime conditions. Such a
patriotic appeal would surely have been a key factor behind the decision to invite
Bottomley and Harman Grisewood, who as Chief Assistant to the Director-General was
on the front line between the BBC and NO.10 during Suez, to the Ministry of Defence
after Jacob's oeparture.P" Here, according to Grisewood, they were told of the
imminent military operations and informed of the government's intention to revive
wartime broadcasting measures which would involve an elaborate system of
803 WAC, R2/9/2, Board of Management meeting, 'External Services: Grant-In-Aid 1957-58', 29
October 1956.
804 The Sevres Protocol as reproduced in, Hennessy, Having It So Good, p.435-6.
805 During the war Grisewood had been Kirkpatrick's deputy in the BBC's European Services.
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censorship and direction.P" Again, this was simply not possible for immediate
enactment, but as the ensuing days would reveal the real difference between Whitehall
and the BBC was not practical, but conceptual.
The government was asking the BBC to consider its responsibility to broadcast in the
national interest in terms of Britain as a country at war. This was at odds not only with
the direct experience of many in the BBC who could vividly remember the broadcasting
requirements and meaning of total war, but with public and parliamentary opinion and
the government's own rationale for military operations in the Middle East as a police
action. As J.B. Clark pointed out at the end of November, the widening gap in
Parliament on policy had been difficult but manageable for the External Services
'because policy had not yet turned into considered intervention. The difficulties became
acute when military operations were involved because Party conflict, instead of settling
down, flared still higher,.807 Rather than acquiesce to the government line, the nature of
Britain's engagement in the Middle East and the criticisms it drew from friend and foe
alike - America and Russia both condemning British actions - coupled with domestic
division resulted in just the kind of heightened sense of impartiality the Foreign Office
had been so critical of in the past. As the BBC's 1956-57 Annual Report and Accounts
pointed out in retrospect,
'At no time since broadcasting began had there been such a lack of agreement
in Parliament and in the country on a major matter of foreign policy. Never
previously, therefore, had the BBC's tradition of objective reporting in its
external as in its home programmes led it to show to the world a large part of
806 Harman Grisewood, One Thing at a Time: an autobiography, (London: Hutchinson, 1968),
£.197.
07 WAC, R1/92/7, G 91 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting', 27 November 1956.
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the nation deeply critical of the Government of the day on a matter of vital
national concern. ,808
It was to counter just such a resolve that the proposal of a Foreign Office Liaison
Officer had been made. This eleventh-hour attempt to affect some measure of control
over the BBC's output was to prove less of an effective means of censorship and more
of a professional irritant to the normal editorial processes of Bush House. The proposal
had been made by both Nutting and Butler at their meetings with the BBC and was
included in the Dodds-Parker draft letter. Consequently, on 31 October Paul Grey
telephoned the Acting Director-General, Norman Bottomley, seeking the BBC's
approval for an immediate appointment on an experimental basis. As he put it, 'the FO
wished to know what the BBC was saying in its External Services and the BBC ought
to know what the FO was saying and thinking'. After consulting Cadogan, Bottomley
rang back to say that 'the BBC was willing to fall in with the Government's suggestion'
on the basis of the terms of reference laid out in the Dodds-Parker draft letter.
Accordingly, the Corporation received an important assurance that the
'appointment would not, of course, be intended to derogate in any way from the
existing degree of independence of the BBC and from their own responsibility
for the programmes which they transmit. Its purpose would be to improve the
arrangements for consultation between the Corporation and the prescribing
Government Departments, and it would supplement, not replace, the existing
arrangements for the transmission of information from these departments to the
Corporation' .809
808 Annual Report and Accounts of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 1956-57, Cmnd. 267,
October 1957, p.15. .
809 WAC, R34/1580/1, Record of a telephone conversation with Mr Paul Grey on the subject of
'appointment of liaison officer', 31 October 1956; Ibid., copy of 'draft letter' with covering note
from Douglas Dodds-Parker to Sir Ian Jacob, 26 October 1956.
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The Foreign Office's diplomatic choice as Liaison Officer, Lanham Titchener, seemed
ideally qualified for this delicate task being someone who, as an ex-SOE man,
understood the exigencies of political warfare and, as a former BBC television
producer, appreciated the technical and editorial requirements of broadcastinq.""
However, at the end of October 1956 he was stationed in Tehran and did not arrive at
Bush House until 12 November, well after the Suez crisis had turned into a disaster for
the British government. In his stead, on 1 November Duncan Wilson, who would later
become British Ambassador to Moscow, arrived at Bush House."" His work in that first
twenty-four hours perfectly exemplified the essential problem facing relations between
the BBC and the government at this crunch-point and helps explain the de facto
stalemate reached between the two. It also demonstrated the impossibility of achieving
the 'effective' liaison that the Dodds-Parker letter had called for.
No doubt conscious of the suspicion and resentment with which staff at Bush House
would have greeted his arrival, Wilson was upbeat when he volunteered his
assessment of a talk by Maurice Latey called Government and Critics, the External
Services' main comment piece on 1 November. As J. B. Clark later reported Wilson
thought the programme, which explained that the British government was forced to act
because of the predictable delays in action by the United Nations, was 'not only a
brilliant piece of work, but the best justification until then which had been made of the
Government's action' and was a theme subsequently taken up by the Prime Minister in
his broadcast on 3 Novernber.f" Yet at the same time Wilson was charged with
complaining to Clark about the coverage given in the previous day's press review of a
Manchester Guardian leader which accused the British and French government's of 'an
act of folly without justification in any terms but brief expediency' .813 In this way, Wilson
810 Briggs, Competition, p.126.
811 Partner dates his arrival at Bush House as 2 November 1956.
812 WAC R1/92/7, G91, 27 November 1956.
813 Briggs, Competition, p.128.
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gave voice to the conflicting demands the government was making of the External
Services at the start of the military phase of the Suez crisis. On the one hand, Bush
House ably demonstrated the value to Whitehall of having independent and
professional broadcasters make sense of Britain's actions for overseas listeners. On
the other, broadcasting as an adjunct to Britain's military campaign required central
direction and the stamping out of contrary and competing views. The one was
incompatible with the other, a fact that had repeatedly dawned on ministers and
officials in their deliberations earlier in the year and which had resulted in the ultimatum
put to the BBC on 25 and 26 October. In this sense, the imposition of a liaison officer
was the manifestation of an unresolved problem, not the solution to it.
This was also reflected in a growing schizophrenia in the BBC's output as Bush House
sought to manipulate its editorial logic to suit two increasingly disparate purposes.
While news remained the truly independent core of the External Services operation,
and the fly in the broadcast ointment as far as the government was concerned, there
was a well developed appreciation in Bush House of the need, under the rubric of the
national interest, to also project an understanding of the motivations that lay behind
British government policy and action. In this, Clark felt 'the BBC's critics were obscuring
the difference between news and comment, for while the news could not be otherwise
than objective and impartial, in comment it was possible to put the British case for
action forcefully and effectively,.814 By 'British case', Clark evidently meant the
government's and as Peter Partner has put it: 'There does not seem to be much
evidence that the Arabic Service did anything but loyally try to present the British
government's policies in the best light it could during the Suez crisis' .815 Accordingly,
during the crisis Bush House simultaneously strove, on the one hand, to defend itself
from inappropriate government interference in editorial decision-making while, on the
814 Ibid.
815 Partner, Arab Voices, p.111.
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other, actively seeking to provide broadcast support, in the guise of public diplomacy,
for Britain's action in the Middle East.
In achieving this balance a liaison officer might have had some clear benefit, aiding the
flows of information at a critical time, had it not been for the fact that Wilson and then
Titchener were charged with the highly political task of influencing output to suit
government wishes. In this, however, they were undermined by their relatively
toothless terms of reference. So, while Wilson made suggestions 'on the undesirability
of news items ranging from the views of the Opposition to communiques issued from
GHQ in Cyprus on the bombing of military installations in Egypt', editorial judgments,
albeit conditioned by the cumulative effect of immense government pressure, remained
with the BBC.816 Accordingly, while the government agitated for broadcasts overseas,
either by omission or commission, to reflect the government's line, Bush House
remained adamant that, as laid out in the 1946 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy,
the 'treatment of an item in an Overseas news bulletin must not differ in any material
respect from its treatment in a current news bulletin for domestic listeners' .817 As the
former Director-General, Sir William Haley had pointed out earlier in the year:
'It has been the primary conception of British broadcasting ever since it decided
to speak to peoples beyond its borders, that it would pour through the world
hour by hour, day by day, and year by year an unending, undeviating, irrigating
flow of truthful news given as objectively and as impartially as British
professional men and women could make it. The BBC does not attempt to have
one story for its own people and another for the rest of the wortd.'?"
816 WAG, R1/92/7, G 91,27 November 1956.
817 Broadcasting Policy, Gmd.6852, HMSO, July 1946, para.59.
818 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/16 'The SSG and its External Services', pamphlet by the SSG,
1956.
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This was to cause particular problems in relation to the English language General
Overseas Service which, to the great frustration of the Foreign Office as Grey ruefully
noted in a memo to Kirkpatrick, 'escapes our influence almost entirely,.819 Reporting to
the Cabinet, the Minister of Defence laid out the concerns of the Allied Commander-in-
Chief, General Keightley, with regard to troop morale 'in view of the conflicting
statements on the wireless and in the Press about the value of operations' .820
Programmes detailing press comment and public opinion at home lay at the heart of
this disquiet, particularly the news talks featuring the speeches by Eden and Gaitskell
broadcast on the third and fourth of November respectively. In these, Eden attempted
to invoke the image of war leader and spoke of the solemn duty that lay in front of the
country. Gaitskell, by contrast, effectively appealed to the nation in general and
disillusioned Conservative MPs in particular to force Eden's resignation. As General
Keightley later remarked in his perceptive and influential review of the military
operations, 'His Majesty's Opposition 'rocked the landing craft' in the early stages' and
the BBC, in the eyes of the government, helped them do it,821
It was the government's own psychological warfare plans, however, and not the BBC's
reporting of events, which was to prove to be the Achilles heel of Britain's
communication strategy during the Suez crisis. In this tactical field of operations, as
Keightley pointed out, 'the Egyptians had it all their own way' .822 Emblematic of this
failure to win the 'psy-war' were the shortcomings of the Voice of Britain radio station,
the United Kingdom's mouthpiece in the Middle East from the start of the military phase
of the crisis.
819 TNA, F0953/1643, PB1011/54, 'BBC External Services', Grey to Kirkpatrick, 2 October
1956.
820 TNA, CAB128/30 Part 2, CM(56)82nd, 'Suez Canal', 8 November 1956.
821 TNA, DEFE 5/78, COS(57)220 'Part II of General Sir Charles Keightley's Despatch on
Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, November - December, 1956', 11 October 1957.
82~ Ibid.
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Brought into being on 31 October 1956, the Voice of Britain (VOB) was the focus of the
UK's psychological warfare operation and was intended to break the will of the
Egyptian government and its people and prevent them from resisting the allied military
intervention. However, in the planning, implementation and subsequent execution of its
remit, VOB was a bungled, ineffective and ultimately counter-productive means of
achieving this. Formally the Near East Arab Broadcasting Station (NEABS), it had been
established during the Second World War by the British and was run by the Foreign
Office in conjunction with the Secret Intelligence Service. Re-Iaunched in 1948/49 and
disguised as a commercial station, known popularly as Sharq-al-Adna, its headquarters
were moved from Limassol in the Lebanon to Cyprus where it broadcast entertainment,
mainly music, programmes in an attempt to align itself with regional sentiment. Indeed,
at that time the Foreign Office had requested that the BBC nominate candidates from
its own Arabic staff to 'act as "stooge" directors of the Company' - an offer the BBC felt
obliged to turn down.823 The major changes in military planning after the signing of the
Sevres Protocol in October 1956 and the rapid mobilisation to enact its provisions
meant that that by the time VOB was pressed into operation it had neither the capacity
nor the expertise to broadcast effectively.
As it became apparent, after being requisitioned for active service by the Governor of
Cyprus, what its new role would be, Arabic staff at Sharq-al-Adna refused to broadcast
and walked out of the station. Such was the anger of its Director, Ralph Poston, at both
the manner of the take over and the damage to the government's reputation in the
Middle East that he thought would follow, not only did he refuse to broadcast, but had
to be held under house arrest until he could be safely sent home.824 The result was a
broadcasting operation designed for a different military plan, enacted without adequate
preparation, and with no experienced staff to run it. As a consequence, its output
823 WAC, E1/631, AHEastS to HEastS, 12 January 1949.
824 Sir Ian Jacob Papers. JACS 2/4, Poston to Jacob, 22 April 1957.
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consisted of entertainment records broadcast from Cyprus, news and talks by the
Foreign Office in London, in addition to the warnings and threats to the people of Egypt
emanating from the Allied High Command.P" And from 7 November (as well as one
transmission on 2 November), relays of the BBC's Arabic Service.826
The blatant use, by the British government, of broadcasting to subdue and intimidate
listeners in the Middle East in equal measure had immediate consequences for the
BBC. Already understaffed, four of the Arabic Service's expatriate staff resigned at the
start of hostilities - one third of its workforce."? More importantly, the activities of VOB
eroded confidence in the BBC as a broadcaster whose output could be trusted by
listeners as being independent of the tactical objectives of the British government.
There was also a pressing technical significance to the rise and fall of the Voice of
Britain. It had been decided in Whitehall in the summer of 1956, starting with the
decision of the Policy Review Committee, to fund a medium-wave transmitter for BBC
output to the Middle East. As a result, it had been agreed with the BBC that the
government would announce on 20 October the decision to requisition the Sharq-al-
Adna transmitter for this purpose.?" Just days before the Sevres agreement was
signed outside Paris, the announcement was postponed, according to the BBC Board
of Management minutes, because of 'a hitch in Whitehall' .829 Whether preparing the
ground for the outcome of the meetings in Sevres or not, the result was that at the
eleventh hour the BBC's 20 year pursuit of a medium-wave transmitter in the region
was again put on hold.
It is clear that the BBC was not the only broadcasting headache facing the government
during the Suez crisis. In response to the challenge posed by Radio Cairo and the
825 WAC, R1/92/7, G91, 27 November 1956.
826 TNA, F01110/967, Memorandum by Oakeshott, 18 December 1956.
827 WAC, R1/92/7, G91, 27 November 1956.
828 WAC, R2/9/2, Board of Management meeting, 15 October 1956.
829 Ibid., 22 October 1956.
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success of Egypt's national and international propaganda campaigns, the logic of
Britain's own regional communications strategy gave way to the hastily arranged and
ill-conceived psychological warfare schemes dreamt up by Whitehall's civil and military
planners. Neither an unrepentant BBC (with its 'fetish' for impartiality, objectivity and
consistency), nor the government's own brand of political warfare and fear-mongering
(broadcast by the contorted Voice of Britain), gave the British government what it
wanted. Official and political incompetence could not hide the vast chasm that had
opened up between the government's objectives and the means with which to achieve
them.
It was external forces, however, and not the BBC that finally brought an end to the
Anglo-French military operation, code-named Musketeer (Revise). With global opinion
against Britain, a humiliating climb-down remained the only option after the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, revealed the gravity of the financial crisis facing
the country: a run on the pound with an irate America blocking access to Britain's
International Monetary Fund account. As a result, with British troops having advanced
just over twenty miles down the Suez Canal from Port Said, Eden announced a
ceasefire in the House of Commons at six o'clock on 6 November, effective from
midnight that night.
The irony, in broadcasting terms, was that for all the criticism fired at them from
Whitehall during the crisis, the BBC External Services remained the most effective and
credible platform from which to promote British government interests and, indeed, the
wider national interest. Its role in leading this fight-back and the leverage this would
provide in future dealings with Whitehall was not lost on the BBC. It was also
appreciated with considerable rapidity amongst those who so recently had been willing
to dispense with the constitutional niceties concerning relations between the
government and the BBC and the earlier hostile tone noticeably softened. Even the
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harshest of critics, such as the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, were eager to
view the future of Bush House in a new light. In a paper prepared for the Overseas
Broadcasting Committee at the end of November, once ministers had had time to
digest the events of the previous weeks, he argued that it was 'only when we have
made up our minds what a broadcasting operation can do that we can fairly measure
the performance of the BBC External Services'.830 Accordingly, the government was
forced to rethink, in the light of very recent experience, its attitude to future overseas
broadcasting requirements. From now on it would have to accept as inviolable, as it
should have under the Charter, Licence and Agreement, the editorial independence of
the External Services. Never again would they come under such intense tactical
pressure from Whitehall to accord with government objectives. The Suez crisis had
been a hiatus, albeit a terribly destructive one on all fronts, but with Eden's resignation
on 9 January 1957 the ecology of the broadcasting relationship with government took
on more measured tones. The governing desire for a strategic reorganisation within
Bush House that had pre-dated Suez remained, but was now put on a more
consultative and orthodox footing. The 'bad dream' of Suez, as Jacob had put it, was
finally over.831
End of an Era
Out of the chaos of the Suez crisis, Britain began to regard itself in a new light. From
the Prime Minister down, a re-evaluation of the Britain's place in the world was
instigated and a cost-benefit analysis of empire and international obligations ensued.
While Britain's soon to be operationally active independent nuclear deterrent would
keep the United Kingdom at what Churchill called the 'top table' of international
830 TNA, CAB130/120, GEN 554/7 'Comments on Draft Report by the Committee',
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 November 1956.
831 Jacob Papers, JACB2/4, Sir Ian Jacob to Ralph Poston, 26 April 1957.
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diplomacy, the retention of Britain's seat would in future depend on an ability to
influence events rather than conduct them. Accordingly, by the time that a physically
broken and emotionally exhausted Anthony Eden offered his resignation to the Queen
on 9 January 1957 (to be succeeded by Harold Macmillan), Whitehall and the country
at large was coming to terms with an unexpected narrative departure in the story of the
nation: one that spoke of financial insolvency, military failures and diplomatic bungling.
It was in the glare of this harsh new light that government ministers and officials began
to reconsider the fight they had picked with the BBC. And now that Britain's
misadventure in the Middle East had spectacularly backfired, so the balance of the
broadcasting relationship between the government and the BBC also required a degree
of re-evaluation.
Beyond the acrimony of spiralling relations between Whitehall and Bush House, at its
most acute the crisis had exposed not only the different appreciations of what it meant
to broadcast in the national interest, but also the different perceptions of the corporate
obligations resting on the BBC. In both its domestic and overseas publicity, the
government had demanded, at a time of what it considered to be war, the Corporation's
acquiescence to the government line. The BBC, however, argued that without a
national consensus - and there was none at the time of Suez - it could not bend its
output to tactical needs that were at odds with strategic aims. To do so would have
been to undermine the BBC's reputation and, by extension, the reputation of the
country. As Jacob had made clear in his paper for the Foreign Office on the 'The
External Services of the BBC' at the end of May 1956:
'The BBC's standing abroad is a national asset comparable with the country's
reputation for parliamentary institutions, a free press and a stable system of
justice Unlike other foreign broadcasting systems which have followed the
tactical needs of the moment and earned a corresponding notoriety and lack of
trust, the BBC has reaped the benefits of its long term policy by acquiring a
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reputation for stable responsibility which precisely responds to the needs of
Britain's international position.,832
This was an analysis that elevated the BBC, and Bush House in particular, to a status
of constitutional significance in the exercise of the UK brand abroad. While Whitehall
imagined during the emerging Suez crisis that it was dealing with a truculent satellite
agency which needed to be bullied into fulfilling its function as a tool of foreign policy,
the BBC saw itself (and had done so for quite some time) as an institution whose very
creed was a manifestation of the long-term national interest. As Jacob's predecessor
as Director-General, William Haley, had noted when reflecting on the future needs of
censorship in war, 'Something very vital to both the nation and the BBC would be
damaged' if belief in the BBC's editorial independence were lost.833
Yet, this was a doctrine that cut both ways. While editorial independence was the
public emblem of the BBC's virtue, the Corporation's moral compass could not wholly
discount the needs of the government, especially one in crisis, as to do so would be to
precipitate the collapse of a governing continuity at home which was very definitely at
odds with any assessment of Britain's long-term national interests abroad. Accordingly,
away from the microphone the BBC was liberated to provide assistance in the pursuit
of government aims in the Middle East. For example, psychological warfare, as the
Suez campaign had ably demonstrated, was a concept that appeared to those in
Whitehall to have come of age, but which in practice fell well short of its intended
objectives. Nevertheless, as plans for Musketeer (Revise) progressed it became
apparent that specific broadcast techniques would be at the forefront of the planned
'Psy-War' against Egypt.834 But where should the military go for that sort of training?
The answer was Bush House where in September 1956, just as the government was
832 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/13 'The External Services of the SSC', 31 May 1956.
833 WAC. R1/85/1, G5 'Censorship in War', note by the Director-General, 20 December 1949.
834 For the orchestration of these plans see, Kyle, Suez, pp.238-240.
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gearing itself to take on the BBC over its perceived inadequacies, the BBC's Arabic
and Greek services hosted a special course on 'radio communications with particular
reference to psychological warfare' for 'twenty Military Officers (Secret Branch)'.835
At the same time, the BBC was fully engaged in the activities of a highly secret
Whitehall group known as the Advisory Committee. Chaired by the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Dodds-Parker, this committee
provided the link between the policy set in Eden's Egypt Committee and the
psychological warfare operations being planned by the Information Coordination
Executive (ICE) which heavily occupied the activities of IRD staff, from which it was
formed. Represented on the Advisory Committee first by the future Director-General,
Hugh Carleton Greene and then Head of its Eastern Services, Donald Stephenson,
from the summer of 1956 Bush House put its expertise to work in pursuit of the
committee's highly covert objectives.
This was active participation in the government's Suez strategy and stands at odds
with existing notions of the febrile and overt tone of relations between the two at the
time. It does, however, point to the Corporation's own extraordinary sense of
constitutional 'duty' at a moment of national stress, through which an understanding of
the wider context of the External Services activities should be read. What it reveals is
an institutional sense of diplomatic, political and cultural guardianship towards the
nation's long-term interests (editorial independence balanced with off-mike assistance)
that had become an essential part of Bush House's corporate mindset and which has
since become an integral part of the public service ecology of overseas broadcasting.
835 WAC, R1/92/6, G84 'Report by Director of Administration', November 1956; R2/9/2, Board of
Management meeting, 'Passes for Entry to Greek and Arabic Sections', 17 September 1956.
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It was these subterranean ties as much as anything in the turbulent weeks of October
and November 1956 that provided a seam of continuity in the relationship between
Whitehall and the BBC. The picture on the more familiar battlegrounds of editorial
policy and Bush House's organisational remit was, however, more fractured than it had
ever been. Yet, just as with questions concerning Britain post-Suez place in the world,
so the opportunity arose to broker a broadcasting 'new deal' between the Foreign
Office and Bush House. And the person chosen to do that - and emblematic of a
change in mood music from aggression to reconciliation - was an old broadcasting
hand, the wartime 'radio doctor', Charles Hill, who had been Postmaster-General under
Eden and then made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with responsibility for
Information Services under Macmillan.
Hill's Committee on Overseas Information Services took up, in terms of methods of
engagement with the BBC, where Christopher Warner had left off in 1950. The style
was a return to hard bargaining within a framework of collective negotiation. At a
meeting between Jacob, Cadogan, Butler and Hill on 14 December 1956 it was
decided that the Dodds-Parker letter of 26 October should no longer be considered as
an ultimatum. Instead, it was 'agreed that the draft letter should serve as a basis of
discussions between the BBC and the Government' .836 The effect was to turn the clock
back nearly a year and to take as their stating point the Drogheda-inspired agenda for
reform drafted by Paul Grey in March/April 1956.
The lack of consultation in 1956 and the aggressive and presumptive manner of
government's behaviour towards the BBC had reduced the Corporation's options to a
choice between capitulation or defiance. In light of its institutional assessment of the
national interest and the lack of a clear public consensus over government policy, it
decided to call the government's bluff and chose defiance. By the spring of 1957 the
836 WAC, R1/24, Board of Governors meeting 'External Services', 20 December 1956.
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fundamental questions over the size and scope of the External Services raised a year
earlier still pertained, but now the government was pursuing a far more diplomatic
engagement with the BBC and a refusal to cooperate was far harder to maintain.
The result, by the time of the publication of the Committee's White Paper on Overseas
Information Services in July 1957 was the final acquiescence by the BBC to a doctrine
of overseas broadcasting that it had been resisting for a decade - one that gave
greater weight to the political and economic requirements of the British government
than to the idea of an independent global broadcaster with a truly global remit. Services
to the Middle East and Far East were to be expanded at the expense of services to
Europe: services in Portuguese, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and Danish would be
abolished while those in French, German, Italian and Spanish would be greatly
reduced.?" In what is recognisably a modern form, the dynamics of international
broadcasting from Britain had been reset and the legacy of wartime broadcasting finally
evaporated.
837 Overseas Information Services, Cmnd.225, (London: HMSO, 1957), para.17.
283
CONCLUSION
Between the end of the Second World War and the Suez crisis in 1956 the BBC
External Services travelled through a cycle of experience that helped define principles
and practices which have subsequently become part of the DNA of Bush House. After
the war the rules governing broadcasts abroad found expression, in the loosest
possible terms, in the 1947 Charter, Licence and Agreement. As a result, the calculus
of overseas broadcasting was assessed in terms of what it meant to broadcast in the
national interest. Not surprisingly, the government's first attempt to re-engineer Bush
House output just a year later revolved around a process of persuasion aimed at
adapting this understanding in light of prevailing cold war conditions. However, in the
coming years this fragile consensus concealed deeper tensions developing between
Whitehall and the External Services, fuelled by ever-increasing budgetary pressures.
The Suez crisis then dramatically and publicly exposed the apparent distance between
the government and the BBC on the practice-based meaning of the national interest.
Yet, at the height of dysfunction in 1956 there continued to exist, a hidden seam of
cooperation that sat at odds with the surface war taking place between the two
institutions.
For both the government and the BBC, looking back from the brink at the end of 1956,
the postwar consensus on overseas broadcasting must have seemed like a figment of
the imagination. Yet with the benefit of a longer historical perspective it is possible to
argue that only after 1956 was a genuine consensus established, based on the
experience of a decade of postwar broadcasting. That forging experience, running
through the full emotional range of institutional and personal relations, produced a
matured set of expectations in Bush House and on King Charles Street. In analyses of
the media, much is said about the ongoing conversation between the broadcaster and
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its audience. For the Grant-in-Aid funded External Services, unlike their domestic
counterparts, this meant the Foreign Office as much as it did listeners overseas. The
deliberations of the Woolton Committee in 1944 and the discussions of Morrison's GEN
81 Committee, resulting in the July 1946 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy,
represent the beginnings of this conversation in its postwar form. Over the next ten
years, and as the vocabulary changed to reflect external pressures, chief amongst
them being the cold war, and internal pressures, such as finance and governance,
Whitehall and Bush House came to a negotiated understanding of the tone necessary
to allow that conversation to continue. Charles Hill's return to a consultative though,
where necessary, critical engagement with the BBC in 1957 was a prime example of
this understanding. The result was the re-settlement of relations into a form of attritional
consensus, a sometimes wearing juggling act, which managed to keep in the air the
political and fiscal requirements of government alongside the editorial and professional
demands of the External Services.
Identifying where this balance lay - negotiating political sensibilities alongside the
editorial and technical requirements of broadcasting abroad - was a consuming
preoccupation of the relationship. Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart, former head of the
Political Warfare Executive and regular contributor to the BBC's Czech Service, had
noted early on that the government's funding of the External Services meant that for
'the cost of a small cruiser you could secure the services of a battle fleet' .838 The
question that inevitably followed, was who got to command this fleet of language
services: the BBC which made the programmes or Whitehall who paid for them? The
original answer given by Morrison, that the BBC would 'remain independent in the
preparation of programmes for overseas audiences' was balanced with the requirement
on Bush House to consult the government on output 'as will permit it to plan its
838 Time and Tide, 28 October 1950. Quoted in Briggs, Competition, p.116.
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programmes in the national Interest.'?" This was a fudqe, albeit a politically necessary
one, that provided the External Services, crucially, with a constitution as opposed to a
contract. In this respect the principles governing postwar overseas broadcasting were
akin to those of case law and relied on a particularly British model of jurisprudence - a
retrospective interpretation of purpose made apparent through the working out of
current practice. It was only when the government tried to unilaterally impose its will, as
it did during the Suez crisis, thereby rescinding this approach to doing business, that
the relationship came under the serious threat of breaking down.
The activities of Bush House were not entirely negotiated though the prism of policy
versus practice. Finance was an equally significant determinant of the shape and
direction of overseas broadcasting. From the outset the gap between Grant-in-Aid
income and rising BBC expenditure grew at a rapid rate. Austerity Britain provided the
economic background against which decisions about broadcasting abroad had to be
measured. Between 1947 and 1952 income had risen by 18 per cent while costs had
grown by 50 per cent."? The problems resulting from this tension forced a cost-benefit
analysis of the global remit of the External Services which led directly to the setting up
of the Drogheda Committee. Ironically, the effect of this was to temporarily relieve the
responsible departments from having to engage with the problem (now under review
elsewhere) and the government's subsequent tentative response to the committee's
final report, demonstrating the genuine anxieties in Whitehall concerning the wholesale
reinvention of its information services, ensured that decisions on the core issues raised
were put into abeyance for another three years. However, by 1956 the disparity
between income and expenditure remained just as acute and with the added strain of
the Suez crisis the delicate balance finally broke. The immediate result was the
government's splenetic assault on Bush House and the biggest challenge to the BBC's
839 Broadcasting Policy, Cmd.6852, (London: HMSO, July 1946), para.60.
840 WAC R20/53, 'Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas
Information Services', 27 July 1953.
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independence to date. In the longer term, though, it led to Hill's far more considered
and far more coherent White Paper on Overseas Information Services, a kind of
second-chance Drogheda, and a settlement that re-thought the strategic priorities for
overseas broadcasting for a generation to come.
Yet for all the domestic challenges, the External Services engagement with audiences
overseas was the defining objective of both the government and the BBC. The postwar
External Services, designed for a world at peace, had had little time to find their new
voice before the course of international relations and developments in Czechoslovakia
and Berlin enforced a change in the broadcasting climate. It was to this end that
Whitehall's new machinery of control, in respect of Bush House, was first used in an
attempt to re-engineer the tone of Britain's voice abroad, and as cold war tensions rose
there was no more compelling objective than to try and influence attitudes behind the
Iron Curtain. How, though, do you communicate with an imagined audience? The
occupation of Central and Eastern Europe by Soviet-backed regimes in the years after
the Second World War had severely limited the BBC's opportunities to access
audiences and comprehend their broadcast requirements. The flood of letters received
after the liberation of Europe, indicating the tastes, aspirations and preoccupations of
audiences, rapidly evaporated under the glare of official censors. Those that did reach
the BBC - perhaps posted on a trip overseas or through a chain of forwarding
addresses - were avidly read in Bush House for evidence of the BBC's editorial affinity
with listeners in the Soviet sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it was the case that the
BBC's cold war audiences could never be properly quantified.
In the absence of reliable and regular sources of information about audience needs
and conditions in reception countries, the External Services were required to piece
together a mind's-eye picture of listeners and the political and social context in which
they tuned into the BBC. Accordingly, this process of triangulation attempted to fit
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together a variety of sources: feedback from British Missions overseas, particularly in
the 'Aside' series of telegrams; collaborative intelligence from other Western
broadcasters such as RFE and VOA; anecdotal evidence from staff trips abroad, as
with the visit to Russia in 1956; and the testimony of emigre's and dissidents, from
Colonel Tokaev to the bedraggled masses leaving their homeland in the death-throes
of the Hungarian uprising.
At the core of this perpetual system of editorial calculation was the BBC's own staff and
the nature of the work they did. The Corporation's open-source collection arm, the BBC
Monitoring Service (in partnership with its American counterparts in the CIA), provided
an unending assimilation of information from the world's media - a contextualised
back-story for the BBC's own narration of events. But it was in Bush House itself, in the
Talks and Features departments, the Central Research Unit, in the editorial selection of
news, in its corridors, and in the individual language sections, that the corporate
understanding of audiences was translated into output. Despite a predominantly Anglo-
Saxon management, Bush House's multinational character (a consequence of the
displacement of vast numbers of people during the Second World War, supplemented
by cold war refugees) offered an insight into, and cultural affinity with, audiences no
longer visible behind the Iron Curtain. In addition, the journalistic endeavour of BBG
staff - the digestion and production of news and the daily intellectual engagement with
the lives of listeners - itself became an intuitive part of the critical assessment of what
tone of voice, or variety of tones, was appropriate for these constantly re-imagined
audiences.
Such judgments were not, however, made in isolation and the political and diplomatic
context of these decisions was an ever-present feature as the BBC's debates with the
Foreign Office's Information Policy and Information Research departments make very
apparent. Indeed, at times the degree of integration between the two spheres, as with
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Jacob's membership of the Russia Committee and Colonial Information Policy
Committee and, later, Greene and Stephenson's contribution to the Suez Advisory
Committee, seems remarkable. Although demonstrating, especially in the case of
certain individuals, the amphibian nature of postwar public service, these ties should
not be taken as clear evidence of a shared outlook and communality of purpose, but
rather as a binding together of expertise on both sides of the broadcast divide to
produce a synergy of aims, often not without conflict, around the idea of the national
interest. The collective editorial result, in terms of communicating with the SSC's cold
war audiences, was a mixture of political and diplomatic drivers, broadcast
professionalism, fiscal restrictions, sociological and behavioural guesswork, shared
cultural identities and the received wisdoms of broadcasting under war conditions for
listeners living under oppressive circumstances.
These dialogues, within and between Bush House and Whitehall, were the meeting
point between what today is sometimes described as "hard" and "soft" power: coercive
diplomacy and the more culturally attuned engagement with overseas opinion. The
result, after a protracted period of negotiation, was the recasting of broadcasts to the
satellite states designed to exploit listeners' sense of indigenous political and cultural
tradition and history in order to emphasise the illegitimacy of their Soviet-sponsored
governments. Or, in the case of Russia itself, to speak as a concerned friend
empathising with listeners' aspirations while discrediting the methods of control used by
their leaders. Nevertheless, the establishment of these cold war broadcasting
strategies (within a peacetime regulatory framework) was an inexact science, with the
potential to engender considerable discord between the government and the SSC over
their application. This, along with the ongoing crisis in financing the External Services,
was the fault-line on which relations between the two rested. At the same time, it was
necessary to acknowledge the limits of this broadcast offensive. While radio was able
to tear holes in the Iron Curtain (despite the best efforts of Soviet jammers), there was
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nothing the BBC, nor any of the other western broadcasters, could do in providing
material support for listeners. This was ably and repeatedly demonstrated in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. What could be achieved, however, was a
sense of solidarity through the spoken word, a social contract formed in the ether
between broadcaster and listener, based on the long term policy, as the architect of the
BBC's cold war broadcasting machinery, Ian Jacob, adroitly described it, of 'acquiring a
reputation for stable responsibility which precisely responds to the needs of Britain's
international posltlon'P"
841 TNA, F0953/1640, PS1011/13. 'The External Services of the SSG', Sir Ian Jacob, 31 May
1956.
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